Paul Goble, EDM, 29/9/23
https://jamestown.org/program/china-strengthening-its-position-in-northern-russia-and-the-arctic-sea/
Moscow has long declared that China’s role in the development of
the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is a central part of their strategic
cooperation (see EDM, July 23, 2020; March 28). Despite this, the
Kremlin cannot be entirely comfortable with the recent extent of
Beijing’s expanding activities in the Arctic Sea. Nor can Moscow
be at ease with the Chinese government’s increasing ties with
Russian regional governments in the Far North and along the coast
of the Arctic Sea. If any country other than China did the same,
Moscow almost certainly would denounce such actions as
neo-colonialism. If any country other than Russia did so anywhere
else in the world, the Russian government would make the same
pronouncement. Given the international sanctions regime, Russia
has little choice but to allow China to take these steps. Such
actions carry the risk that the Russian-Chinese alliance may begin
to collapse, with ever-more Russians concerned that Moscow is
losing out to Beijing.
Russian commentators and officials have expressed concerns on this
point with growing frequency over the past several years (see EDM,
September 3, 2019, May 6, 2021, February 1, 2022, March 28, April
4). Since Chinese President Xi Jinping’s summit with Russian
President Vladimir Putin in March 2023, however, Russian analysts
have published fewer articles on China’s actions in the Arctic.
This reflects the difficult position the Russian leadership finds
itself in with international sanctions and the Putin government
increasingly cracking down on narratives that challenge its basic
foreign and domestic policy lines. It would be a mistake to assume
that the concerns Russians have expressed in the past have
disappeared. Increased Chinese activities in the Arctic have
likely had the opposite effect, even if there is less public
evidence of that.
Beijing’s moves in the Arctic since the spring of 2022 have taken
on two basic forms: increasing scientific research in the Arctic
Sea itself (Ru.arctic.ru, September 21) and expanding contacts
with the heads of the littoral Russian regions (The Barents
Observer, September 22). The former is less immediately
politically sensitive than the latter. It is possible that China’s
scientific research may matter more in the long term, as it will
offer Beijing the chance to chart its own course in the Arctic.
This may even be the case with the possibility that China might
establish an entirely different Arctic sea route to the north of
the NSR. As such, China would be able function as an east-west
carrier in the Arctic independent of Russia (see EDM, October 3,
2017).
China has focused on expanding its research efforts in Arctic
waters. During this summer’s navigation period, Beijing sent its
most advanced icebreaker, the Snow Dragon 2, to establish a
temporary research base at the 84th parallel north, far beyond
where the NSR passes. The ship and station conducted research that
will allow for improved weather forecasting and mapping of the
region, two capacities essential to opening the Far North to
shipping (Ru.arctic.ru, September 21). These developments will
allow ships to pass beyond areas strongly controlled by Russia and
may offer the basis for challenging Moscow’s expansive territorial
claims in the Arctic before the United Nations. These claims have
exacerbated relations between Russia and the other Arctic powers
(Window on Eurasia, December 24, 2022, February 23).
Conversely, it is Beijing’s efforts in hosting and then visiting
leaders of the Russian regions on the Arctic Sea littoral that has
the potential to unsettle relations China and Russia. Since last
spring, Beijing has either hosted or sent its diplomatic and
commercial representatives to visit the leaders of Murmansk Oblast
(T.me/andrey_chibis, September 16), Arkhangelsk Oblast
(Vk.com/a.tsybulskiy, May 16), the Komi Republic
(Vk.com/vladimiruiba, May 23) and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug
(Vk.com/juri_bezdudnyi, May 21). The governors were predictably
upbeat about growing Chinese involvement, as Moscow has cut
subsidies to the regions due to the costs of the war in Ukraine.
Beijing is more than ready to provide additional infusions of
cash.
Moscow’s reaction to this Chinese diplomatic offensive has been
muted. The state-owned Russian media largely ignored these
contacts between the Chinese officials and Russian regional
leaders. A meeting in Moscow on September 7 between senior
officials from both countries included the obligatory optimistic
comments but failed to reach an agreement on any of the issues
discussed. This included the future of international organizations
such as the Arctic Council. The only accomplishment of note was
the announcement that the two states would hold another bilateral
meeting in 2024, this time in China (Mid.ru, August 9).
Moscow has a compelling reason for such caution: the influx of
Chinese money into these regions is likely to be followed by an
influx of Chinese workers. This is all the more significant as the
Russian populations in these area are small and declining. This
growing Chinese presence runs the risk of affecting the political
stances of the various regional elites. Chinese migrants are close
to, or soon will be, the largest ethnic group in some regions of
the Russian Far East (Kasparov.ru, September 7; Window on Eurasia,
September 17), a development that will give Beijing the kind of
leverage that Russians have long expressed concerns about
(Reforum.io, June 28; Arctida.io, accessed September 28). Beyond
these regions’ populations being quite small, Russians are leaving
in massive numbers, allowing what might appear to be smaller
groups of Chinese immigrants to have an outsized impact (RBC,
September 13).
Such fears are undoubtedly on the minds of many in Moscow. Yet,
the Kremlin might have a more immediate worry: As China has become
involved in Russian regions elsewhere, it has given the leaders of
these regions the political capital to parry Moscow’s demands (see
EDM, March 9, September 21). If that pattern holds in the Arctic,
Moscow will become increasingly wary and more fault lines will
likely begin to appear in the Russian-Chinese alliance.