[Salon] How the United States can rejuvenate the global institutions it created.



https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/11/us-china-russia-multilateralism-diplomacy-alliances-trade/

Essay

A New Multilateralism

How the United States can rejuvenate the global institutions it created.

By Gordon Brown, a formerrime minister of the United Kingdom and the U.N. special envoy for global education.
An illustration shows the Statue of Liberty holding a torch with other hands alongside hers as she lifts the flame, also resembling laurel, into place on the edge of the United Nations laurel logo.
lex Nabaum illustration for Foreign Policy

“America is back.” That was the message from U.S. President Joe Biden, the most internationalist of recent U.S. presidents, speaking at the Munich Security Conference in February 2021. There is a “dire need to coordinate multilateral action,” he declared. But his administration’s fixation on bilateral and regional agreements—at the expense of globally coordinated action—is underplaying the potential of our international institutions, all while undermining any possibility of a stable and managed globalization. Without a new multilateralism, a decade of global disorder seems inevitable.

The great irony, of course, is that the world’s preeminent multilateral institutions—from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to the United Nations—were all created by the United States in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Through U.S. leadership, these institutions helped deliver peace, reduce poverty, and improve health outcomes. Now, with America aloof, cracks in the world order are becoming canyons as we fail to design global solutions for global challenges.

No one but Vladimir Putin is to blame for the war in Ukraine, which, to America’s credit, has brought the whole of Europe together. But elsewhere, the world is suffering from self-inflicted wounds: failures to address mounting debt; famine and poverty afflicting low- and middle-income Africa; an inability to coordinate an equitable response to COVID-19; and an impasse on finding the money to deal with the biggest existential crisis of all—climate change. These crises have left the developing world not only reeling but also angry at the West for its failure to lead.

Anything the international community has done, it has done by halves—and usually too late. It has let people die for lack of vaccines, let them starve for lack of food, and let them suffer because of inaction on climate change and on the catastrophes that follow. Just look at U.N. humanitarian aid or the World Food Program, both of which have received far less than half of the funding they need for this year. World Bank funding for poorer countries is being cut back this year and next, at a time when demands for it to add climate investment to its human capital interventions are growing.

To their credit, U.S. leaders have recognized that old approaches cannot work. The once dominant Washington Consensus now has little support, not least in Washington. In an April speech that the economist Larry Summers accurately called the “most carefully intellectually developed exposition of the administration’s philosophy,” U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan rebuked crumbling, Parthenon-like global structures. Rather, he saw more promise in targeted, precision-guided actions such as the proposed Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, and the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity. Sullivan made only passing reference to the need to reform the World Bank—despite the fact that U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has devoted speeches to this—and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and no mention at all of the IMF, United Nations, or the World Health Organization (WHO). And the premier forum for international economic cooperation, as the G-20 was designated in 2009, did not even merit a name check.

As a statement of a modern industrial policy that recognizes America’s increased need to make security a decisive factor in setting its economic direction, the Sullivan synthesis cannot be faulted. But his intervention was pre-advertised as a statement of “international economic policy” and not just of domestic industrial policy—and in this respect something was missing. This comprehensive speech on U.S. international relations fell short of any plan for a managed globalization. The United States, the undisputed leader of the nearly 80-year-old global institutions designed to enhance international cooperation, seems to be absenting itself from a serious debate about their relevance and potential reform. And as trade wars become technology wars and capital wars and threaten to descend even further into a new kind of economic cold war marked by competing global systems, an America that was, generally, multilateralist in a unipolar world is closer to unilateralism in a multipolar world.

Clubs, large or small, will not give the world the stability it needs.

We cannot reduce international policy to merely the sum of regional and bilateral relationships. What happens if there’s another global financial crisis? What happens if there’s again a worldwide contagion? What happens when droughts, floods, and fires reveal a global action that needs to be taken? What happens if, as U.S. President Ronald Reagan once mused to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, an asteroid is hurtling toward Earth?

A ship in stormy seas needs steady anchors, and today there are none. The world used to be anchored by U.S. hegemony. Those unipolar days are now behind us. But after a unipolar age comes a multipolar age, which requires a multipolar anchor. This anchor—and the stability it provides—must be built on reformed multilateral institutions. Indeed, such an overhaul of the global architecture is the only way to repair a global liberal order that is now neither global nor liberal nor orderly—and to overcome a geopolitical recession that has given us a global no man’s land of ungoverned spaces.

A multilateral reform agenda is all the more important because alternative world orders envisaged by commentators are hardly inclusive and thus not viable. A U.S.-led free trade zone is likely to be opposed not only by those excluded from it but by the more protectionist U.S. Congress. A coalition of democracies would, by definition, have to exclude U.S. allies from Rwanda and Bangladesh to Singapore and Saudi Arabia, which Washington would be loath to do. And a Concert of Great Powers—akin to the post-1815 Concert of Europe—or a G-2 comprising just the United States and China would also provoke an angry response from most of the world’s other 190-odd countries. Clubs, large or small, will not give the world the stability it needs, making a reinvigorated multilateral system a far better way to arrest the slide toward a “one world, two systems” future.

Chinese President Xi Jinping understands well the benefits that can accrue to Beijing from shifts in geopolitical power. Just as the United States has moved from multilateralism to bilateralism and regionalism, China has introduced its own new overarching idea onto the global stage.

A decade ago, China focused on professedly regional structures such as the Belt and Road Initiative, which has succeeded in attracting 149 members, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, with 106 members, including most of Europe, the U.K., and Canada—and which the United States has refused to join, giving the impression it will not join any club it does not lead.

Buoyed by this, China’s focus has shifted toward joint international initiatives, including the New Development Bank and the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Now, China has gone global, reaching out on its own with the boldly named Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative. With their focus on joint action on crime, terrorism, and domestic security, they follow on from what China considers to be the success of its first fully independent global program, the Global Development Initiative (GDI). All three interventions are far more Parthenon-like and certainly more structured and ambitious in their rhetoric, if not in reality. All told, some 60 countries have already joined the GDI’s Group of Friends. As detailed in Dawn C. Murphy’s China’s Rise in the Global South, China is using these global initiatives to build spheres of influence that could one day become a competing global order.

A new multilateralism powered by persuasion and not dictation would bring people together.

And this surge in Chinese global engagement is not passing propaganda from China but an enduring endeavor on Xi’s part—a deliberate display of political ambition and an attempt to present China as the true defender of the international order. Having just brokered a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran to restore diplomatic relations, and potentially end the war in Yemen, Xi has now been sufficiently emboldened to push a peace settlement proposal to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, not to mention murmurings of a leading Chinese role in a two-state Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement, all under the umbrella of upholding the U.N. Charter.

There’s fine print, of course. While China supports the Charter’s commitment to the territorial integrity of states and noninterference in the domestic affairs of member countries, it is silent on the sections of the Charter and subsequent U.N. resolutions that focus on human rights, the responsibility to protect, and the principle of self-determination—and China does little to uphold rulings made by the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court or, for example, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The logical response is clear. Rather than retreating further, the United States must respond to a changing global order by championing a new multilateralism—not the old hub-and-spoke multilateralism that assumed unchallenged U.S. hegemony and could be upheld by instructing allies and suitors. A new multilateralism powered by persuasion and not dictation, and founded on the realities of our global economy, would bring people together through reforming the international institutions that the United States has the potential to once again lead.

Washington has yet to fully comprehend the sheer scope and power of three seismic geopolitical shifts—what Xi calls “great changes unseen in a century”—that are creating a fractured and fragmented world in which Pax Americana is no more. And such a world still requires attention to be given to the provision of global public goods if we are to combat the disruptions that come from climate change, pandemics, financial instability, and excessive inequality.

The first seismic shift is, of course, recognized by Sullivan, at least as far as it affects the White House’s domestic ambitions. Neoliberal economics, dominant for three decades, bequeathed a globalization that was open but not sufficiently inclusive. That economic order, in which half the world enjoyed higher living standards but many in the United States and the West stagnated, is being replaced by neo-mercantilist economics as states redefine their economic self-interest in terms of security protection. Resilience now trumps the old desire for efficiency; guaranteed supply trumps cost; and “just in case” matters more than “just in time.” Where once economics drove politics, politics is now driving economics—as evidenced by the trade, technology, investment, and data protectionism gripping the globe.

The second shift is not so well understood in Washington. Policymakers have failed to wake up to the full implications as the 30-year-old certainties of a unipolar world are giving way to the uncertainties of a multipolar world. This is not, of course, a world that can be described as “multipolar” in the narrow sense that three or more countries have equal power and status—and some writers have therefore concluded that there is still a “partial unipolarity.” Rather, multipolarity means a world of multiple and competing centers of power, with huge implications for future U.S. relationships around the globe. We have seen this at work in dramatic form in the resistance of half the world—most non-Western countries—to supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia. Only around 30 are imposing sanctions against Moscow. Yet another more menacing measure of multipolarity reflecting the growing group of multiplayers, as described in Ashley J. Tellis’s book Striking Asymmetries, is the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons. If Iran secures a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Egypt will all likely seek to go nuclear. And as China’s nuclear weapons arsenal expands from around 400 warheads to more than 1,500 by 2035, South Korea and Japan will need more definitive assurances from the United States if they are not to become nuclear weapon states in their own right. Perhaps more worryingly, an India increasingly worried about China’s growing power is looking to acquire reliable thermonuclear weapons designs, given that its most reliable weapon has a yield 100 times smaller than China’s. All this risks a different kind of domino effect in the form of a deepening relationship between a Pakistan seeking more lethal nuclear weapons and China.

Multipolarity means a world of multiple and competing centers of power, with huge implications for future U.S. relationships around the globe.

Mainly as a result of the move away from neoliberalism and unipolarity, from one hegemon and one hegemonic world-view, a third seismic shift is underway. The hyperglobalization that characterized much of the last 20 years is being superseded by a new kind of globalization. It is not deglobalization, for trade is still growing (not at twice the rate of the world economy, as before, but keeping pace with it). In fact, global merchandise trade hit record levels in 2022. It is not even “slowbalization”—globalization at a snail’s pace—as global supply chains in digital services grew by an average of 8.1 percent annually between 2005 and 2022, compared with 5.6 percent for goods. Global exports of digital services reached $3.8 trillion in 2022, or 54 percent of total export services. As professions such as accountancy, law, medicine, and education are unbundled, many of the technical services that are now capable of being delivered from any part of the world will, like call center work, be offshored. “Globalization-heavy,” the presumption that globalization through trade would make your country’s citizens better off, has been superseded by “globalization-lite”—that restrictions on trade may be a better guarantee of protecting national living standards.

There is a common thread underpinning all three seismic shifts and which appears to bring together these new developments: It is a resurgent nationalism best reflected by the country-first movements worldwide. Even Biden’s “Buy America” label, a watered-down version of the “America First” label of the Trump years, does not seem to dilute this economic nationalism.

It is a nationalism characterized not just by more border controls, more customs duties, and more immigration restrictions but by tariff wars, technology wars, investment wars, industrial subsidy wars, and data wars. Globally, we are seeing more civil wars (around 55 in number), more secessionist movements (around 60), and more walls and fences physically separating countries (70 as of 2019, more than quadruple the number in 1990).

This resurgent nationalism is expressed in an even more aggressive way. More and more governments and peoples are thinking in terms of a struggle between “us and them”: insiders versus outsiders. This new focus on a narrow and not enlightened self-interest has come at the expense of international cooperation at precisely the moment it is most needed to deal with global challenges.

Fragmentation comes at an economic cost, too. WTO researchers have estimated that a “one world, two systems” future with reduced international trade and diminished benefits from specialization and scale would cut real incomes by at least 5 percent in the long run. Low-income countries would suffer even more, with a 12 percent fall in incomes, undermining any hopes of their convergence with middle- and higher-income economies. The IMF has done a similar study, suggesting that global losses from trade fragmentation could range from 0.2 to 7 percent of GDP. The costs may be higher when accounting for technological decoupling. Consider this: Whereas trade between the United States and the Soviet Union remained at around 1 percent of both countries’ total trade in the 1970s and ’80s, trade with China today makes up 16.5 percent of United States’ and about 20 percent of the EU’s imports, respectively.

From left to right: Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Chinese President Xi Jinping, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov raise their arms as they pose for a group photograph at the BRICS summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, on Aug. 23. From left to right: Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Chinese President Xi Jinping, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov raise their arms as they pose for a group photograph at the BRICS summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, on Aug. 23.

Gordon Brown is a former prime minister of the United Kingdom and the U.N. special envoy for global education. Brown is a co-author of Permacrisis: A Plan to Fix a Fractured World, with Mohamed A. El-Erian, Michael Spence, and Reid Lidow.



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