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Ankara is seeking to re-establish leadership over a former sphere of influence at Russia’s expense.
By: Kamran Bokhari
Russia’s
weakening, especially following its invasion of Ukraine, has serious
implications for its southern flank. In the years ahead, Moscow’s
ability to project power in the Black Sea basin will decline, and one of
the main beneficiaries will be Turkey. Though currently overwhelmed by
political and economic problems at home, in the medium to long term
Turkey can be expected to fill the strategic vacuum left by Russia’s
receding footprint in the Caucasus region.
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The countries of
the region are even starting to publicly acknowledge Russia’s decline.
In a Sept. 4 interview with Italian paper La Repubblica, Armenian Prime
Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Russia had failed to ensure his country’s
security from an increasingly aggressive Azerbaijan, which since late
2020 has gained the upper hand in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.
Responding to the claims, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters
that his country continues to be the “guarantor of security” in the
region. Peskov also insisted that Moscow has played a consistent role in
stabilizing the region and will continue to do so. Separately, Russian
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova called Pashinyan’s
comments “public rhetoric verging on rudeness” and said that, rather
than blaming others, the Armenians should take responsibility for their
own actions. A day earlier, the Russian Defense Ministry announced that
it had replaced the head of its peacekeeping forces in the South
Caucasus, the second change in recent months.
The Armenian
prime minister’s comments were extraordinary, especially considering
that Yerevan has long been a close ally of Moscow and dependent on the
Kremlin for its security and economic well-being. Russia’s reaction was
equally telling, reflective of just how weak its position has become –
at least in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, both former
Soviet republics that have maintained ties with Russia. Pashinyan
explained Moscow’s inability to provide for Armenia’s security as a
result of the Kremlin’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war. But the fact
is that the situation in the South Caucasus predates the conflict in
Ukraine.
In the summer of
2020, fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh
erupted once again. Azerbaijan retook territories that Armenia had
controlled since the end of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, which ended
in 1994. The Azerbaijanis were able to force a major reversal in the
regional balance of power in large part due to military and intelligence
support from their ally Turkey. The Turks took advantage of an opening
in what was unquestionably part of Russia’s sphere of influence.
For decades
following the Soviet Union’s collapse, Moscow had been the security
guarantor of the region – which explains why the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict was left frozen in Armenia’s favor for a quarter of a century.
Turkey and Azerbaijan saw an opportunity in Russia’s focus on its
western neighbor since the ouster in February 2014 of the pro-Russian
government in Kyiv. Ankara and Baku realized that Moscow was distracted
and unlikely to intervene in Nagorno-Karabakh – despite the fact that it
had, and still has, troops stationed in the area. Their bet paid off.
When the fighting in 2020 escalated, the most that the Russians could do
was formally preside over the cessation of hostilities later that year.
Russia’s
peacekeeping operation, which began following the conflict in 2020, was
ineffective because Moscow was likely already preparing for the war in
Ukraine, which it believed would strengthen its position relative to the
West or at least prevent its further decline. Nineteen months into the
Ukraine campaign, the Russians find themselves in a far weaker position
given the terrible performance of Russian forces on the ground, the
economic toll of Western sanctions and, more recently, the infighting
within the Kremlin exemplified by the Wagner crisis.
Though Pashinyan
only recently expressed it in public, he’s been watching the Russians
flounder for some time now. His comments show that he realizes his
country can no longer rely on Russia and that he needs a new strategy.
He also understands that, despite the U.S.’ official recognition in
April 2021 of the 1915 Armenian genocide at the hands of the Ottoman
Empire, Washington has done very little to challenge the
Turkish-Azerbaijani alignment in the South Caucasus. Indeed, it’s
becoming increasingly clear that U.S. and Turkish interests are
converging, particularly given the situation in Ukraine. This is why,
despite facing opposition at home, Pashinyan has been trying to work
with the Turks to insulate his country from an increasingly assertive
Azerbaijan.
The Armenians
aren’t the only ones in Russia’s near abroad to realize the tectonic
shifts underway. The Georgians are also closely watching the situation.
They have a lot at stake with the presence of Russian forces in two
breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Any further weakening of
Moscow could allow them to regain control over these two territories.
With signs of growing closeness between Ankara and Tbilisi, Georgia
certainly wouldn’t decline Turkey’s help if it was offered.
For now, the
Turks are focused on leveraging the Ukraine conflict to enhance their
influence in the northern Black Sea basin, which the Russians seized
from the Ottoman Empire in the late 18th century. Since 2014, the Turks
have opposed Russia’s annexation of Crimea, whose Tartar population they
view as their ethnic kin. More recently, Ankara’s role in brokering the
now-defunct Black Sea grain deal between Russia and Ukraine and its
efforts to revive it are a small but key part of Turkey’s strategy here.
Ultimately, the Turks are seeking to re-establish leadership over their
former sphere of influence at Russia’s expense. |