There are no easy fixes or exit ramps here. Such is the scale of atrocities Israel suffered in the Oct. 7 Hamas attack that the country's political leadership simply has to demonstrate this is not a business-as-usual response. First and foremost, this is being driven by national rage at the massacre of 1,400 Israelis. But in a regional security environment built on seventy years of Israeli military deterrence, there is also an Israeli fear that failure would be interpreted as weakness and invite attacks. Crisis levels could well subside, but the events triggered by Oct. 7 are likely to shape the region and indeed impact policy areas ostensibly unrelated to the Israel-Palestine crisis.
Ground War Questions
The call-up of some 360,000 reservists means there is also economic pressure to terminate active operations sooner rather than later. In the short-term, this means at the very least crippling Hamas’ military capacity. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Wednesday vowed to fight Hamas “above ground, underground, in Gaza and outside Gaza”— but gave no timing for a ground invasion.
There is a scenario whereby a lid is kept on the regional situation though a combination of high-level diplomacy, avoidance of an all-out Gaza invasion and lowered rhetoric, says Andreas Krieg of King's College London. But the signs are not propitious. Limited ground incursions are already taking place. Israeli ground forces attacked multiple targets in the northern Gaza Strip on Thursday before withdrawing, the Israeli military said in a statement. A weekend raid on Khan Younis in Gaza left one Israeli soldier dead and several injured.
Meltdown Scenario
The biggest immediate danger is that of a two-front or even multifront war. Fighting between Israel and the pro-Iran Hezbollah group has slowly been intensifying, with casualties and thousands of refugees on both sides. An escalation in Gaza — in the form of a major ground invasion — would likely escalate the war in the north. A major Hezbollah attack could trigger US intervention, which if bloody enough, could bring in others, including possibly Iran.
Multiple reports citing Hezbollah, Iranian, Israeli and US officials, however, all point to an awareness of the dangers and a desire to contain them. Hezbollah is understandably keen to avoid a repeat of the massive destruction suffered by Lebanon as a result of its 2006 war with Israel. This severely damaged its popularity among ordinary Lebanese. And for their part, Israel and America are keenly aware that the Iran-backed Shiite group is formidable foe, boasting well-trained troops and far bigger rocket arsenal than Hamas. Rocket defenses in the end are a numbers game, argues Krieg. “Hezbollah has the numbers. So, it could overwhelm the [Israeli] system if it really wanted to escalate.”
But the issue too is that bombardment has already wrought an unbearable toll — over 6,000 deaths, 40% of them children, reported early on Oct. 25 by the Hamas-run Gazan health ministry. To an extent not seen since the 2011 Arab Spring, the Arab street is now a factor in regional dynamics, with outrage at Palestinian deaths triggering mass protests in Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan. In the latter country, whose population is over 50% of Palestinian origin, there is pressure to rip up its peace treaty with Israel.
There have also been protests throughout Europe and in the US, with major spikes in Islamophobic and antisemitic attacks. Synagogues in Germany and Tunisia have been attacked. This Arab outrage dovetails with the agenda of radical pro-Iran groups. In recent days, the US has intercepted rocket attacks from Yemen’s rebel Houthi group aimed at Israel, while US military bases in both Iraq’s Kurdish north and Syria have been hit.
It is noteworthy regional protests appeared to have subsided somewhat toward mid-week, but it is hard to overstate how explosive the Arab street is. Gaza aside, there are also other flashpoints that could detonate. In the West Bank, violence — spearheaded by the radical settler movement — has been escalating. So far, the Palestinian Authority has been cooperating with Israeli security forces, says Yossi Mekelberg of London’s Chatham House think tank. Another source notes there are strong concerns over a build-up of heavy, high-tech weaponry among radical groups in the West Bank over the past couple of years. The fear is they “could actually start firing missiles from inside the West Bank into Israel, into Jerusalem,” he says.
Collateral Damage
Even absent significant escalation, the conflict is likely to have a ripple effect. Tourism-dependent states in the region are going to get hit at the same time as they struggle to deal with Ukraine war-fueled inflation and the global economic slowdown. Moves toward Saudi-Israeli normalization are on ice for the foreseeable future.
On the energy front, OECD countries could pivot to policies favoring more security of supply and domestic production — whether in fossil fuels or renewables. Post-war reconstruction and beefed-up military budgets could absorb some of the funds that would otherwise be earmarked for funding the energy transition and loss and damage in the Global South.
Serious escalation could threaten key energy infrastructure and trade arteries in the Gulf. There is already renewed pressure to ramp up sanctions on Iran and destabilize the regime in Tehran. Qatar so far has earned plaudits for its mediation role in the conflict, but it could yet face intensified scrutiny over its relationship with Islamist movements.
The nightmare scenario for the EU, which firmly hitched its flag to Israel, is if the Gaza carnage reactivates Islamist terrorist threats in Europe. Tensions surrounding EU immigration policy are likely to rise further and could play out in upcoming elections, including for the European parliament in June.
The most hopeful outcome is that the crisis will generate real political momentum to resolving the Palestinian question. Statements from Washington suggest there is a realization that the status quo on Palestine is untenable. But there is little in US President Joe Biden’s past to suggest he has the stomach to impose a settlement.