Yet
it is far too simplistic to assume that Vietnam is choosing to align
with the United States. For one thing, although Vietnam reserves its
comprehensive strategic partnerships for a select group of countries,
that list also includes China, India, Russia, and South Korea. And it
maintains other levels of partnerships with many other states. In fact,
such complex and multilayered ties—including with countries that are
themselves rivals—is characteristic of Vietnam’s approach. The
government has long sought to align itself with multiple countries
rather than a single power. At the same time, for Vietnam, it is no
secret that China is both an obstacle to and an impetus for enhanced
security ties with the United States. Getting too close to Washington
too soon could be seen as a provocation to Beijing and would likely
invite some form of retaliation that Hanoi seeks to avoid.
In
this sense, Vietnam’s agreement with the Biden administration should be
seen as an important step forward in bilateral ties, bringing enormous
benefits to Hanoi. But it is not an arrangement that is likely to change
the Vietnamese government’s fundamental orientation. Rather than
choosing between the United States and China, Hanoi sees itself as
reinforcing its omnidirectional foreign policy in which it strives to
keep equidistant from both. Elevating the relationship with the United
States is just another part of that master plan.
FOES INTO FRIENDS
That
Vietnam and the United States have come this far is a significant
achievement. Vietnamese political elites had long resisted such a deal.
For a long time, even after the normalization of ties nearly three
decades ago, they remained suspicious of Washington and its intentions
toward the Vietnamese Communist Party, which has ruled the unified
country since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Well into the
twenty-first century, Hanoi considered the threat of democratic change,
or what in Vietnam is referred to as “peaceful evolution” —potentially
instigated with the support of the United States and any remaining
sympathizers of the fallen South Vietnamese regime—as one of its top
national security threats.
Over
the past decade, however, successive U.S. administrations have
reassured the Vietnamese that the United States respects Vietnam’s right
to self-determination and has no intention of meddling in its internal
politics. In 2018, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, in an attempt to
reach a breakthrough with North Korea, highlighted Vietnam as a model
for how to open up and modernize while remaining communist, and in 2019,
Hanoi hosted the second summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and
the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Although the talks with Pyongyang
were short-lived, the spotlight placed on Vietnam reassured the
country’s leaders not only that Washington accepted their regime but
also that it sufficiently trusted them to serve as honest brokers for
these difficult negotiations.
Vietnam is arguably more exposed to China than any other country.
Geopolitical
changes in Southeast Asia have also provided an important catalyst. In
sharing a land border with China and having a long coastline on the
South China Sea, Vietnam is arguably more exposed to Beijing’s growing
assertiveness than any other country in the region, especially given
that Vietnam has no formal external defense guarantees. China’s flouting
of international maritime law, particularly the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea, its refusal to play by the rules, and its penchant for
flexing its military muscles have alarmed Hanoi. Along with China’s
failure to recognize a 2016 ruling of a UN court of arbitration
dismissing the historical basis for Chinese claims in the South China
Sea, Beijing has militarized artificial islands in the disputed waters,
used maritime militia to menace Vietnamese fishing vessels and Vietnam’s
coast guard, and frequently obstructed Vietnam’s ability to exercise
economic rights within its Exclusive Economic Zone.
Among
China’s most recent provocations was its release in late August of a
new “standard map” showing that most of the South China Sea belongs to
China, in defiance of the 2016 UN ruling. In early September, in what
was seen as a warning from Beijing regarding Biden’s upcoming visit to
Vietnam, the Chinese coast guard used water cannons against Vietnamese
fishing boats operating in the vicinity of the disputed Paracel Islands,
over which China, Taiwan, and Vietnam all claim sovereignty. China has
also used its dams upstream on the Mekong River to significantly
restrict Vietnam’s water supply. And Beijing is vastly expanding
Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base to create what analysts suggest could be a
major overseas installation for the Chinese navy. Assertive moves such
as these have rankled Hanoi, making it feel doubly squeezed—on sea and
land—by its giant neighbor.
Amid
these tensions, both the Trump and Biden administrations set out to
enhance relations with Vietnam. In fact, it was in Vietnam, at the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Da Nang in 2017, that Trump
for the first time articulated the United States’ “Free and Open
Indo-Pacific” concept, which seeks to formalize the sovereign rights of
independent states in the region and limit coercive behavior by Beijing
and which became a prelude to the Indo-Pacific strategy, which the Biden
Administration has further developed. Trump’s remarks referring to
Vietnam’s proud history of independence and sovereignty and to its
current struggles with China over maritime claims were received in Hanoi
as an unequivocal _expression_ of U.S. support.
SEA CHANGE ON CHINA
A
shared perception of the Chinese threat now anchors U.S.-Vietnamese
relations. Under Trump, the United States also went through a drastic
transformation in its attitude toward China. In the final six months of
Trump’s presidency, the State Department departed from its policy of not
taking sides in the claimants’ disputes in the South China Sea and
issued statements explicitly rejecting China’s claims, condemning its
coercive actions toward Vietnam, and affirming Hanoi’s sovereign rights
to exploit natural resources within its Exclusive Economic Zone.
Paradoxically,
although Trump’s disregard for a more traditional values-based foreign
policy may have been detrimental to U.S. relations with democratic
allies and partners, it assisted the rapprochement between Washington
and Hanoi, making it easier for the two sides to come together despite
major differences in their respective norms, values, and political
systems. This convergence has evidently deepened under the Biden
administration, and a rare bipartisan consensus has emerged regarding
China. In July 2021, the Biden administration made its first
cabinet-level visit to Southeast Asia when Secretary of Defense Lloyd
Austin traveled to the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. Two of those
countries were natural destinations: the United States has extensive
defense commitments with its formal treaty ally, the Philippines, and
Singapore has long been its most important security partner in the
region. Vietnam, however, stood out, particularly given that Thailand,
Washington’s other partner in the region, and Indonesia, the region’s
largest player, were not given a similar level of attention.
When
Biden skipped the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in
Jakarta in September and attended only the G-20 in India and then headed
to Vietnam for a bilateral visit, it said a great deal about the
importance Washington now places on Hanoi. And although other regional
capitals may take it as another U.S. snub to ASEAN and its multilateral
gatherings, for the Vietnamese, this prioritization is a sign of
prestige. In formal speeches, U.S. officials stress that they are not
pressuring governments in the region to choose sides. Yet by proactively
strengthening bilateral ties with countries such as Japan, the
Philippines, South Korea, and Vietnam while downplaying multilateral
gatherings that include China, Washington itself seems to have made a
choice: it is working with those that it finds like-minded in regard to
strategic competition with Beijing.
Washington and Hanoi have come together despite vast political differences.
In
some respects, Washington’s new understanding with Vietnam has extended
to other issues. For example, it has helped both countries address the
lingering wounds of the Vietnam War. Traditionally, Vietnamese foreign
policy elites have been more receptive to engagement with the United
States, whereas the country’s defense establishment has been more
resistant, given the personal experience of many of its members who
fought in the war and for whom the legacy of the war holds greater
importance. In the memorandum of understanding signed during Secretary
of Defense Lloyd Austin’s visit in 2021, the United States promised to
help search for Vietnamese soldiers listed as missing in action,
reciprocating for years of Vietnam’s help in finding lost American
soldiers and repatriating their remains since the normalization of ties
in 1995. As recently as 2018, and despite strong advocacy from
Vietnamese and international humanitarian groups, the United States was
reluctant to help clear unexploded ordnance, land mines, and Agent
Orange residue in Vietnam that has contaminated the land and devastated
peoples’ health. This breakthrough signals that the Biden administration
understands the importance these issues have for advancing future
security cooperation.
The
rapprochement has had other effects, as well. The vaccines that the
United States and its partners donated to Vietnam since 2021 were
instrumental for the country as it struggled to cope with the outbreak
of the Delta variant of the COVID-19 virus. Washington is building a
sprawling new embassy in Hanoi at a cost of $1.2 billion, making it the
most expensive U.S. diplomatic complex in the world. The United States
has become Vietnam’s top export market (to the point that it has left
the United States with an awkward $116 billion trade deficit, as of
2022). And as the U.S.-Chinese trade war has intensified, Vietnam has
become a popular destination for multinational corporations seeking to
leave China. Notably, a number of large technology companies, including
Apple, Dell, Google, Microsoft, and others, have invested in Vietnam in
recent years. Conversely, Vietnam’s biggest outbound business investment
so far has been in the United States, with VinFast, a Vietnamese
electric vehicle maker, announcing in 2022 that it would invest a
stunning $6.5 billion in a manufacturing complex in North Carolina.
Nonetheless,
China still enjoys respect from Vietnam’s political leaders. In October
2022, despite a general reluctance to travel and lingering health
issues, Trong ventured to China to become one of the first foreign
leaders to congratulate the Chinese leader Xi Jinping on his third term
in office. And as security negotiations with Washington have progressed,
Hanoi has been careful to avoid provoking Beijing. In what appears to
be an attempt to downplay the significance of the new comprehensive
strategic partnership with the United States and double down on its multialignment policy,
Vietnam has signaled its intentions to elevate its relations with
Australia, Indonesia, and Singapore to the same status in recent weeks.
BALANCING, WITH BENEFITS
Vietnam’s
deepening security cooperation with the United States certainly marks
an important turning point for both countries and will be especially
important in managing its power asymmetry with China. But it does not
suggest that Hanoi is abandoning formal opposition to military alliances
and to hosting foreign bases—two of the key prohibitions in its Four
Nos policy, articulated in its defense white paper in 2019. Hanoi will
always seek to make sure that it is not solely dependent on the United
States and that Washington is not its only choice. Not only it is
seeking to balance between the United States and China; Vietnam also
maintains good—and, when it comes to defense contracts, cosy—relations
with Russia, even since its illegal invasion of Ukraine. So it would be a
mistake to interpret the new U.S. agreement as a prelude to Vietnam
joining a Washington-centered block to collectively contain China.
Rather than taking sides in the current U.S.-Chinese tensions, Vietnam
will always choose Vietnam. Still, Washington can support Vietnam in
ways that also serve U.S. interests.
The
United States has much to offer Vietnam. By helping build up the
country’s industrial know-how and supporting the growth and
diversification of its economy, Washington can expand Hanoi’s options
for resisting Chinese coercion. Technology transfer and training,
including expanding Vietnam’s capacity in maritime surveillance, are of
particular interest to Vietnamese officials. Hanoi has ambitious plans
to stake out a more important position in global supply chains,
especially when it comes to semiconductors, and the United States and
its allies can help Vietnam achieve that goal. Indeed, along with the
joint U.S.-Vietnamese announcement of the new elevated partnership, the
two countries have launched substantive plans for technology investment,
education and research, and other initiatives aimed at building
Vietnam’s digital labor force. Notably, Biden was accompanied on his
visit by the executives of top American chip-making and tech companies,
suggesting that these industries will be a significant focus of future
bilateral cooperation.
For
its part, the United States is interested in Vietnam chiefly in the
context of its competition with China, but there could also be important
economic advantages. For example, Vietnam’s defense industry is
becoming a significant international player, including as a supplier of
semiconductors, defense equipment, and training for both sides in the
war in Ukraine. This sector is of interest to the United States, as
well. Last December, Vietnam organized its first-ever defense
exposition, where it signaled a strong desire to expand its range of
international suppliers and boost its own indigenous production. U.S.
contractors Lockheed Martin and Raytheon had a strong presence at the
expo. Given that the U.S. embargo on lethal weapons sales to Vietnam, in
place since the Vietnam War, was lifted only in 2016, this development
is remarkable.
Is
the entente between Washington and Hanoi sustainable? The answer truly
depends on how hard China pushes. For now, the Vietnamese leadership is
doing its best to make up
for its lack of a formal security alliance while taking care to avoid
overcommitment. Hanoi is thereby turning the country’s vulnerability
into a strength by maintaining relations with both China and the United
States and even benefiting from their competition. If that balance
continues to hold, Vietnam may become a model for other countries in the
region increasingly caught between two powerful rivals.