Riyadh police shut down a concert last Friday by Australian rapper Iggy
Azalea after complaints on social media about the “sacrilegious” nature
of her performance and a costume malfunction [Photo credit: X/Twitter]
The crown prince has insisted
that his reforms seek to reform Islamic thought within Saudi Arabia and
“return” it to one that is more “moderate.” However, the reforms that
Bin Salman is introducing appear not to be pulling Islamic thought back
to moderacy but rather to oust it from the public sphere entirely.
A central pillar of Vision 2030 is the redefining of, and setting
limits on, the role of religious influences in society. Under the crown
prince, laws have been passed that have banned the use of loudspeakers
for the recitation of the Quran (including during prayers). The volume
of mosque loudspeakers across the kingdom is now limited
to a third during the call to prayer. The broadcast of prayers during
Ramadan have been banned for all mosques (with the exception of the two
Holy Mosques in Mecca and Madinah). Reforms have been made to the
education curriculum that have significantly reduced the hours pupils spend on Islamic studies, Quran and the Arabic language.
The pace of the reforms has been such that even local authorities are
no longer certain what the law is. When three friends, including a
young woman not wearing the hijab or the abaya, recorded a TikTok video
of themselves dancing on a street in Jeddah, they were arrested
for indecency. After a social media outcry, the three were subsequently
released. The incident highlighted the extent to which the reforms are
outpacing the law and the confusion among the authorities as to what is
now legal and what is not. More importantly, the incident also
highlighted the basis of reforms as being rooted in Bin Salman’s decrees
as opposed to any adjustment of the law. In other words, if the
prince’s word contradicts the law, his word takes precedence.
Islam in Saudi Arabia has been the subject of much debate, not just
in the Western world, but also within the Islamic world itself. Often
accused of being ‘rigid’ and ‘harsh’, the brand of ‘Salafism’ in Saudi
Arabia had drawn much criticism from the rest of the Muslim world long
before Bin Salman became Crown Prince, particularly on issues relating
to gender interactions, permissible forms of dress and the
permissibility of different forms of entertainment that scholars inside
Saudi Arabia deem ‘haram’ or unacceptable, but those outside consider
‘halal’ or permissible.
The argument that Islam in Saudi Arabia should be reformed is one
that resonates with many Muslims and is not considered an outrageous
suggestion in and of itself. However, the framing of the debate within
the Muslim world differs greatly from that in the Western world. Where
Muslims ask for a shift within the Islamic framework, Bin Salman is
proposing [in de facto terms] to oust the Islamic framework from the
public sphere entirely and detach the Saudi identity from Islamic
symbolism.
The Saudi Crown Prince has ordered historians to change the date
of the founding of the kingdom from 1744 (the year of the pact with
Mohamed Bin AbdulWahhab) to 1727 (the year Mohamed Al Saud became head
of the clan), thereby disassociating the kingdom from the religious
fervour that inspired it and redefining its identity in purely tribal,
nationalistic terms. The emblem Bin Salman has introduced to commemorate
the founding of the kingdom makes no reference to Islam and the
infographic explaining the emblem depicts an image of the clan’s
stronghold in Dir’iyyah without any of its minarets.
The significance of these measures however cannot be understood
without an appreciation of how Islam is generally viewed in the Muslim
world and how the perception of religion differs greatly from Europe and
the ‘West’. The modern relationship between the Western world and
religion is one that remains defined by the outcomes of the bitter war
between Europe and the Church; the outcome of which led to the
relegation of religion to the private and personal sphere and the
emergence of secularism and ‘enlightenment’.
The Muslim world however has no equivalent experience of a war with a
‘church’ or high religious authority. Instead, Islam remains associated
with glory, justice, prosperity, and idyllic governance. The pioneers
of enduring scientific advancements such as Al-Biruni (astronomy),
Al-Khawarizmi (algorithms), Ibn Sina (medicine), Ibn al-Haytham
(optometry) are held to be pious men who were inspired in their
endeavours by the Quran. Prolific references to ideal governance abound
in Islamic history: Umar Ibn Al-Khattab, Umar Ibn AbdulAziz, Harun
Al-Rashid, Fatih Sultan Mehmet, Sultan Sulayman are all considered
rulers possessing a high degree of Islamic piety.
It is for this reason that the first free and fair elections
following the Arab Spring delivered religiously-inclined parties to
power, regardless of their policies. People voted based on affinity to
an idea that continues to be viewed positively by the masses. When these
parties failed, it was not considered a failure of Islam but rather a
failure of the parties. In other words the actor was considered flawed
rather than the idea. It is for this reason that liberal parties could
not capitalise on the failures of the Islamist parties at the ballot box
in Tunisia for example, despite the latter’s decline in popularity and
share of the vote.
This is the context within which Bin Salman’s de-Islamisation of
Saudi Arabia should be analysed. His reforms are premised on the idea
that Islamic thought is what hinders economic progress and limits the
political potential of the kingdom on the global stage. Such an idea
resonates in Western capitals on the basis of their own historical
narratives regarding religion. The general belief in the Muslim world
however can be summarised in the second caliph Umar Ibn Al-Khattab’s
maxim:
“We [Arabs] were a humiliated people. Allah has elevated and given
glory to us through Islam, and should we ever seek glory in anything but
that, Allah will surely humiliate us once more”.
Sisi understood this sentiment in Egypt and this is why he sought out
the Sheikh of Egypt’s most prestigious Islamic institution of Al-Azhar
to stand alongside him when he announced his toppling of the
democratically-elected Mohamed Morsi. Libya’s warlord Khalifa Haftar
understood this when he launched his offensive on the capital Tripoli in
2019 as he cited verses from the Quran referencing Prophet Muhammad’s
impending conquest of Mecca. Kais Saied understood this when he seized
power in Tunisia and wrote in his unilaterally written constitution
under Clause 5 that “the sole purpose of the state is to strive to
achieve the objectives of Islamic law”.
The point is not whether their actions were actually Islamic. Rather,
it is to highlight that these measures indicate an implicit recognition
that Islam remains a formidable, if not the most potent, influence in
the region today and that there is an imperative to at least be seen to
be operating within the bounds of ‘Islam.’ More importantly, they also
suggest that Bin Salman’s un-Islamic policies are not necessarily as
popular as is being touted in the kingdom’s lavish PR campaigns.
Perhaps the greatest testament to that is his enduring crackdown on
civil society and religious clerics and the swelling numbers in prisons
indicating that the implementation of these ‘popular’ reforms relies
greatly upon an effective crackdown on the population. In other words,
Bin Salman's reforms that are designed to ‘open up’ society are
dependent upon heavy-handed measures that suppress that same society.