I
know this is probably a foolish piece for me to write as it will not
change any dynamics while probably stirring disenchantment with me among
readers on all sides. But having been there before, I simply cannot
remain silent in the face of the renewal of the long running
Israel-Palestine war.
My
2003 book, ROGUE NATION- American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good
Intentions, was written in the wake of 9/11 in an attempt to show the
American public that despite its very good intentions America’s
perceptions of itself and its international role were (are) greatly at
odds with reality and with the perceptions of much of the rest of the
world, and especially of the Arab world.
What
I am seeing on the TV screen as I write now is proof positive that
despite mine and the efforts of many others, nothing has changed.
Indeed, the mis-perceptions, false assumptions, half truths, and
outright lies have only gotten worse. The reporting admits of no
history, of no possible causes other than sheer barbarism, and of no
solutions other than completely wiping the “barbarians” and the people
of their lineage out.
A LITTLE HISTORY
Let me take you back to the beginning of the Arab/Palestinian-Jewish/Israeli
conflict. Some may say, with justification, that it goes all the way
back to Abraham and his two sons- Ishmael (father of the Arabs) and
Isaac (father of the Jews). But today’s conflict really began in the
late 19th century when Jewish leaders in Europe like Theodore Herzl, Leo
Pinker, and Moses Hess began promoting the idea of enabling Jews to
escape the discrimination they often suffered in Europe by emigrating to
Palestine, the ancient homeland of the Jews around Jerusalem which was
then part of the Turkish Ottoman Empire. In reading their early
writings, it is fascinating to observe that they seemed completely
unaware that the area had long been and was then occupied by Arabs.
Indeed, they ventured to speak of “ a land without people for a people
without land.”
Consider
that for just a moment. Either they just did not know that in fact
there were a lot of people there or they did not consider the then
present inhabitants to be people.
As
the project proceeded, friction between immigrant Jews and resident
Arabs quickly arose as it became ever clearer that the newcomers had no
intention of becoming part of the local life, but aimed rather to build
their own separate and very different society. Indeed, Chaim Margalit
Kalvarisky, a one time Jewish Colonization Association manager, once
noted that he felt “compassion” for the Arabs and that twenty five years
of dispossessing them had been hard, but he had had no choice because
the Jewish public demanded it. The Jewish philosopher and writer Ahad
Ha’am noted prophetically, “We have to treat local populations with love
and respect… and What do our brethren in the Land of Israel do (note
that even at this early date when there were virtually no Jews there, it
was being called the Land of Israel)? Exactly the opposite. Should the
time come when the life of our people in Palestine imposes on the
natives, they will not easily step aside.”
World
War I brought a pregnant moment when, in an effort to marshal Jewish
support for the allied cause in Europe and the U.S., British Foreign
Minister Lord Balfour issued the “Balfour Declaration” which called for
eventual “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish
People.” He added that “Zionism, good or bad, is of far profounder
import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now
inhabit the ancient land.”
Of
course, this happened to be at odds with the views of Henry McMahon,
Britain’s High Commissioner for Egypt who was trying to incite an Arab
revolt against Germany’s allies, the Ottoman Turks. He went so far as to
send a letter to Arab leader Sharif Hussein promising independence to
the Arabs in the Ottoman-ruled provinces if they would rise up against
the Turks. Indeed, he even sent the letter along with a person charged
with assisting such an uprising - one T.E. Lawrence (of Arabia).
These
promises collided at the Versailles Peace Conference where President
Woodrow Wilson allowed his prejudices to overcome his devotion to
national self-determination noting that “undeveloped peoples” would need
“guidance” from administering powers under mandates from the League of
Nations. London, having long forgotten Lawrence and the Arab revolt
pushed hard to be awarded the Mandate for Palestine. Wilson’s King-Crane
Commission was sent to investigate local sentiment and found strong
opposition to the Zionist program among the area’s Christian-Muslim
majority as well as a desire for an American Mandate. The Zionists, who
surmised that America would insist on majority rule that would put Arabs
in control, strongly opposed any American presence. ( the Zionists did
not “stand with America” ). Rather, they strongly preferred Britain and
the Balfour Declaration. Wilson went along, and the Brits wound up in
charge of Palestine. (France got Lebanon).
The
Mandate turned out to be unhappy and nothing but trouble for Britain.
As immigrants poured in from Europe with financing from the Colonization
Association, tensions with the Arab population led to frequent riots.
But when the Brits tried to restrict immigration, they wound up with
serious conflicts with the Zionist groups who had significant political
influence in London.
This
all got lost in the tumult of WWII, but with the end of the war,
millions of Holocaust survivors turned their steps toward Palestine.
Fearful of massive displacement, the Arabs resisted further Jewish
immigration, and the Brits again imposed restrictions. But now a new
player named the Irgun entered the game. A Jewish underground army (the
father of today’s Prime Minister Binjamin Netanyahu was a key Irgun
leader) that had been fighting Arabs, it now turned its guns and bombs
on the British, blowing up, among other things, the Kind David hotel
which served as the British army’s headquarters in Palestine. Deciding
that the game was no longer worth the candle, the Brits gave their
Mandate back to the United Nations and left Palestine in 1948.
The
UN proposed a two state solution with Jerusalem internationalized. This
was rejected by the Arabs who declared war on the newly form Israel and
promptly lost the fight, leaving Palestine and Jerusalem along an
armistice line that now constitutes the internationally recognized
Israeli border. About 750,000 Palestinian refugees from the area that
was now Israel were left stranded in camps in the West Bank, Gaza, and
other countries like Jordan and Lebanon. Nothing fundamental changed
until 1967 when the Six Day War left Israel in charge of the West Bank
and Gaza and gave rise to the Israeli settler movement setting the stage
for decades of struggle, terrorist attacks, war in Lebanon, UN
resolutions calling for peace negotiations and various more or less
aimless “peace talks.”
The
first “Intifada” of 1987-89 and the Gulf War of 1990-91 began to create
movement. U.S. President George H.W. Bush called for a peace conference
in Madrid and also for a halt to Israeli settlement construction ,
which U.S. aid was inevitably underwriting. Indeed, Bush suspended
certain aid flows to Israel. At the same time, the election of Yitzhak
Rabin as Israeli Prime Minister led to an agreement between the two
sides in Oslo under which Israel would gradually withdraw its army from
some occupied areas and transfer responsibilities for such things as
education, health, and police to Palestinian governance. The deal also
committed the Palestinians to recognition of Israel’s right to exist and
to renunciation of all acts of violence.
As
long as Rabin was in charge, things moved steadily, if slowly, in a
good direction. But his assassination in late 1995 by an Israeli, I
repeat, an Israeli shooter resulted in what the shooter and his backers
obviously wanted which was an unwinding of the who peace process.
ARAFAT AND DESPERATE EFFORTS
Yasir
Arafat, for many years a major thorn in the Israeli side and even
caused by Israel to be exiled from Lebanon to Tunis at one point, had
been resurrected by Rabin to be his (Rabin’s) key interlocuter for peace
negotiations. Rabin’s untimely death was a huge loss to both the
Palestinians and the Israelis, but Arafat managed to stay in the game
for quite a while longer and during his period of leading the
Palestinians there occurred perhaps the best opportunity for a long
term, peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
I
met him in the summer of 2002 at his then headquarters in Ramallah just
outside of Jerusalem. I had requested the meeting a couple of weeks in
advance and at 3 p.m. on August 10, I received a call telling me that
“Chairman Arafat can see you, but you must be at the Ramallah checkpoint
at 5 p.m. Since Ramallah is essentially a suburb of Jerusalem, under
normal circumstances it should not take more than a half hour to get
there and to see Arafat. But nothing about the West Bank is normal.
About 400 kilometers of special roads are reserved for Israeli settlers
while Palestinians must stop at endless checkpoints to have their
vehicles and whatever they are carrying inspected. It can take hours to
go a couple of miles.
Once
through the checkpoint, my car headed with difficulty to the Muqata,
Arafat’s headquarters. The roads had been rutted and crushed by Israeli
army tanks that were now surrounding the Muqata with guns leveled Arafat
by order of the new Israeli Prime Minister and former Israeli army
general Ariel Sharon who succeeded Rabin. Unlike Rabin, Sharon had no
use Palestinians and certainly not for Arafat.
When
I finally reached his presence at the sandbagged entrance of the
Muqata, I was quite surprised to see a very small man whose hand almost
disappeared in my own more or less average male hand as we greeted each
other with a handshake.
In
his small, simply furnished and telegram/memo laden office he had
gathered the top leadership of his Palestinian Authority team. He was at
pains to explain that he was not directing or instigating terror
attacks on Israel. Noting that the Israeli army had more or less
destroyed all the Palestinian Authority’s police stations and public
offices, including closing Palestinian universities and taking computer
hard drives, he argued that he had little capability to direct anything.
“Bush” he said, “calls for reform and elections, but how can we hold
elections when we can’t even make a telephone call.?” He attributed
recent suicide bombing extremist Hamas and Islamic Jihad organizations
that were competing for the support of Palestinians with his Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) for the support of the Palestinian people
and noted that the more Israel attacks him and undermines the Palestine
Authority, the stronger Hamas becomes.
We
particularly discussed the relatively recent negotiations at Camp David
in July, 2000, and at Taba in January of 2001. In March 2000, then
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (who had immediately succeeded Rabin)
had called President Clinton to proposed leapfrogging the tedious Oslo
negotiation process by calling an all-or-nothing negotiation session at
Camp David. Clinton saw an historic opportunity for an agreement and
perhaps a legacy for himself and bit. It had been the ultimate failure
of these talks and succeeding talks at Tabah on the Red Sea that had
resulted suicided bombings, the election of Big Israel proponent Ariel
Sharon as Israeli Prime Minister and brutal Israeli reprisals. Moreover,
the inevitable attribution of blame had led to a broad acceptance among
Israeli and American leaders of an orthodox view that the Palestinians
had rejected generous Israeli offers because they truly hate Israel and
prefer to seek its violent destruction rather than peace.
Indeed,
Barak had explained exactly this to me over breakfast in Washington DC a
few months earlier. He insisted that he had offered Arafat the deal of
a lifetime: a demilitarized Palestinian state on 92 percent of the West
Bank and 100 percent of the Gaza Strip: the dismantling of most of the
Israeli settlements and relocation of settlers to an 8 percent portion
of the West Bank to be annexed by Israel; creation of a Palestinian
capital in East Jerusalem; custody (not sovereignty) of the Temple
Mount; a return of refugees to the Palestinian state (but not to Israel
proper), and a massive international aid program. Nevertheless, he
(Barak) insisted that Arafat had said “no” and was just performing and
seeking maximum Israeli concessions without negotiating in good faith.
He insisted to me that there is no “truth” in Arab culture and that they
have no qualms about lying.
Very
significantly, he argued that Palestinians don’t believe Israel has a
right to exist and that they see demographics (Israeli birth rate is far
below Palestinian rate) as their main weapon. He insisted to me that
the Palestinians would take advantage of Israeli democracy to turn
Israel into “a state for all its citizens” and then push for a
bi-national state until demographics gives them a majority and thereby
an end to the “Jewish state”
In
another conversation I had with President Clinton’s lead Camp David
negotiator Dennis Ross, I heard essentially the same argument. Ross
didn’t say it the same way as Barak, but he put most of the blame for
the failure of the talks on Arafat. He called Arafat a “surfer” who
missed the “big wave” because he was more interested in surfing than in
riding into shore. Clinton also pointed the finger at Arafat.
But
Arafat said it was Barak, not Arafat, who rejected the Clinton-Taba
peace plan ideas. He said Barak had admitted that he could not sell the
plan to the Israeli public- to with his recent electoral defeat at the
hands of the Israeli hawk Sharon. Arafat added that he would welcome a
settlement imposed by the United States. I took this seriously because
several leading Israelis had told me the only real hope was a U.S.
imposed settlement. Not a “we stand with Israel” deal, but a sincere
American sculpted deal aimed at delivering fairness for both sides.
Saab
Erekat was Arafat’s chief negotiator. A University of California
graduate with a PhD in economics and he pointed to another factor
virtually never mentioned in the normal discussions. I asked him why the
suicide bombings and terrorist attacks could not be stopped and noted
that as one who knew America he surely recognized how devastating each
of these attacks is to any American support for the Palestinians.
His
response was deeply troubling. “Of course, I know that”, he replied.
“But listen to me. I am supposed to be have some authority here in
Jericho, but I am being made more irrelevant day by day. The real head
of Jericho is Lieutenant Allon down at the checkpoint. It is he who
decides who gets into the city and who gets out, whether an old woman
gets to the hospital or not, whether fuel comes in or not. And just as
he is undermining me the guys over here”, pointing to the local Mosque,
“are also undermining me irrelevant by telling the people that Erekat
can do nothing for you and only God can help. Life on the West Bank is
hell. Unemployment is near 80 percent. Half the people are living on
only $2 per day in hovels and must wait at checkpoints so that Israeli
settlers can have priority. The Israelis complain about suicide bombings
and they are correct to do so, but more Palestinians are being killed
by Israelis than the reverse. Every time Sharon orders reprisals and
assassinations, he creates more support for Hamas.
Re
Camp David, Erekat said that he and Arafat had begged Clinton for more
time but to no avail. He further noted that it was the Palestinians who
had made some of the imaginative proposals such as swapping land in
Israel with the Palestinians in exchange for incorporating some of the
major West Bank settlements into Israel proper. The real problem, he
said, had been the rapidly approaching end of Clinton’s term and the
ever weakening political position of Barak which made it impossible for
him to commit to anything in the least politically risky.
Of
great significance is that this view was essentially shared by Rob
Malley, one of the key players on the U.S. side. He agreed that
preparation time was dangerously short and driven mostly by the
political weakness of Barak and the rapidly approaching end of Clinton’s
term. In addition, Barak had not kept his commitment to some interim
steps like withdrawal of troops from the West Bank and transfer of
control of several villages to the Palestinian side. To Barak, this may
have seemed inconsequential because a final deal would incorporate all
of it in any case. But to the Palestinians it seemed like the same old
game all over again.
Clearly there was enough blame to go around. But it was not presented that way in the U.S. media or by the U.S. government.
MEANING FOR TODAY
So
here we are twenty years down the road and from where I sit, not much
seems to have changed. Yes, the attack, murder, and terror conducted by
Hamas was and is despicable and deserves to be severely punished, with
Hamas completely eliminated as a player in the future. But is killing
half or a fourth or even five percent of the 2.2 million people locked
in Gaza with severely limited supplies of water, food, medicine, and
electric power going to achieve that?
Is
it really wise for the United States to be “standing with Israel” in
supporting the conduct of massive destruction and the inevitable murder
of thousands of innocent people? Indeed, isn’t that exactly what Hamas
wants? Think of the propaganda win it will have in the rest of the
middle east, Africa, Asia, and Latin America if by standing with Israel
we effectively condone atrocities as bad as or worse than those of
Hamas. Think of the support this will give to China and its drive to
create alternatives to the G-20, the G-7, and the UN.
There has to be a better way.
Clyde Prestowitz is
President of the Economic Strategy Institute, a noted author on
international affairs and Chief Economist for Cardinal Wealth
Management.