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Atrophy, from the French, atrophie, < Latin atrophia, Greek ἀτροϕία, noun of state < ἄτροϕος ill-fed, not nourished, < ἀ privative + τροϕή nourishment: A wasting away of the body, or any part of it, through imperfect nourishment: emaciation.
Talleyrand was so distracted by the silence of a major Western institution regarding the devastation in Libya last week that he failed to notice two significant interventions: a ‘major’ speech by the current American secretary of state, and a cri-de-cœur by a former UK prime minister, both saying that the West must pay more serious attention to the ‘Global South’.
Talleyrand wasn’t the only one. Neither the speech nor the essay were picked up by most Western media.
Generally such pronouncements are meant to send a message to the like-minded, telling them what they think they ought to hear, in language really only they can understand. Below are some of the main points followed by a translated response for the rest of us.
Blinken: The end of the Cold War brought with it the promise of an inexorable march toward greater peace and stability, international cooperation, economic interdependence, political liberalization, human rights.… But what we’re experiencing now is more than a test of the post-Cold War order. It’s the end of it. That didn’t happen overnight. And what brought us to this moment will be the subject of study and debate for decades to come. But there is a growing recognition that several of the core assumptions that shaped our approach to the post-Cold War era no longer hold.
Brown: The world used to be anchored by U.S. hegemony. Those unipolar days are now behind us. But after a unipolar age comes a multipolar age, which requires a multipolar anchor. This anchor – and the stability it provides – must be built on reformed multilateral institutions.
Talleyrand: There is a time and place for reform. And another for revolution. Pity those who mistake the one for the other.
Blinken: Decades of relative geopolitical stability have given way to an intensifying competition with authoritarian powers, revisionist powers.… And Beijing and Moscow are working together to make the world safe for autocracy.… So when the Beijings and Moscows of the world try to rewrite – or rip down – the pillars of the multilateral system; when they falsely claim that the order exists merely to advance the interests of the West at the expense of the rest – a growing global chorus of nations and people will say, and stand up to say: No, the system you are trying to change is our system; it serves our interests.
Brown: China has gone global, reaching out on its own with the boldly named Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative. With their focus on joint action on crime, terrorism, and domestic security, they follow on from what China considers to be the success of its first fully independent global program, the Global Development Initiative (GDI). All three interventions are far more Parthenon-like and certainly more structured and ambitious in their rhetoric, if not in reality.… And this surge in Chinese global engagement is not passing propaganda from China but an enduring endeavor on Xi [Jinping]’s part – a deliberate display of political ambition and an attempt to present China as the true defender of the international order.
Talleyrand: This contrast speaks for itself. The chorus is capable of defining their own interests and who can best ‘defend’ them.
Blinken: Countries and citizens are losing faith in the international economic order, their confidence rattled by systemic flaws.… The longer these disparities persist, the more distrust and disillusionment they fuel in people who feel the system is not giving them a fair shake.… Any single one of these developments would have posed a serious challenge to the post-Cold War order. Together, they’ve upended it.
Brown: [T]he world is suffering from self-inflicted wounds: failures to address mounting debt; famine and poverty afflicting low- and middle-income Africa; an inability to coordinate an equitable response to COVID-19; and an impasse on finding the money to deal with the biggest existential crisis of all – climate change. These crises have left the developing world not only reeling but also angry at the West for its failure to lead. Anything the international community has done, it has done by halves – and usually too late.
Talleyrand: Bravo, you’re both right. But it ain’t the system’s fault; nor is fixing it the sole burden of those who claim to lead it.
Blinken: The United States is leading in this pivotal period from a position of strength. Strength grounded in both our humility and our confidence. Humility because we face challenges that no one country can address alone. Because we know we will have to earn the trust of a number of countries and citizens for whom the old order failed to deliver on many of its promises. Because we recognize that leadership starts with listening, and understanding shared problems from the perspective of others, so that we can find common ground. And because we face profound challenges at home, which we must overcome if we are going to lead abroad. But confidence – confidence – because we’ve proven time and again that when America comes together, we can do anything. Because no nation on Earth has a greater capacity to mobilize others in common cause. Because our ongoing endeavor to form a more perfect union allows us to fix our flaws and renew our democracy from within. And because our vision for the future – a world that is open, free, prosperous, and secure – that vision is not America’s alone, but the enduring aspiration of people in every nation on every continent.
Brown: But [the U.S.] administration’s fixation on bilateral and regional agreements – at the expense of globally coordinated action – is underplaying the potential of our international institutions, all while undermining any possibility of a stable and managed globalization. Without a new multilateralism, a decade of global disorder seems inevitable.… Now, with America aloof, cracks in the world order are becoming canyons as we fail to design global solutions for global challenges.… The once dominant Washington Consensus now has little support, not least in Washington.… The United States, the undisputed leader of the nearly 80-year-old global institutions designed to enhance international cooperation, seems to be absenting itself from a serious debate about their relevance and potential reform. And as trade wars become technology wars and capital wars and threaten to descend even further into a new kind of economic cold war marked by competing global systems, an America that was, generally, multilateralist in a unipolar world is closer to unilateralism in a multipolar world.
Talleyrand: So much for hands-across-the-sea! Get your story straight, guys.
Blinken: [We envision a] world where every nation can choose its own path and its own partners.… We will advance this vision guided by a sense of enlightened self-interest that has long animated U.S. leadership at its best.… Now, our competitors have a fundamentally different vision. They see a world defined by a single imperative: regime preservation and enrichment.… Our competitors claim that the existing order is a Western imposition, when in fact the norms and values that anchor it are universal in aspiration – and enshrined in international law that they’ve signed onto.
Brown: Clubs, large or small, will not give the world the stability it needs.… The logical response is clear. Rather than retreating further, the United States must respond to a changing global order by championing a new multilateralism – not the old hub-and-spoke multilateralism that assumed unchallenged U.S. hegemony and could be upheld by instructing allies and suitors. A new multilateralism powered by persuasion and not dictation, and founded on the realities of our global economy, would bring people together through reforming the international institutions that the United States has the potential to once again lead.… There is a common thread underpinning all three seismic shifts and which appears to bring together these new developments: It is a resurgent nationalism best reflected by the country-first movements worldwide.… It is a nationalism characterized not just by more border controls, more customs duties, and more immigration restrictions but by tariff wars, technology wars, investment wars, industrial subsidy wars, and data wars.
Talleyrand: We get it: give us a kinder, gentler Empire and nationalism will disappear.
Blinken: Our domestic renewal reinforces, and is reinforced by, American leadership in the world. And that’s where the power and purpose of American diplomacy comes in. At the core of our strategy is re-engaging, revitalizing, and reimagining our greatest strategic asset: America’s alliances and partnerships.… We’re doing this through what I like to call diplomatic variable geometry. We start with the problem that we need to solve and we work back from there – assembling the group of partners that’s the right size and the right shape to address it. We’re intentional about determining the combination that’s truly fit for purpose.… So, we’re determined to work with any country – including those with whom we disagree on important issues – so long as they want to deliver for their citizens, contribute to solving shared challenges, and uphold the international norms that we built together.… That’s what variable geometry looks like: for every problem, we’re assembling a fit‑for‑purpose coalition.
Brown: The geopolitical fallout from these seismic changes gives us a world in flux – or worse, one that is fracturing and in danger of breaking up. The old global architecture that gave us fixed allegiances and unbreakable alliances is under strain… The G-7, not the G-20, is now seen by [Jake] Sullivan as the “steering committee of the free world.” But that leaves a G-180+ feeling unimpressed and unrepresented.… But one-off trade and security deals and playing friend against foe will only get countries so far. Their economic future depends more on a stable international system than on ad hoc and opportunistic deals that suit the conveniences of the moment. Each country for its own different reasons needs a new multilateralism, not an old opportunism.… Today, the United States lacks the power it had in the past to direct these unreformed institutions through the back door when, as most members are painfully aware, the institutions cannot flourish without fundamental reforms upfront.
Talleyrand: Maybe give chemistry a go instead of geometry and architecture. It’s cheaper to try the experiments at home.
Blinken: Together, we’ve committed to deliver $600 billion in new investment by 2027 through the Partnership of Global Infrastructure and Investment, or PGI. And we’re focusing our government support on areas where reducing risks will unlock hundreds of billions more in private sector investment.… Take any recent challenge where nations around the world have looked to powerful countries to lead. At best, our competitors have sat on the sidelines, closed their checkbooks. At worst, they’ve made bad problems even worse and profited from others’ suffering – extracting political concessions in order to sell countries vaccines; deploying mercenaries who make unstable places less secure, plunder local resources, and commit atrocities; turning people’s basic needs – for heat, for gas, for food, for technology – into a cudgel to threaten and coerce them. At this critical inflection point, we’re showing countries who we are. So are our competitors.… That’s why we’ve put forward an affirmative vision for expanding the UN Security Council to incorporate more geographically diverse perspectives – including new permanent and non-permanent members from Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. With Secretary [Janet] Yellen’s leadership, we’re making a major push to revitalize and reform the multilateral development banks so that they can meet the pressing needs of low- and middle-income countries who are facing a perfect storm of challenges: the growing impact of the climate crisis, economic fallout from COVID, inflation, and crushing debt.
Brown: It makes sense for an America that has pivoted to the Pacific to be part of the continent’s biggest trade partnership; however, it continues to give the impression that it will not join any club it does not create and control. And that same unilateralist mindset led to the botched Afghanistan exit that was ordered without any substantive consultation with the allies that formed the Afghan coalition. The United States is selling itself short. The country that led a unipolar world can still lead in a multipolar world, not by issuing orders to its fellow countries as if they were vassals but by persuading them as allies.… And if it does so, the United States – the country that most of the world still looks to for leadership and wants to continue to do so – could and would be the only country able to rally a majority of the world around a rejuvenated multilateralism: global solutions to global problems through global institutions…. What is less under the microscope is the fallout from the loss of U.S. influence in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. The United States could win the battle with China but in doing so lose the war for support worldwide.… Today, it looks as if China has the interest needed to be a global beacon but not the values. America has the values but not, as things currently stand, sufficient interest. Values don’t change overnight, but interests can. It’s your move, America.
Talleyrand: No, America, stop plotting so many moves. Stay still for a minute and think. Your one job is to leave behind fewer disasters than the British did with their Empire as you, inevitably, pack up and go home. Harold Macmillan was only partly right: Romans, do not take your advice from dogmatic Greeks; but at least learn from their example. Please, do no more harm.