United Nations for First Time Recognizes 1948 Israeli Ethnic Cleansing (Nakbah) of Palestinians
Juan Cole 05/15/2023
“Article 22. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory [i.e., a Western power] until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.”
b. The rate of migration from the State of Israel until June 1, 1948 (including Jenin and the south, until June 14, 1948):
1. Approximately 180 Arab villages empty.
2. 3 cities entirely empty, and in Haifa, only 5,000 residents . . .
6. Total who left the State of Israel 239,000 . . .
d. The number of Arabs who remained in the State of Israel:
1. No. of urban dwellers who remained in the State of Israel 5,000
2. No. of villagers who remained in the State of Israel 38,000
3. No. of Bedouins (in the Negev) who remained in the State of Israel 60,000 103,000
4. 39 inhabited Arab villages remained in the country (With respect to some, there is no information that they left).
5. Only one of the cities of the State of Israel has an Arab population (Haifa: 5,000 persons) .
e. The rate of migratory movement in Eretz Yisrael as a whole: The number of displaced Arabs is 391,000. (As stated in the introduction, the margin of error is 10%-15%) . . .
The fourth phase: This stage spans the month of May. It is the principal and decisive phase of the Arab migration in Eretz Yisrael. A migration psychosis begins to emerge, a crisis of confidence with respect to Arab strength. As a result, migration in this sage is characterized by:
Major increase iin migration trajectory in Tel-Hai district.
“ “ “ “ “ “ Gilboa “ . “ “ “ “ “ “ Jaffa “ . “ “ “ “ “ “ Western Galilee “ .
Evacuation in Negev villages takes place in this month. On the other hand, the Central Region enters this phase having peaked already, with most villages having been evacuated. Therefore, for the Central Region, this phase is the “final stretch”. Because the number of remaining villages in the Central Region was small, the seemingly significant decrease felt here is no more than the final touch. The only place where a true decrease is felt in this month is the Sea of Galilee area.
4 Conclusion: The mass migration of Eretz Yisrael Arabs took place in April-May. May was a climax and recorded as the month during which most of the Arab migration took place, or, more precisely, the Arab flight.
Causes of Arab migration
a. General . . .
In reviewing the factors that affected migration, we list the factors that had a definitive effect on population migration. Other factors, localized and smaller scale, are listed in the special reviews of migration movement in each district. The factors, in order of importance, are:
1. Direct Jewish hostile actions against Arab communities.
2. Impact of our hostile actions against communities neighboring where migrants lived (here – particularly – the fall of large neighboring communities).
3. Actions taken by the Dissidents [Irgun, Lehi].
4. Orders and directives issued by Arab institutions and gangs.
5. Jewish Whispering operations [psychological warfare] intended to drive Arabs to flee.
6. Evacuation ultimatums.
7. Fear of Jewish retaliation upon a major Arab attack on Jews.
8. The appearance of gangs and foreign fighters near the village.
9. Fear of an Arab invasion and its consequences (mostly near the borders).
10. Arab villages isolated within purely Jewish areas.
11. Various local factors and general fear of what was to come.
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b. The factors in detail.
Without a doubt, hostilities were the main factor in the population movement. Each and every district underwent a wave of migration as our actions in that area intensified and expanded. In general, for us, the month of May signified a transition into wide-scale operations, which is why the month of May involved the evacuation of the maximum number of locales. The departure of the English, which was merely the other side of the coin, did, of course, help evacuation, but it appears that more than affecting migration directly, the British evacuation freed our hands to take action. Note that it was not always the intensity of the attack that was decisive, as other factors became particularly prominent – mostly psychological factors. The element of surprise, long stints of shelling with extremely loud blasts, and loudspeakers in Arabic proved very effective when properly used (mostly Haifa!);
It has, however, been proven, that actions had no lesser effect on neighboring communities as they did on the community that was the direct target of the action. The evacuation of a certain village as a result of us attacking it swept with it many neighboring villages.
The impact of the fall of large villages, centers, towns or forts with a large concentration of communities around them is particularly apparent. The fall of Tiberias, Safed, Samakh, Jaffa, Haifa and Acre produced many large migration waves. The psychological motivation at work here was “If the mighty have fallen….”. In conclusion, it can be said that at least 55% of the overall migration movement was motivated by our actions and their impact.
The actions of the Dissidents and their impact as migration motivators:
The actions of the Dissidents as migration motivators were particularly apparent in the Jaffa Tel-Aviv area; the Central Region, the south and the Jerusalem area. In other places, they did not have any direct impact on evacuation.
Dissidents’ actions with special impact:
Deir Yassin, the kidnapping off five dignitaries from Sheikh Muwannis, other actions in the south. The Deir Yassin action had a particular impact on the Arab psyche. Much of the immediate fleeing seen when we launched our attacks, especially in the center and south, was panic flight resulting from that factor, which can be defined as a decisive catalyst. There was also panic flight spurred by actions taken by the Irgun and Lehi themselves.
Many Central Region villagers went into flight once the dignitaries from Sheikh Muwannis were kidnapped. The Arab learned that it was not enough to make a deal with the Haganah, and there were “other Jews”, of whom one must be wary, perhaps even more wary than of members of the Haganah, which had no control over them. The Dissidents’ effect on the evacuation of Jaffa city and the Jaffa rural area is clear and definitive – decisive and critical impact among migration factors here. If we were to assess the contribution made by the Dissidents as factors in the evacuation of Arabs in Eretz Yisrael we would find that they had about 15% direct impact on the total intensity of the migration.
To summarize the previous sections, one could, therefore, say that the impact of “Jewish military action” (Haganah and Dissidents) on the migration was decisive, as some 70% of the residents left their communities and migrated as a result of these actions. . . .
Jewish psychological warfare to make Arab residents flee.
This type of action, when considered as part of the national phenomena, was not a factor with a broad impact. However, 18% of all the villages in the Tel-Hai area, 6% of the village in the central region, and 4% of the Gilboa region villages were evacuated for this reason.
Where in the center and the Gilboa regions such actions were not planned or carried out on a wide scale, and therefore had a smaller impact, in the Tel-Hai district, this type of action was planned and carried out on a rather wide scale and in an organized fashion, and therefore yielded greater results. The action itself took the form of “friendly advice” offered by Jews to their neighboring Arab friends. This type of action drove no more than 2% of the total national migration.
Our ultimatums to Arab villages: This factor was particularly felt in the center, less so in the Gilboa area and to some extent in the Negev. Of course, these ultimatums, like the friendly advice, came after the stage had been set to some extent by hostilities in the area. Therefore, these ultimatums were more of a final push than the decisive factor. Two percent of all evacuated village locales in the country were evacuated due to ultimatums.
Fear of reprisals. This evacuation, which can also be termed “organized evacuation” came mostly after actions against Jews had been launched from inside the village or its vicinity. An Arab attack on a Jewish convoy (the “Ehud” convoy on route to Ahiam, for instance), or a Jewish Arab battle (the Mishmar HaEmek front, the Gesher front, the attack on Lehavot, etc.), automatically impacted the evacuation of nearby villages. One percent of evacuated Arab locales left due to this factor.
All other factors listed . . . together account for no more than 1%.
General fear. Although this factor is listed last, it did have a sizeable impact and played a significant part in the evacuation. Still, given its generality, we chose to conclude with it. When the war began, various reasons caused general fear within the strata of the Arab public, which chose to emigrate for no apparent, particular, reason. However, this general fear was the primary manifestation of the “crisis of confidence” in Arab strength.
It is reasonable to assume that 10% of all villages evacuated for this reason, such that, in effect, the impact of the “crisis of confidence” was the third most important factor following our actions and the actions of the Dissidents and their impact. Local factors also had a rather marked impact on migration movement: failed negotiations, plans to impose restricted settlement, inability to adjust to certain realities, failed negotiations for maintaining the status-quo or non-aggression agreements – all had an effect in certain areas (for instance, the south), but fail to have any presence in other areas. It can be said that 8%-9% of the evacuated villages in the country were evacuated because of various local factors. . . .