Ever since Morocco normalized diplomatic relations with Israel in late 2020, the government and the royal Cabinet of King Mohamed VI have had to engage in an awkward balancing act. As they nurtured fast-growing political, economic and military relations with Israel, authorities had to simultaneously portray Rabat’s official position as remaining actively pro-Palestinian.
Morocco’s stance, like that of other countries that signed up to the Abraham Accords, was always going to be a challenge. For years, the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis has been marked by sporadic clashes between Israeli forces and armed groups in Gaza, the ongoing encroachment of illegal Israeli settlements amid violence in the West Bank, and diminishing hope for a genuine political resolution.
But after the brutal attacks perpetrated by Hamas on Israeli civilians and military personnel on Oct. 7 and the ruthless and escalating war unleashed by the Israeli military on Gaza in response, Morocco’s stance is close to untenable.
The biggest challenge for the government and, more importantly, the royal Cabinet is that a majority of Morocco’s population has traditionally supported the Palestinian cause. Indeed, many were not in favor of normalization with Israel in the first place.
It was the king himself who opted to push through with establishing links under the framework of the Abraham Accords brokered by the Trump administration in 2020. In exchange, Washington recognized Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, a complete reversal of U.S. policy up to that point and a major diplomatic victory for the kingdom.
For Moroccan authorities, it was a risk worth taking. King Mohamed VI has made legitimization of Morocco’s control over the Western Sahara the main objective of Rabat’s foreign policy. Over decades, the kingdom’s claims over the territory have become so ingrained in state messaging that it is no longer possible to question them in domestic political and social discourse. Foreign diplomats have gotten used to receiving stern reprimands from Moroccan officials any time they espouse even the slightest reticence regarding what Rabat calls its “territorial integrity.”
Much like the issue of the Western Sahara, Morocco’s increasingly close relations with Israel had until Oct. 7 become a matter that could not be questioned. In March 2023, when the Israeli military raided the Jenin refugee camp in the West Bank, Abdelilah Benkirane—a former prime minister and the secretary-general of the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party, or PJD—accused Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita of sounding like a “defender of Israel” in his discussions with African and European officials.
Benkirane was promptly rebuked by the royal palace, which stated that foreign policy remained a prerogative of the king and that the issue should not be used for political gain.
Denying the leader of a political party that both sits in parliament and serves in the government the right to question the country’s foreign policy says a lot about how Morocco’s powers that be see the role of parliamentarians.
But King Mohamed VI always knew that befriending Israel would be met with societal disapproval. It was no coincidence that when diplomatic relations were officially inaugurated, then-Prime Minister Saad Eddine El Othmani of the PJD was made to sign the deal as the representative of the Moroccan state.
Given the current humanitarian crisis in Gaza, normalization between Morocco and Israel seems set to be frozen, if not reversed altogether.
This had two clear advantages for the country’s rulers. First, it allowed King Mohamed VI to distance himself from a decision that was visibly unpalatable to many of his subjects, perhaps even the majority of them. Second, it also allowed the palace to strike a serious blow to the cohesion of the PJD, which had been brought into government in the parliamentary elections that followed the 2011 Arab Spring as a concession to popular discontent at the time. With the PJD’s base staunchly against the deal, seeing one of the party’s leaders sign it triggered disarray.
Before the current war, the king and his royal Cabinet had succeeded in making the links with Israel a new unquestionable reality. Diplomatic engagement accelerated after 2020, with ministers, business delegations and military leaders of both countries shuttling between Rabat and Tel Aviv. In July, Israel recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara, opening the door to a potential visit to Rabat by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Now, given the current humanitarian crisis in Gaza, normalization between the two countries seems set to be frozen, if not reversed altogether.
It was always optimistic of Morocco’s leadership to think that ties with Israel would elude questioning every time there was a flare-up of tensions between Palestinians and Israelis. But the sheer scale of the current violence is making the Moroccan regime’s position indefensible to its own people.
In mid-October, tens of thousands of Moroccans across several cities protested in support of Palestine. In some cases, demonstrators stepped on Israeli and U.S. flags and chanted slogans against Morocco’s normalization process with Israel.
Understanding how deep support for Palestinians runs in Moroccan society, authorities have allowed the protests to take place. And herein lies the paradox for Morocco’s rulers: What was once unpalatable for a single politician to say publicly is now being screamed by thousands of Moroccan citizens in the streets. It is no wonder that Benkirane, the PJD’s secretary-general, has once again criticized Morocco’s foreign policy choices, calling on the government to sever ties with Israel altogether. Will the royal Cabinet once again publicly rebuke him, knowing that many Moroccans agree with him?
Moroccan authorities now have very few options, besides hoping that the conflict will end soon. The kingdom has been trying to position itself as a mediator to the crisis in Gaza. But it is unrealistic to think that Rabat could have much sway with Netanyahu or the diplomatic capital to somehow convince Israel to scale down its attacks, opt for a cease-fire or retreat from Gaza altogether.
Morrocco seems to be banking on Netanyahu’s political career likely coming to an end along with the war. Authorities will surely underline the fact that historical links with Israel’s Moroccan Jewish community justify state-to-state relations in a way that transcends the current Israeli government’s policies.
But this, too, is overly optimistic. The current Israeli government’s policies differ in scale, but not in substance from those of its predecessors: extending Israel’s military control over Palestinian territories, while denying Palestinians basic rights and self-determination. The current violence only makes it harder for Morocco and other Arab governments to deny that their softer stance toward Israel has increasingly drifted away from public opinion among their citizens.
For Rabat, much will hinge on how long the Israeli offensive in Gaza lasts. As vocally as the Moroccan government has called for Israel to stop its military campaign, that hardly erases the violent imagery of civilian Palestinian deaths coming out of Gaza daily, images that will continue to tilt opinions in Morocco further and further against diplomatic ties with Israel.
It will all come down to time, says a political analyst close to Morocco’s ruling circles who asked to remain anonymous given the sensitivity of the subject. “I don’t think that the current crisis will end normalization between Morocco and Israel. But this will only be the case if the war is short,” he told WPR. “If the offensive in Gaza continues for four or five months, with casualty numbers climbing, of course this will put the Moroccan state in an awkward position. It might impact normalization and even lead to its reversal.”
Because of the enduring Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, relations between Morocco and Israel were always going to be marred by periods of volatility. In 2000, the outbreak of the Second Intifada led to the closing of liaison offices in Rabat and Tel Aviv.
The ongoing Israeli offensive in Gaza will leave a much deeper mark. In the short term, it will weaken relations between Morocco and Israel. But a long conflict and a weak response by Rabat risks eroding the link between the Moroccan state and its population.
Francisco Serrano is a journalist, writer and analyst. His work has appeared in Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Weapons of Reason, The Outpost, Foreign Affairs and other outlets. His latest book, “As Ruínas da Década,” about the Middle East in the decade after the 2011 popular revolts, was published in 2022.