[Salon] MbS’s army: growing signs of discontent



MbS’s army: growing signs of discontent

Summary: the execution of two army pilots signals all is not well in the Saudi military as discontent festers and resentment is quelled with harsh measures.

On 7 September Saudi authorities announced that two army pilots, Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Majid bin Musa Awad al-Balawi and Chief Sergeant Yousef bin Reda Hassan, had been executed.

Their arrest, interrogation, hearings, sentencing and execution all took place in complete secrecy but Saudi media reported that their crime was treason in three forms - high, national, and military.

Opposition sources say al-Balawi and Hassan were executed after refusing to bomb civilian targets in Yemen. They may also have been recorded criticising Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Given that both men came from Sunni tribes who are traditional opponents of the Huthis, the suggestion that they actually committed treason in the sense of collaborating with the enemy seems unlikely.

As we have explained in the past, “high treason” as a legal concept does not exist in Saudi Arabia anyway because there is no such thing in Sharia law, which despite massive reform in Islamic institutions in recent years remains fundamental to the kingdom's judicial process.

While the concept of treason does exist in Sharia, it usually refers to collaborating with the enemy in terms of espionage but it is carefully qualified and does not automatically lead to execution.

No Sharia court could justify sentencing someone to death for refusing to bomb civilians in Yemen, hence the unspecific treason charges. But as everyone in the kingdom understands the courts are highly politicised and serve the wishes of the crown prince’s regime.

The point is to send a strong message of deterrence to other would-be dissenters and prevent Al-Balawi and Hassan becoming the crystal in the saturated solution, the catalysts for armed rebellion against MbS.


Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Majid bin Musa Awad al-Balawi was one of two Saudi pilots executed earlier this month [photo credit X / Twitter]

There have been several attempts by members of the Saudi armed forces to overthrow the regime in the past.

The most famous was in 1969 when around 2000 high-ranking members of the Royal Saudi Air Force were arrested, including 28 lieutenant colonels and 30 majors alongside approximately 200 other officers for plotting a coup d'état against King Faisal.

Their plan had been to bomb the Royal Palace in Riyadh, killing the King and other high ranking princes, before announcing the formation of the Republic of the Arabian Peninsula.

Another less spectacular case was in 1990 when a Saudi pilot defected and flew his brand new F-15 to Sudan. He returned a short time later following negotiations with the Sudanese, supposedly to be pardoned, but instead was imprisoned.

As Arab Digest has reported in the past, today the Saudi army is seething with discontent and dozens of officers and pilots are currently being held in detention.

A trickle of military defectors keeps emerging, some to the UK, while others went to Yemen to fight with the Huthis against Saudi Arabia in the war which has been largely on pause for the past year.

In May 2023, despite being subject to a travel ban, former Saudi National Guardsman Muhannad Al-Subiani defected and made his way to the UK where he told a human rights organisation that while serving in the National Guard he had witnessed numerous horrific violations of detainees’ and migrants’ human rights, in addition to the smuggling of drugs and weapons. (For more on violence against migrants see our 18 September newsletter)

Even more concerning for the regime was the defection last month of Colonel Tarek Al Zahrani who was in the Royal Guard. The Royal Guard’s job is protecting the King and his close relatives, so MbS is fortunate Al Zahrani did not try to take more direct action.

Discontent in the army is not solely accountable to the war in Yemen, intended by MbS to last for just a few weeks after it was launched in March 2015. In the more than 8 years since, the Saudis have not revealed their military losses. (In 2019 the Huthis claimed that 500 Saudi soldiers were killed and another 2000 captured in an operation inside the kingdom.  The Huthi claim was not independently verified with the Saudis declining to comment.)

Saudi soldiers, especially at the lower levels, are generally not treated well and their salary is much less than elsewhere in the Gulf. It starts at the equivalent of £1,443.38 per month, compared to a Kuwaiti soldier’s starting salary of around £1,912 and a Qatari soldier’s £2017, and the Saudi rank and file receive no special allowances.

Before the public prosecutor decreed that anyone who complained publicly would be punished, on several occasions Saudi soldiers broadcast videos appealing to the King for financial help saying that while they were away fighting, their families were facing eviction or repossessions for non-payment of debts and loans.

History shows a disorganised army and a complete breakdown of discipline has been the condition for every victorious revolution. However, there are several obstacles preventing the army in Saudi Arabia becoming the spear tip of the revolution.

Firstly, the military police are extremely active inside the armed forces, looking for any signs of dissent and arresting people like al-Balawi and Hassan.

Secondly, the Saudi army is very small compared to the size of the rest of the internal security forces, which since 2017 has included special forces, the mabahith secret police as well as counterterrorism and anti-terror financing units. State Security forces are also much better resourced with the latest kit and training compared to Saudi soldiers who complain they have to buy their own boots and food.

Thirdly, although the Saudi army is still nominally arranged hierarchically, in practice all communications between ground forces and senior commanders have to go via the Royal Court. This deliberately makes it impossible to coordinate any large-scale opposition involving multiple units.


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