It looks inevitable that the war in Gaza will spread. Is it?
The Middle East is the greatest area of vulnerability for the United States, and many countries want to cause trouble
At first sight, it looks almost inevitable that the war in Gaza
will spread. Quite apart from the anger it has caused in the Muslim
world, China and still more Russia would seem to have every incentive to
cause trouble for the United States – and, as has been demonstrated
again and again over the years, the Middle East is the greatest area of
US vulnerability.
On closer examination, things
do not look so simple. In the first place, if Moscow and Beijing are
content with a purely diplomatic and public relations victory, they do
not need to do anything at all. US virtual silence in the face of
Israel’s indiscriminate bombardment of Gaza is doing it for them. Yet
again, the United States has used its UN security council veto
to defend Israel, as the solitary opponent both of all the other UNSC
members, and a large majority of the general assembly. As western (and
some US) diplomats have remarked
(off the record), unfaltering US support for Israel has shredded the
Biden administration’s strategy of competing with China for influence in
the “global south”.
Since
the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the western reaction to it, the
charge has been made across most of the non-western world (including by
US partners like India) that the west has one standard for white
victims, and a much lower one for everyone else. The Biden
administration (and many European governments) have now in effect
confirmed this.
Witness (in a widely circulated clip)
the US national security council spokesperson John Kirby choking back
crocodile tears over Russian bombardment of civilians in Ukraine, then
justifying Israeli “collateral damage” in Gaza – although according to
UN figures,
Israel has already killed almost as many Palestinian civilians in two
weeks as Russia has killed Ukrainian civilians in 20 months. Equally
striking has been the refusal of the Biden administration to do anything
to help the 500-600 Palestinian American US citizens trapped
in Gaza. If anyone wants evidence to argue that in the eyes of
Washington some US citizens are more equal than others, they need look
no further than this.
Dependence on imported
oil also gives China a strong incentive not to try to extend the Gaza
conflict across the Middle East. Especially given its present economic
troubles, China cannot afford the shock to the world economy that would
result from a massive and prolonged surge in oil prices. China has used
the Ukraine war and western sanctions to drive some very advantageous
energy deals with Russia, but Moscow is nowhere near being able to
compensate for Chinese energy supplies from the Persian Gulf.
Moreover,
given their own restive Muslim regions, both Russia and China fear the
spread of Sunni extremism. This may well happen anyway, but Moscow and
Beijing will not help the process. Fear of Sunni jihadi movements was a
key reason for Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war, where many
Chechens and other Muslim volunteers were fighting for the Islamic
State.
In Syria, Russian forces fought
alongside Iranian revolutionary guards and Hezbollah. Since the invasion
of Ukraine has faltered, Russia and Iran have forged a closer partnership,
and Russia has come to increasingly depend on Iran for supplies of
drones. On the other hand, Russia is in a position to give extremely
important help to Iran in the areas of missile technology and satellite intelligence.
That
does not mean that Iran will launch itself into an appallingly risky
war with the United States at Russia’s behest, nor that Hezbollah will
launch such a war against Israel at Iran’s behest – though it is easy to
imagine how the clashes occurring on the Lebanese-Israeli border could escalate to full-scale war.
One thing does nonetheless seem certain: that if hawks
in Israel and the US manage to exploit this crisis to bring about a US
attack on Iran (as many of the very same people 20 years ago used 9/11
to bring about a US attack on Iraq), then Russia at least will do its
utmost to arm Iran. For Russia, such a strategy would be irresistible,
given US and Nato arming of Ukraine. Attacks by Iranian-backed Shia militias on US troops in Iraq, if they manage to cause significant casualties, could give these hawks a casus belli.
In
two ways, the repercussions of the war in Gaza will be beyond the power
of any outside state to control. The first is the reaction of the Arab
masses – whom, as the Arab spring of 2011 demonstrated, cannot safely be
ignored. It is impossible to judge just how endangered the regimes in
Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia are at present; but their differing
vulnerabilities are obvious.
Second, there is
the likely spread of terrorism. Tens of thousands of US and European
citizens working in the Gulf are acutely vulnerable to attack, if only
by infuriated lone wolves. Their flight would in turn have a severe
effect on the local economies, potentially worsening mass discontent.
Above all, there is the dire threat
of a new wave of terrorism in Europe (which has indeed already begun on
a small scale) as a result of Europe’s refusal to support a ceasefire
in Gaza. Given Russia’s own experience of terrorism, there is no reason
to think it would support such terrorism, but it could bring Russia
considerable benefits.
Increased Islamist
terrorism would almost certainly drive still further anti-immigrant
sentiment and support for rightwing parties in Europe, which are already surging in the polls. As a result of the invasion of Ukraine, these have mostly reduced
(in public at least) their traditional sympathy for Russia; but their
overwhelming focus on immigration in itself would reduce their
commitment to Ukraine. Moreover, the ascent to power of populist
rightwing movements in western Europe would deepen divisions within the
European Union and leave Germany isolated.
The
repercussions of an ongoing war in Gaza will therefore work themselves
out over many months and years. It is hard to see how any of them will
be to the advantage of the United States or Europe.