Bahrain's Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani, Egypt's
Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, Israel's Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, US
Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Morocco's Foreign Minister Nasser
Bourita and United Arab Emirates' Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin
Zayed Al Nahyan pose for a photograph during the Negev Summit in Sde
Boker, Israel March 28, 2022
For the Biden administration, getting the “China piece” right has
been a challenge with two key partners, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Biden
spoke harshly of the Saudis during his presidential campaign and many
Democratic Party activists think his criticism of the Saudis was right.
The Saudis’ commitment to sustained oil production cuts, the ongoing war
in Yemen, and political repression at home all discomfort many
Democrats. Yet Biden and his team have found the Saudis to be essential
partners on everything from energy pricing to regional security to
counterterrorism, and the rapid liberalisation of some aspects of Saudi
life is a sign that the Kingdom is changing, at least in part in ways
the Biden team finds constructive. President Biden’s awkward trip to
Saudi Arabia in July 2022, and President Xi’s much smoother trip in
December 2022, created a visible contrast. Since then, the Biden
administration seems to have found its footing with Saudi Arabia, with a
series of high-level visits to help advance ties with Israel and open
discussion about the possibility of normalisation.
While the US-Saudi relationship has been improving in the last nine
months, the US-UAE relationship has been growing more tense. Not only
have the two parties failed to agree on terms to sell the F-35 to the
UAE — after the agreement to do so was the foundation for Israel’s
official recognition by the UAE and three other Arab governments—but
tensions over the UAE’s ties to Russia amidst the Ukraine war and to
China have raised the temperature in both capitals. Billions of dollars
in Russian assets and thousands of Russian citizens have flooded into
the UAE and there are widespread reports that the UAE is facilitating
Russian economic activity. Complaints that the Emiratis were allowing
China to construct a military facility in Abu Dhabi, and disbelief at
their denials, raised tensions further. The UAE had grown accustomed to
being Washington’s favourite and most trusted Arab government but much
of the shine has worn off. A perception among Democrats that the UAE was
too closely aligned with Trump and with Republican politics has
lingered. Meanwhile, the Qatari decision to make every effort to help
with the withdrawal from Afghanistan created a debt of US gratitude in
stark contrast to lingering UAE-Qatar hostility dating from the 2017
blockade that other UAE allies have since abandoned.
Iran remains a Biden administration focus but movement is slow. The
administration was never able to resume direct nuclear talks with the
Iranians (it came into office in January 2021, President Raisi came into
office in August 2022 and the timing was never right). Resuming
compliance with the JCPOA was an initial objective of some in the
administration but it has been abandoned. The Biden administration
appears to be pursuing a “less for less” strategy of something short of
an agreement in return for something short of sanctions relief, built on
private understandings rather than public agreements. With the Iranian
economy under pressure, and with the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei in diminishing health, the Biden team seems to have decided
that Iran remains important but is not urgent and the time to negotiate
heavily is not now.
Some of the administration’s stickiest problems are in Israel. Prime
Minister Netanyahu is a favourite of few in the Biden White House but he
is far more palatable than many members of his ruling right-wing
coalition. The president has treaded lightly in Israel’s ongoing
political crisis, although his sympathies are clear. It is unclear
whether Netanyahu has any wiggle room — to push off a reckoning with the
Israeli public, to sustain his coalition, to tack toward the centre and
build a different coalition, or any other course. Meanwhile, violence
is growing in Israel (both between Arabs and Jews and within the Arab
community), the economy is weakening, politics are polarising, and
Palestinian politics are dissolving. Israel could have a crisis on many
fronts.
For Biden, putting an Israeli-Saudi peace deal front and centre meets
a number of needs. On the Israeli side, the prospect of a deal with
Saudi Arabia, which is widely popular in Israel, allows the United
States to press Israel while saying it is merely advancing Saudi
normalisation. For the U.S.-Saudi relationship, serious strategic
discussions have put to rest all of the discourse about the United
States abandoning the Middle East. Like many processes, this one is
likely to unfold over years, and the Saudi aspirations are far above
what any U.S. administration is likely to deliver or be able to deliver.
For the Saudi side that’s fine.
In fact the Saudis feel less urgency than the other parties by far.
First, it is not committed to the principle of making an agreement,
whereas both Israel and the United States have long talked about the
importance of normalisation between Israel and its neighbours.
Netanyahu and Biden also face difficult political straits, and each
could use a win. The Saudi economy is strong and Crown Prince Mohammed
bin Salman believes he will be in power for decades. He can make this
deal today, in five years, or ten. For such a major move, he will want
major rewards. And from a purely political perspective, it is hard to
imagine that he is eager to deliver a political victory to either Biden
or Netanyahu; in any case he may doubt their ability to deliver.
Last Saturday, the Saudi online newspaper Elaph reported that Saudi
Arabia has frozen talks over normalisation because Israel was refusing
any gesture to the Palestinians. Then, on Tuesday, the New York Times
reported that the White House was exploring a formal defence treaty with
Saudi Arabia. It remains unclear whether the contradictory reports of
stagnation and progress are related, or what either might have to do
with the shape of any future agreement. Regardless, we are likely many
steps away from a comprehensive deal.
The US-Saudi-Israeli triangle is likely to be an important, and
perhaps even the dominant line of effort for the United States in the
Middle East in the years to come. Crises will emerge, and some are
likely to displace the talks for a time. The logic of greater
cooperation seems clear to all sides, however, and in the absence of
other US-led processes, this one is likely to be a central dynamic over
many years.