If You Want Peace, Prepare for War — and Diplomacy
By Robert Einhorn - October 16, 2023
At
this Kim Dae-jung Peace Forum, it’s useful to recall seemingly
paradoxical advice offered by a fourth-century Roman general: Si vis
pacem, para bellum. “If you want peace, prepare for war.”
This
Roman-era aphorism has come to mean that if you face an aggressive
adversary, build your military strength so that the adversary knows
that, if it launches an attack, it will receive a punishing response —
and will therefore be discouraged from pursuing such an attack. The idea
of achieving peace by preparing for war has been a critical foundation
of security strategies for many centuries. Today we call it
“deterrence.”
Of course, not all countries prepare for war in
order to have peace. Some have prepared for war as a prelude to waging
war. Hitler built the Nazi war machine to conquer Europe and beyond. But
for countries genuinely seeking peace and facing significant security
threats from well-armed adversaries, building countervailing military
strength has usually been the chosen strategy. They feared that failure
to build and maintain adequate deterrent capabilities would signal
weakness and might only invite aggression.
Deterrence — or peace
through strength, as it is sometimes called — has stood the test of time
because it is widely believed to have worked. Deterrence of the Soviet
Union by the United States and its NATO allies during the Cold War is
credited with avoiding a major East-West conflict.
But a strategy
of deterrence is not without risks. Strengthening defenses to deter an
adversary may be interpreted by that adversary as an indication of
aggressive intent and a serious threat to its own security. It may
respond by further building up its own capabilities. The result may be
an expensive and destabilizing arms race — one that reinforces mutual
antagonisms, perpetuates a state of confrontation, and makes resolution
of the underlying conflict even more difficult.
In addition, as
both sides build up their military capabilities, they may declare
policies, test weapon systems, or engage in exercises or deployments
that the other side views as preparations for the use of force, even
preemptive use of nuclear weapons. In such an environment, the risk of
armed conflict breaking out as a result of accidents, misperceptions, or
miscalculations would grow.
Moreover, even if a mutual military
buildup does not result in large-scale armed hostilities, it would not
necessarily prevent lower-level provocations. Indeed, an aggressor’s
belief that it could deter large-scale retaliation could increase its
confidence that it could engage in lower-level provocations with
impunity.
To avoid war and ultimately achieve peace, deterrence should be accompanied by diplomacy.
During
the Cold War, while amassing huge nuclear arsenals to deter each other,
the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in diplomacy to moderate
and stabilize their competition, limit and reduce their nuclear forces,
adopt transparency and confidence-building measures to avoid dangerous
miscalculations, and in general prevent their competition from getting
out of control.
Yes, if you want peace, prepare for war. But also pursue diplomacy.
So, how do these considerations apply to matters of war and peace on the contemporary Korean Peninsula?
North Korea's growing capabilities
Seventy
years after the Korean Armistice Agreement, hope for genuine peace on
the peninsula continues to fade. In recent years, the security
environment has dramatically deteriorated. The primary cause of
increased tension and instability has been North Korea’s relentless
efforts to expand and diversify its nuclear and missile capabilities.
Under
Kim Jong Un, this rapidly growing nuclear arsenal has been accompanied
by inflammatory rhetoric toward Seoul and Washington, including the
North’s often-declared willingness to use nuclear weapons preemptively.
What
is Kim’s motivation for his aggressive nuclear posture? Is it
essentially defensive — to ensure the survival of his regime from
foreign interference or attack? Or is it essentially offensive — to
intimidate and coerce South Korea and reunify the peninsula under
Pyongyang’s control? Of course, we don’t know. We can only speculate.
North
Korea’s initial motivation for pursuing nuclear weapons may well have
been defensive — to deter what it perceived as foreign, mainly U.S.,
efforts to undermine or eliminate its regime. But whatever its initial
motivation, Kim may now feel emboldened by his increased capabilities to
pursue more offensive objectives.
Most observers doubt that Kim
sees reunification of the peninsula by force as a realistic possibility.
But he may now feel he can dominate inter-Korean relations, drive
wedges in the U.S.-South Korean alliance, and engage in increasingly
aggressive provocations. And he may become dangerously overconfident in
his ability to control the risks of escalation.
South Korea and
the United States have become increasingly alarmed by the growing threat
from North Korea. South Korean concerns have been magnified by
uncertainty about the reliability of U.S. security guarantees.
U.S.-South Korean response: Prioritizing deterrence
The main allied response to the North Korean threat has been to boost their collective deterrent capabilities.
At
the highest political levels, the administrations of President Yoon Suk
Yeol and President Joe Biden have worked together closely to
demonstrate strong alliance solidarity and resolve. Seoul has augmented
its own conventional capabilities, including its three-axis strategy.
South Korea and the United States have taken significant steps to
reinforce the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent and to
give South Korea a more prominent role in the planning and execution of
that deterrent — most notably in the Washington Declaration adopted
during Yoon’s state visit to Washington in April. And together with
Japan, the allies have boosted trilateral defense cooperation in
unprecedented ways, as agreed at the recent Camp David summit.
While
prioritizing deterrence, the allies have also sought diplomatic
engagement — reaching out repeatedly to Pyongyang to begin talks. But
all those initiatives were rebuffed by the North.
In
the absence of diplomacy, the situation is becoming more dangerous.
North Korea continues to advance its threatening capabilities. The
allies continue to strengthen their deterrent — with large-scale,
live-fire joint defense drills and high-profile visits of U.S. strategic
assets, including a port visit by
a U.S. ballistic missile submarine. Pyongyang, in turn, condemns those
allied efforts, which it claims are preparations for attacking the
North. It says those efforts justify the further acceleration of its own
programs and even its preemptive nuclear doctrine.
Risk reduction: The most immediate objective
So,
what can be done to break this downward spiral? I think it may be time
for a renewed push for diplomacy. But to get talks underway, a somewhat
different approach may be required.
I believe the major reason
Kim Jong Un has so far rejected engagement has been his desire to avoid
talks that might interfere with the completion of his ambitious
five-year plan to develop and test key nuclear and missile capabilities.
But
another reason may be what Washington and Seoul declare must be the
focus of any negotiation — namely, the North’s complete
denuclearization. Kim has made it clear that he has no intention of
eliminating what he regards as essential to the survival of his regime.
He says repeatedly that North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons is irreversible and non-negotiable.
If
Pyongyang eventually gets rid of its nuclear weapons, it will be the
result of either a fundamental transformation of the current regime’s
policies and values or its collapse.
Neither outcome can be
dismissed altogether, especially the regime’s eventual collapse. But we
can’t count on either one, at least not in the near term. Realistically,
we will have to live with North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons
for the foreseeable future.
The United States and its allies
can’t accept the North as a legitimate nuclear-armed country. It
acquired nuclear weapons illegally and deceitfully. Accepting its
nuclear capability would set a dangerous precedent that is damaging to
the global nonproliferation regime.
So, the United States and its
allies should continue to adhere to the ultimate goal of the complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. But for now, they should focus
on the most immediate threat — the risk of intentional or inadvertent
armed conflict that could escalate to the nuclear level.
The
United States and the South should therefore approach the North and
propose setting aside denuclearization for the time being and focusing
instead on a risk reduction agenda — primarily confidence-building,
transparency, and communications measures that can enhance
predictability and reduce the risks of armed conflict resulting from
accident, misperception, or miscalculation. Negotiations could take
place bilaterally, trilaterally, or in a multilateral regional format,
perhaps involving the countries that participated in the Six-Party
Talks.
Participants
might be required to reaffirm the goal of complete denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula — a goal Kim Jong Un supported in the 2018 Singapore Joint Statement —
although participants would presumably continue to differ on the
conditions that would make the attainment of that goal possible.
The risk reduction measures that might be considered in such talks could include:
- prenotification of flight tests of several categories of missiles.
- prenotification of land, sea, and air military exercises meeting certain agreed-upon criteria.
- avoidance of military activities in specified geographic areas (for example, no-fly zones or maritime buffer zones).
- the establishment of routine and crisis communications channels.
- the resurrection of several confidence-building steps contained in the moribund North-South Comprehensive Military Agreement.
- the adoption of so-called “rules of the road” to prevent provocative cyber activities.
- the
toning down of inflammatory rhetoric (including threats to use nuclear
weapons preemptively or to launch decapitation strikes against an
adversary’s leadership).
- the creation of what might be called
“risk reduction dialogues” where civilian and military officials would
meet regularly to raise concerns about another country’s military
activities and seek measures to address those concerns.
Such
risk reduction measures would not bring peace to the Korean Peninsula.
Neither would they ensure progress toward denuclearization or remove the
need for current U.S. and South Korean efforts to strengthen deterrence
and maintain allied military readiness.
Moreover, North Korea’s
willingness to engage on risk reduction measures is far from certain. It
may believe that maintaining risks at a high level serves its interests
by discouraging the United States and its allies from conducting
military activities that could increase the likelihood of conflict. Or
it may decide to engage but condition its support for risk reduction
measures on unacceptable concessions from the allies.
Still, in
light of the huge stakes, it is worth a try. Risk reduction measures
along these lines — together with a determined allied effort to
reinforce deterrence — could help arrest or even reverse the current
downward spiral on the peninsula. They could reduce each side’s
incentives for pursuing an open-ended arms competition. Perhaps most
importantly, they could help alleviate one of the most acute threats on
the peninsula today — the risk of inadvertent armed conflict that could
escalate to nuclear war.
And if faithfully implemented, such
measures could reduce tensions, build habits of constructive engagement,
pave the way for practical steps to reduce the North Korean nuclear
threat — and at least keep alive the hope, however remote today, of a
nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula living in peace.
“If you
want peace, prepare for war.” There’s much truth in that age-old advice.
Deterrence may well be a necessary condition for achieving peace — or
at least avoiding war.
But it’s only a partial truth. Deterrence
may be necessary, but it’s not sufficient. It must be accompanied by
diplomacy. And there’s an increasingly urgent need for diplomacy on the
Korean Peninsula — diplomacy with realistically achievable and
critically important goals.