Over the last year, Saudi officials and their spokespeople have been telling anyone who would listen that their country is central to the global economy, a geopolitical power, dynamic, and the undisputed leader of the Middle East. The response within the U.S. foreign-policy community, especially among Middle East analysts, has been a general collective eyeroll.
The Saudis are certainly flush with oil revenues and have become a source of investment for the global business community. Throughout 2022, world leaders beat a path to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s door in search of everything from weapons contracts and currency swaps to increased oil output.
But this was the result of happy circumstances for the Saudis; they had not demonstrated unique wisdom or political insight. They were in the geopolitical equivalent of being in the right place at the right time, benefiting from the end of COVID-19 lockdowns and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which sent consecutive shocks through global energy markets.
Also, Saudi boasting seemed misplaced. The country was in retreat across the region, after all. Unable to extricate themselves from their Yemen misadventure, the Saudis sought help from Tehran—the price of which was Lebanon and Syria, where the Iranians are now free to reinforce their already considerable influence.
Oddly, it is against this backdrop of dumb luck and failure that Saudi Arabia seems ascendant, especially in the Middle East.
Indeed, if a country can fail upward, the kingdom is accomplishing it. A recent Gallup poll of people in 13 majority-Muslim countries found that Saudi Arabia was far more popular than Iran. Only Turks and, to a lesser degree, Palestinians were ambivalent, though even among those two groups, the Saudis were more popular than the Iranians.
Of course, it is hard not to believe that Gallup is being unfair. Iran is a low bar against which to judge most countries with few exceptions. It harbors hegemonic ambitions in its region and is responsible for spilling a copious amount of blood. Try as it may, the Iranian government does not get a lot of good press anywhere in the Middle East except in Syria, parts of Lebanon, and maybe Gaza.
Even taking all of Iran’s deficits into account, Saudi Arabia’s popularity does seem to be authentic. According to the well-respected Arab Barometer, in Jordan, Saudi Arabia ranks second only to Turkey in the public’s approval. Nearly half of Tunisians view Saudi Arabia—along with France and Turkey—favorably. Iraqis favor Saudi Arabia more than any country except China, and Mohammed bin Salman is their favorite leader only after the United Arab Emirates’ president, Mohammed bin Zayed.
This kind of data is so at odds with the way many Western elites view Saudi Arabia that it raises an important question: Why is Saudi Arabia so popular in the Middle East?
The polls do not tell analysts anything about why people in the region admire the Saudis, but there are clues from a fair amount of anecdotal evidence that the crown prince’s domestic and foreign policies appeal to folks across the Middle East. Middle Eastern interlocutors point to the social changes underway in Saudi Arabia, which are real and important and have affected the lives of many Saudis positively. This is the case even though reform is entirely from above; activists demanding change from below are dealt with harshly, and societal surveillance has intensified.
This is not to suggest that Middle Easterners are unaware of these issues, but on balance they seem to have concluded that Saudis are enjoying a way of life that they like. According to one Jordanian confidante, young professionals are increasingly seeking opportunities in Riyadh, Jeddah, and Neom—the futuristic city and Mohammed bin Salman’s pet project that will require an army of skilled and unskilled workers to realize. For these Jordanians, Saudi Arabia has opened up enough, but not too much for those who still do not want to let it all hang out in go-go Dubai.
This may or may not have been the crown prince’s intention, but it may actually be a hidden advantage for the Saudis. While Westerners focus on the fact that legions of Americans, Brits, Aussies, and Europeans would be unwilling to relocate to the kingdom because alcohol and other vices remain haram, or forbidden, the open yet not bacchanalian atmosphere may be an attractive feature of life in Saudi Arabia for talented young Arabs.
The popularity of the crown prince’s foreign policy may be even more pronounced, however. Given Saudi Arabia’s poorly conceived and executed intervention in Yemen, its leading role in the blockade of Qatar, Mohammed bin Salman’s forced resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri (truly one of the stranger episodes in the annals of contemporary Middle Eastern politics), and the gruesome murder of Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul, it is not surprising that much of Washington views the 37-year-old crown prince as reckless and dangerous.
Yet Middle Easterners seem to have a different view. Instead of a source of regional instability, Riyadh is seen as a force for stability. The kingdom’s considerable investment in and financial assistance to Jordan, for example, provides hope that Riyadh can pull Amman out of debt and help secure Jordan’s future.
It is not just the aid and the stability it might bring, however. According to the same Jordanian friend, the fact that Saudi Arabia is supplying copious amounts of aid is better than assistance from the United States. This perspective is apparently widely shared, especially among young people. It stems from two ideas that anyone who has spent any time in the Middle East in the last five years has heard any number of times. First, Arabs would like to see U.S. “disengagement.” Second, Arab leaders and their subjects want to shape the Middle East rather than allow the Americans, Chinese, or Russians to do it for them.
Because the United States has been the predominant power in the region and because the Saudis have been subtly and not so subtly defying the United States in a variety of ways, Mohammed bin Salman’s middle finger to Washington is burnishing Riyadh’s image. For example, when the Saudis decided—over U.S. objections—to fly aid to regime-controlled Aleppo after the Feb. 6 earthquake, I am told that Syrians were deeply appreciative of both the badly needed aid and Mohammed bin Salman’s willingness to stick it to Washington in the process.
It is the same with Syria’s recent return to the Arab League, which the Saudis spearheaded. My best Syrian pal, who fled the country in 2012—and who loathes Syrian President Bashar al-Assad not just for the destruction he has wrought generally but also for the blood of my friend’s relatives who perished in his prisons—gives Mohammed bin Salman high marks for bringing Syria in from the cold. In this person’s estimation, it is the only way to end the suffering and the only chance to rebuild the country, which will take generations.
Overall, it seems that as Saudi Arabia pursues a foreign policy independent of Washington, people in the region see the country as an engine of prosperity and a regional stabilizer. It is almost the exact mirror image of how the kingdom is perceived in the West. It would behoove U.S. officials and policymakers to take the polls and the reasons—however anecdotal they may be—for the kingdom’s popularity seriously.
If Washington is going to compete with Beijing and Moscow, and if it is going to fight extremists, head off nuclear proliferation, and help Middle Easterners combat climate change, U.S. policymakers will have a greater chance of success if they see the world the way it is. And in that world, Saudi Arabia is a critical economic player, a geopolitical power, dynamic, and popular. Who would have thought?
Steven A. Cook
is a columnist at Foreign Policy and
the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle
East and Africa studies at the Council on
Foreign Relations. His latest book is False
Dawn: Protest, Democracy, and Violence in
the New Middle East.