To compete with China, the US must embrace multilateral diplomacy
By Kenneth C. Brill - April 30, 2023
Despite
bellicose statements and increasing military investments by both sides,
the most active front lines for the U.S. and China run through
conference rooms across the globe, not the Taiwan Strait.
What is
at stake is fundamental to U.S. interests. It will determine whether
the rules-based international order the U.S. and its allies assembled
after World War II will continue or be displaced by one reflecting
China’s domestic governance and international interests — a global order
where autocratic norms displace liberal norms such as human rights and
free elections.
Those
working the front lines between the U.S. and China are diplomats, not
soldiers, and the competition involves multilateral diplomacy related to
the various international and regional organizations and the norms
that, together, make up the international order.
For much of the
21st century, China has paid more attention to multilateral diplomacy
than has the U.S. While the U.S. has talked about a “pivot to Asia,”
China has been pivoting to the world.
At the Chinese Communist
Party’s 2014 Foreign Policy Work Conference, President Xi Jinping noted
an impending struggle for the future of the international order. At the
2018 conference, Xi called for China to “lead the reform of the global
governance system.”
Xi’s words produced action. China has become
the second-largest contributor across the multilateral development banks
and the fifth-largest overall to the United Nations’s regular budget
and for U.N. peacekeeping operations. In 2021, Chinese nationals headed
four of the principal 15 U.N. agencies. China has also become active in
organizations dealing with issues far from Asia, such as the Arctic
Council.
Additionally, China has launched three multilateral
development institutions, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB), which a number of U.S. allies joined over U.S. objections.
Xi has expanded membership in the security-focused Shanghai Cooperation
Organization beyond Russia and Central Asia to include India and
Pakistan as members and Saudi Arabia and Iran as dialogue partners.
China has also launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Global
Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative. The expansion
of the BRI’s and the AIIB’s lending and development activities into
Africa and Latin America, as well as Europe, demonstrate China’s goals
are global, not regional.
These are the kind of actions on which the U.S. once had a near monopoly.
Still,
the U.S. remains the leading global power. It is the largest
contributor to most international institutions to which it belongs and
holds more senior positions in international organizations than China.
Russia’s war on Ukraine has showcased America’s unparalleled ability to
galvanize global resources and action, but it has also highlighted how
the world has changed. Most of America’s traditional allies have
supported Ukraine, but many other increasingly important states have,
like China, neither condemned nor condoned Russia’s invasion.
Past U.S. diplomatic inattention and missteps have created multilateral opportunities for China.
The
U.S. has traditionally prioritized bilateral diplomacy between two
countries over multilateral diplomacy. This is reflected in arrearages
of U.S. payments to the U.N., as well as its history of quitting
international organizations and agreements. During the Trump
administration, for example, the U.S. withdrew from the Paris Climate
Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (a U.S. initiative to maintain
power over China), UNESCO, the Iran nuclear agreement, the U.N. Human
Rights Council and announced its intention to quit the World Health
Organization.
Walking out of multilateral organizations and
agreements is self-defeating for the U.S. when China is looking for
opportunities to displace it internationally. And treating multilateral
diplomacy as a second-tier priority is counterproductive when rising
regional powers, such as India, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa
recognize their agency on global issues and need to be engaged to be
convinced.
The U.S. cannot advance its national security
interests in the coming decades by going it alone or collaborating only
with close allies. Instead, the U.S. must prioritize working with and
through the institutions and alliances of the existing international
order to sustain its operations, solve serious transnational problems
and help constructively accommodate roles within the existing order for
newly significant nations, ranging from China to India.
The Biden
administration’s vow to return multilateralism to U.S. diplomacy is a
change in the right direction. Biden’s National Security Strategy noted
there is a competition to shape the future of the international order
and vowed to sustain America’s leading international role. The
administration backed its policy words with diplomatic action in a
successful campaign for the 2022 election of an American candidate over a
Chinese-backed Russian to lead the U.N.’s International
Telecommunications Union (ITU). China and Russia want the ITU to mandate
national government control of the internet, which the U.S. and its
allies oppose.
This is a good start, but the Biden administration
— and its successors — will need to do more to blunt Chinese efforts to
reshape the international order.
To be effective, U.S.
multilateral diplomacy must be a team sport. Without consistent
congressional support, Biden’s and future administrations will struggle
to out-compete China. Congressional support is required to pay off U.S.
arrearages and keep payments to international organizations current.
Congressional funding is also needed to support a more engaged approach
to multilateral diplomacy and the diplomats who conduct it. Although
Biden and the Congress share concerns about China, there is no sign this
includes a shared view of the importance of U.S. multilateral diplomacy
and the U.S. role in international organizations in America’s ongoing
competition with China.
To lay the foundation, the Biden
administration and its successors should prepare a biennial report to
Congress’ two foreign affairs committees. These reports should address
the challenges facing U.S. interests and the rules-based global order,
the administration’s detailed strategy for addressing them and the
resources — financial and human — needed for the strategy to succeed.
With
regard to resources, the American Academy of Diplomacy reported in 2022
that work needs to be done in the boiler room of American diplomacy for
success on the competitive frontlines of multilateral diplomacy. China
and other nations field their diplomatic best to engage in multilateral
diplomacy and international organizations; the U.S. needs to do the
same, beginning with making clear the work is a high priority and then
training and supporting American diplomats to do it.
While the
State Department responded positively to the academy’s report, following
up on its recommendations will take sustained attention, action and
funding. The Biden administration and the Congress should prioritize
implementing the Academy’s nuts-and-bolts recommendations.
Like
the global economic landscape, the global diplomatic landscape has
changed in the last three decades. The U.S. no longer towers over the
landscape. It has a peer economic and diplomatic competitor in China and
a host of other regional power centers that need to be engaged
regularly. Additionally, transnational and global challenges that cannot
be successfully dealt with bilaterally, such as climate change,
increasingly affect U.S. national security.
Former Secretary of
State George Shultz noted that diplomacy is like gardening; the more
attention diplomats pay to issues and relationships, the more likely
they are to prevent weeds and solve problems.
The Biden
administration has renewed tilling the multilateral garden of the
international order, but Congress and future administrations will need
to keep working the soil for many years ahead to sustain a global order
that has worked better at addressing problems and promoting progress
than what preceded it — and certainly works better than one reshaped by
China.
Kenneth C. Brill is a retired career foreign service
officer who served as an ambassador in the Clinton and Bush
administrations and was the founding director of the U.S. National
Counterproliferation Center within the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.