I
 know this is probably a foolish piece for me to write as it will not 
change any dynamics while probably stirring disenchantment with me among
 readers on all sides. But having been there before, I simply cannot 
remain silent in the face of the renewal of the long running 
Israel-Palestine war.
My
 2003 book, ROGUE NATION- American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good
 Intentions, was written in the wake of 9/11 in an attempt to show the 
American public that despite its very good intentions America’s 
perceptions of itself and its international role were (are) greatly at 
odds with reality and with the perceptions of much of the rest of the 
world, and especially of the Arab world.
What
 I am seeing on the TV screen as I write now is proof positive that 
despite mine and the efforts of many others, nothing has changed. 
Indeed, the mis-perceptions, false assumptions, half truths, and 
outright lies have only gotten worse. The reporting admits of no 
history, of no possible causes other than sheer barbarism, and of no 
solutions other than completely wiping the “barbarians” and the people 
of their lineage out.
A LITTLE HISTORY
Let me take you back to the beginning of the Arab/Palestinian-Jewish/Israeli
 conflict. Some may say, with justification, that it goes all the way 
back to Abraham and his two sons- Ishmael (father of the Arabs) and 
Isaac (father of the Jews). But today’s conflict really began in the 
late 19th century when Jewish leaders in Europe like Theodore Herzl, Leo
 Pinker, and Moses Hess began promoting the idea of enabling Jews to 
escape the discrimination they often suffered in Europe by emigrating to
 Palestine, the ancient homeland of the Jews around Jerusalem which was 
then part of the Turkish Ottoman Empire. In reading their early 
writings, it is fascinating to observe that they seemed completely 
unaware that the area had long been and was then occupied by Arabs. 
Indeed, they ventured to speak of “ a land without people for a people  
without land.”
Consider
 that for just a moment. Either they just did not know that in fact 
there were a lot of people there or they did not consider the then 
present inhabitants to be people. 
As
 the project proceeded, friction between immigrant Jews and resident 
Arabs quickly arose as it became ever clearer that the newcomers had no 
intention of becoming part of the local life, but aimed rather to build 
their own separate and very different society. Indeed, Chaim Margalit 
Kalvarisky, a one time Jewish Colonization Association manager, once 
noted that he felt “compassion” for the Arabs and that twenty five years
 of dispossessing them had been hard, but he had had no choice because 
the Jewish public demanded it. The Jewish philosopher and writer Ahad 
Ha’am noted prophetically, “We have to treat local populations with love
 and respect… and What do our brethren in the Land of Israel do (note 
that even at this early date when there were virtually no Jews there, it
 was being called the Land of Israel)? Exactly the opposite. Should the 
time come when the life of our people in Palestine imposes on the 
natives, they will not easily step aside.”
World
 War I brought a pregnant moment when, in an effort to marshal Jewish 
support for the allied cause in Europe and the U.S., British Foreign 
Minister Lord Balfour issued the “Balfour Declaration” which called for 
eventual “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish 
People.” He added that “Zionism, good or bad, is of far profounder 
import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now 
inhabit the ancient land.” 
Of
 course, this happened to be at odds with the views of Henry McMahon, 
Britain’s High Commissioner for Egypt who was trying to incite an Arab 
revolt against Germany’s allies, the Ottoman Turks. He went so far as to
 send a letter to Arab leader Sharif Hussein promising independence to 
the Arabs in the Ottoman-ruled provinces if they would rise up against 
the Turks. Indeed, he even sent the letter along with a person charged 
with assisting such an uprising - one T.E. Lawrence (of Arabia).
These
 promises collided at the Versailles Peace Conference where President 
Woodrow Wilson allowed his prejudices to overcome his devotion to 
national self-determination noting that “undeveloped peoples” would need
 “guidance” from administering powers under mandates from the League of 
Nations. London, having long forgotten Lawrence and the Arab revolt 
pushed hard to be awarded the Mandate for Palestine. Wilson’s King-Crane
 Commission was sent to investigate local sentiment and found strong 
opposition to the Zionist program among the area’s Christian-Muslim 
majority as well as a desire for an American Mandate. The Zionists, who 
surmised that America would insist on majority rule that would put Arabs
 in control, strongly opposed any American presence. ( the Zionists did 
not “stand with America” ). Rather, they strongly preferred Britain and 
the Balfour Declaration. Wilson went along, and the Brits wound up in 
charge of Palestine. (France got Lebanon). 
The
 Mandate turned out to be unhappy and nothing but trouble for Britain. 
As immigrants poured in from Europe with financing from the Colonization
 Association, tensions with the Arab population led to frequent riots. 
But when the Brits tried to restrict immigration, they wound up with 
serious conflicts with the Zionist groups who had significant political 
influence in London. 
This
 all got lost in the tumult of WWII, but with the end of the war, 
millions of Holocaust survivors turned their steps toward Palestine. 
Fearful of massive displacement, the Arabs resisted further Jewish 
immigration, and the Brits again imposed restrictions. But now a new 
player named the Irgun entered the game. A Jewish underground army (the 
father of today’s Prime Minister Binjamin Netanyahu was a key Irgun 
leader) that had been fighting Arabs, it now turned its guns and bombs 
on the British, blowing up, among other things, the Kind David hotel 
which served as the British army’s headquarters in Palestine. Deciding 
that the game was no longer worth the candle, the Brits gave their 
Mandate back to the United Nations and left Palestine in 1948. 
The
 UN proposed a two state solution with Jerusalem internationalized. This
 was rejected by the Arabs who declared war on the newly form Israel and
 promptly  lost the fight, leaving Palestine and Jerusalem along an 
armistice line that now constitutes the internationally recognized 
Israeli border. About 750,000 Palestinian refugees from the area that 
was now Israel were left stranded in camps in the West Bank, Gaza, and 
other countries like Jordan and Lebanon. Nothing fundamental changed 
until 1967  when the Six Day War left Israel in charge of the West Bank 
and Gaza and gave rise to the Israeli settler movement setting the stage
 for decades of struggle, terrorist attacks, war in Lebanon, UN 
resolutions calling for peace negotiations and various more or less 
aimless “peace talks.”
The
 first “Intifada” of 1987-89 and the Gulf War of 1990-91 began to create
 movement. U.S. President George H.W. Bush called for a peace conference
 in Madrid and also for a halt to Israeli settlement construction , 
which U.S. aid was inevitably underwriting. Indeed, Bush suspended 
certain aid flows to Israel. At the same time, the election of Yitzhak 
Rabin as Israeli Prime Minister led to an agreement between the two 
sides in Oslo under which Israel would gradually withdraw its army from 
some occupied areas and transfer responsibilities for such things as 
education, health, and police to Palestinian governance. The deal also 
committed the Palestinians to recognition of Israel’s right to exist and
 to renunciation of all acts of violence. 
As
 long as Rabin was in charge, things moved steadily, if slowly, in a 
good direction. But his assassination in late 1995 by an Israeli, I 
repeat, an Israeli shooter resulted in what the shooter and his backers 
obviously wanted which was an unwinding of the who peace process. 
ARAFAT AND DESPERATE EFFORTS
Yasir
 Arafat, for many years a major thorn in the Israeli side and even 
caused by Israel to be exiled from Lebanon to Tunis at one point, had 
been resurrected by Rabin to be his (Rabin’s) key interlocuter for peace
 negotiations. Rabin’s untimely death was a huge loss to both the 
Palestinians and the Israelis, but Arafat managed to stay in the game 
for quite a while longer and during his period of leading the 
Palestinians there occurred perhaps the best opportunity for a long 
term, peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
I
 met him in the summer of 2002 at his then headquarters in Ramallah just
 outside of Jerusalem. I had requested the meeting a couple of weeks in 
advance and at 3 p.m. on August 10, I received a call telling me that 
“Chairman Arafat can see you, but you must be at the Ramallah checkpoint
 at 5 p.m. Since Ramallah is essentially a suburb of Jerusalem, under 
normal circumstances it should not take more than a half hour to get 
there and to see Arafat. But nothing about the West Bank is normal. 
About 400 kilometers of special roads are reserved for Israeli settlers 
while Palestinians must stop at endless checkpoints to have their 
vehicles and whatever they are carrying inspected. It can take hours to 
go a couple of miles. 
Once
 through the checkpoint, my car headed with difficulty to the Muqata, 
Arafat’s headquarters. The roads had been rutted and crushed by Israeli 
army tanks that were now surrounding the Muqata with guns leveled Arafat
 by order of the new Israeli Prime Minister and former Israeli army 
general Ariel Sharon who succeeded Rabin. Unlike Rabin, Sharon had no 
use Palestinians and certainly not for Arafat. 
When
 I finally reached his presence at the sandbagged entrance of the 
Muqata, I was quite surprised to see a very small man whose hand almost 
disappeared in my own more or less average male hand as we greeted each 
other with a handshake. 
In
 his small, simply furnished and telegram/memo laden office he had 
gathered the top leadership of his Palestinian Authority team. He was at
 pains to explain that he was not directing or instigating terror 
attacks on Israel. Noting that the Israeli army had more or less 
destroyed all the Palestinian Authority’s police stations and public 
offices, including closing Palestinian universities and taking computer 
hard drives, he argued that he had little capability to direct anything.
 “Bush” he said, “calls for reform and elections, but how can we hold 
elections when we can’t even make a telephone call.?” He attributed 
recent suicide bombing extremist Hamas and Islamic Jihad organizations 
that were competing for the support of Palestinians with his Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) for the support of the Palestinian people 
and noted that the more Israel attacks him and undermines the Palestine 
Authority, the stronger Hamas becomes. 
We
 particularly discussed the relatively recent negotiations at Camp David
 in July, 2000, and at Taba in January of 2001. In March 2000, then 
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (who had immediately succeeded Rabin) 
had called President Clinton to proposed leapfrogging the tedious Oslo 
negotiation process by calling an all-or-nothing negotiation session at 
Camp David. Clinton saw an historic opportunity for an agreement and 
perhaps a legacy for himself and bit. It had been the ultimate failure  
of these talks and succeeding talks at Tabah on the Red Sea that had 
resulted suicided bombings, the election of Big Israel proponent Ariel 
Sharon as Israeli Prime Minister and brutal Israeli reprisals. Moreover,
 the inevitable attribution of blame had led to a broad acceptance among
 Israeli and American leaders of an orthodox view that the Palestinians 
had rejected generous Israeli offers because they truly hate Israel and 
prefer to seek its violent destruction rather than peace. 
Indeed,
 Barak had explained exactly this to me over breakfast in Washington DC a
 few months earlier. He insisted  that he had offered Arafat the deal of
 a lifetime: a demilitarized Palestinian state on 92 percent of the West
 Bank and 100 percent of the Gaza Strip: the dismantling of most of the 
Israeli settlements and relocation of settlers to an 8 percent portion 
of the West Bank to be annexed by Israel; creation of a Palestinian 
capital in East Jerusalem; custody (not sovereignty) of the Temple 
Mount; a return of refugees to the Palestinian state (but not to Israel 
proper), and a massive international aid program. Nevertheless, he 
(Barak) insisted that Arafat had said “no” and was just performing and 
seeking maximum Israeli concessions without negotiating in good faith. 
He insisted to me that there is no “truth” in Arab culture and that they
 have no qualms about lying. 
Very
 significantly, he argued that Palestinians don’t believe Israel has a 
right to exist and that they see demographics (Israeli birth rate is far
 below Palestinian rate) as their main weapon. He insisted to me that 
the Palestinians would take advantage of Israeli democracy to turn 
Israel into “a state for all its citizens” and then push for a 
bi-national state until demographics gives them a majority and thereby 
an end to the “Jewish state”
In
 another conversation I had with President Clinton’s lead Camp David 
negotiator Dennis Ross, I heard essentially the same argument. Ross 
didn’t say it the same way as Barak, but he put most of the blame for 
the failure of the talks on Arafat. He called Arafat a “surfer” who 
missed the “big wave” because he was more interested in surfing than in 
riding into shore. Clinton also pointed the finger at Arafat. 
But
 Arafat said it was Barak, not Arafat, who rejected the Clinton-Taba 
peace plan ideas. He said Barak had admitted that he could not sell the 
plan to the Israeli public- to with his recent electoral defeat at the 
hands of the Israeli hawk Sharon. Arafat added that he would welcome a 
settlement imposed by the United States. I took this seriously because 
several leading Israelis had told me the only real hope was a U.S. 
imposed settlement. Not a “we stand with Israel” deal, but a sincere 
American sculpted deal aimed at delivering fairness for both sides.
Saab
 Erekat was Arafat’s chief negotiator. A University of  California 
graduate with a PhD in economics and he pointed to another factor 
virtually never mentioned in the normal discussions. I asked him why the
 suicide bombings and terrorist attacks could not be stopped and noted 
that as one who knew America he surely recognized how devastating each 
of these attacks is to any American support for the Palestinians.
His
 response was deeply troubling. “Of course, I know that”, he replied. 
“But listen to me. I am supposed to be have some authority here in 
Jericho, but I am being made more irrelevant day by day. The real head 
of Jericho is Lieutenant Allon down at the checkpoint. It is he who 
decides who gets into the city and who gets out, whether an old woman 
gets to the hospital or not, whether fuel comes in or not. And just as 
he is undermining me the guys over here”, pointing to the local Mosque, 
“are also undermining me irrelevant by telling the people that Erekat 
can do nothing for you and only God can help. Life on the West Bank is 
hell. Unemployment is near 80 percent. Half the people are living on 
only $2 per day in hovels and must wait at checkpoints so that Israeli 
settlers can have priority. The Israelis complain about suicide bombings
 and they are correct to do so, but more Palestinians are being killed 
by Israelis than the reverse. Every time Sharon orders reprisals and 
assassinations, he creates more support for Hamas. 
Re
 Camp David, Erekat said that he and Arafat had begged Clinton for more 
time but to no avail. He further noted that it was the Palestinians who 
had made some of the imaginative proposals such as swapping land in 
Israel with the Palestinians in exchange for incorporating some of the 
major West Bank settlements into Israel proper. The real problem, he 
said, had been the rapidly approaching end of Clinton’s term and the 
ever weakening political position of Barak which made it impossible for 
him to commit to anything in the least politically risky. 
Of
 great significance is that this view was essentially shared by Rob 
Malley, one of the key players on the U.S. side. He agreed that 
preparation time was dangerously short and driven mostly by the 
political weakness of Barak and the rapidly approaching end of Clinton’s
 term. In addition, Barak had not kept his commitment to some interim 
steps like withdrawal of troops from the West Bank and transfer of 
control of several villages to the Palestinian side. To Barak, this may 
have seemed inconsequential because a final deal would incorporate all 
of it in any case. But to the Palestinians it seemed like the same old 
game all over again. 
Clearly there was enough blame to go around. But it was not presented that way in the U.S. media or by the U.S. government. 
MEANING FOR TODAY
So
 here we are twenty years down the road and from where I sit, not much 
seems to have changed. Yes, the attack, murder, and terror conducted by 
Hamas was and is despicable and deserves to be severely punished, with 
Hamas completely eliminated as a player in the future. But is killing 
half or a fourth or even five percent of the 2.2 million people locked 
in Gaza with severely limited supplies of water, food, medicine, and 
electric power going to achieve that?
Is
 it really wise for the United States to be “standing with Israel” in 
supporting the conduct of massive destruction and the inevitable murder 
of thousands of innocent people? Indeed, isn’t that exactly what Hamas 
wants? Think of the propaganda win it will have in the rest of the 
middle east, Africa, Asia, and Latin America if by standing with Israel 
we effectively condone atrocities as bad as or worse than those of 
Hamas. Think of the support this will give to China and its drive to 
create alternatives to the G-20, the G-7, and the UN. 
There has to be a better way. 
                                                Clyde Prestowitz is 
President of the Economic Strategy Institute, a noted author on 
international affairs and Chief Economist for Cardinal Wealth 
Management.