Latin American Foreign Policies in the New World Order: The Active Non-Alignment Option
By Manuel Cruz
On Thursday, September 14, the Boston University Global Development Policy Center hosted Jorge Heine, Research Professor, Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies and Jorge Castañeda, Former Foreign Affairs Minister of Mexico, to present the main ideas of their book, “Latin American Foreign Policies in the New World Order: The Active Non-Alignment Option.” In their discussion, Heine and Castañeda explained that Active Non-Alignment is a foreign policy strategy Latin American countries can use to maximize their growth opportunities in the current global situation. The event was moderated by Susan Eckstein, Professor at the Pardee School of Global Studies and Sociology, Boston University, was cosponsored by the BU Center for Latin American Studies and kicked off the Fall 2023 Global Economic Governance Book Talk Series.
As a guide to foreign policy action in a world in turmoil, Active Non-Alignment represents the traditions of the Global South with a sharp eye to the imperatives of the new century. As the book charts the transition from the old diplomacy of the New International Economic Order to the present financial statecraft of the New South reflected in institutions such as the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank and the New Development Bank, it shows there are new possibilities for Latin America. The book argues that greater coordination of regional cooperation is needed to form collective action. Active Non-Alignment provides the tools for these purposes.
Heine began his presentation by saying that “Latin American Foreign Policies in the New World Order” provides an answer to one of the great puzzles in contemporary international relations: why are there disparate reactions to Russia’s war in Ukraine from Western countries and the Global South?
Heine notes that there has not been a unanimous reaction in Latin America, unlike in the Group of 7 (G7). On one hand, the presidents of Brazil and Argentina visited Moscow shortly before the conflict in Ukraine, with Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro, expressing solidarity with Russia. Even though the majority of Latin American countries have condemned the conflict in Ukraine at the United Nations General Assembly, no Latin American countries have been willing to provide weapons to Ukraine, and they have not backed political, diplomatic or economic sanctions on Russia, implying an Active Non-Alignment in practice. Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently traveled to Washington, DC, to discuss continuing Western aid with US President Joe Biden.
The reaction in Latin America is particularly notable when considering the number of Latin American countries that have vocally condemned the invasion itself but have declined to support Ukraine militarily.
To Heine, Active Non-Alignment offers an explanation: as it has materialized in Latin America, the strategy reflects a prioritization of one country’s interests over those of others. Heine explains further that Active Non-Alignment is not simply neutrality, but is far more dynamic, where countries may align themselves with different countries for different circumstances.
He argues this arose from a general dissatisfaction with the so-called rules-based international order, which has done little to address global problems like climate change, financial indebtedness, food insecurity and migration. Furthermore, pressure to support Ukraine militarily may come as a surprise in contrast to other conflicts that may contravene international law, such as those in Iraq and Yemen. Thus, Russia’s war in Ukraine has crystallized attitudes that were germinating long before 2022, catalyzing some in the Global South to turn to methods of Active Non-Alignment.
Following Heine’s remarks, Castañeda offered his thoughts. He highlighted two distinctions: first, that circumstances vary across Latin America and second, that there is a “slippery slope” between Latin American Non-Active Alignment and Active Non-Alignment outside the region, for example with the BRICS bloc of countries.
On the first point, Castañeda notes the differing trade ties between Latin American countries and China. Some South American countries export significant amounts of commodities, such as soybeans, to China and receive substantial investment from China linked to commodity sectors. On the other hand, China has no meaningful commodity-based economic relationship with Mexico, for example. Therefore, Active Non-Alignment is more feasible for countries with more diversified trade relations and not strongly dependent on a particular country, while it is a far more delicate balance for countries like Mexico, particularly considering geopolitical ties with the United States.
On the second point, Castañeda and Heine differed in opinion. Castañeda argued that there is a “slippery slope” between regional Active Non-Alignment and a more global Non-Alignment. Even though the BRICS country bloc does not have a unified global policy agenda and represents countries with very different economic development levels and goals, according to Castañeda, it is understandable for a country to be Non-Aligned, but he does not see how a country can be part of the BRICS and maintain Active Non-Alignment in the conflict between the United States and China.
Heine and Castañeda closed by saying that Active Non-Alignment is not about right or left political positions, but about prioritizing the country’s interests over those of others. They also argue that it behooves countries to keep their options open and not fully align with one side or the other.