Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Majid bin Musa Awad al-Balawi was one of two
Saudi pilots executed earlier this month [photo credit X / Twitter]
There have been several attempts by members of the Saudi armed forces to overthrow the regime in the past.
The most famous was in 1969 when around 2000 high-ranking members of
the Royal Saudi Air Force were arrested, including 28 lieutenant
colonels and 30 majors alongside approximately 200 other officers for
plotting a coup d'état against King Faisal.
Their plan had been to bomb the Royal Palace in Riyadh, killing the
King and other high ranking princes, before announcing the formation of
the Republic of the Arabian Peninsula.
Another less spectacular case was in 1990 when a Saudi pilot
defected and flew his brand new F-15 to Sudan. He returned a short time
later following negotiations with the Sudanese, supposedly to be
pardoned, but instead was imprisoned.
As Arab Digest has reported
in the past, today the Saudi army is seething with discontent and
dozens of officers and pilots are currently being held in detention.
A trickle of military defectors keeps emerging, some to the UK, while
others went to Yemen to fight with the Huthis against Saudi Arabia in
the war which has been largely on pause for the past year.
In May 2023, despite being subject to a travel ban, former Saudi
National Guardsman Muhannad Al-Subiani defected and made his way to the
UK where he told
a human rights organisation that while serving in the National Guard he
had witnessed numerous horrific violations of detainees’ and migrants’
human rights, in addition to the smuggling of drugs and weapons. (For
more on violence against migrants see our 18 September newsletter)
Even more concerning for the regime was the defection last month
of Colonel Tarek Al Zahrani who was in the Royal Guard. The Royal
Guard’s job is protecting the King and his close relatives, so MbS is
fortunate Al Zahrani did not try to take more direct action.
Discontent in the army is not solely accountable to the war in Yemen,
intended by MbS to last for just a few weeks after it was launched in
March 2015. In the more than 8 years since, the Saudis have not revealed
their military losses. (In 2019 the Huthis claimed
that 500 Saudi soldiers were killed and another 2000 captured in an
operation inside the kingdom. The Huthi claim was not independently
verified with the Saudis declining to comment.)
Saudi soldiers, especially at the lower levels, are generally not treated well and their salary is much less than elsewhere in the Gulf. It starts at the equivalent of £1,443.38 per month, compared to a Kuwaiti soldier’s starting salary of around £1,912 and a Qatari soldier’s £2017, and the Saudi rank and file receive no special allowances.
Before the public prosecutor decreed that anyone who complained
publicly would be punished, on several occasions Saudi soldiers
broadcast videos
appealing to the King for financial help saying that while they were
away fighting, their families were facing eviction or repossessions for
non-payment of debts and loans.
History shows a disorganised army and a complete breakdown of
discipline has been the condition for every victorious revolution.
However, there are several obstacles preventing the army in Saudi Arabia
becoming the spear tip of the revolution.
Firstly, the military police are extremely active inside the armed
forces, looking for any signs of dissent and arresting people like
al-Balawi and Hassan.
Secondly, the Saudi army is very small compared to the size of the
rest of the internal security forces, which since 2017 has included
special forces, the mabahith secret police as well as
counterterrorism and anti-terror financing units. State Security forces
are also much better resourced with the latest kit and training compared
to Saudi soldiers who complain they have to buy their own boots and
food.
Thirdly, although the Saudi army is still nominally arranged
hierarchically, in practice all communications between ground forces and
senior commanders have to go via the Royal Court. This deliberately
makes it impossible to coordinate any large-scale opposition involving
multiple units.