The Gaza War: Reshuffling Middle East Partnerships
By Patrick Theros - November 17, 2023
The
recent Israel-Hamas war in Gaza carries significant implications for
the Gulf States, the United States, and the broader Middle East that
extends beyond the military and diplomatic realms into the public
opinion. Israel’s war in Gaza serves as a stark reminder of the
complexities involved in gauging public opinion in the Gulf,
particularly in relation to the general populace’s support for the
Palestinian cause. Gulf citizens have reacted with outrage at American
support for Israel, despite previous polling that indicated a decrease
in public support for the Palestinian cause. The public’s initial horror
at Hamas’ killing of innocents in southern Israel has been erased by
what they see as Israel’s wildly disproportionate retaliation against
civilians in Gaza. Now, Gulf Arabs and many of their expatriate
residents are also outraged at what they see as Israel’s attempts to
repeat the 1948 expulsion of Palestinians in Gaza today. Gulf citizens
direct much of their anger at the United States for failing to reign in
the Israelis. These factors risk undercutting the Gulf’s dramatic
diplomatic shift toward the Jewish state and enhancing the geopolitical
position of Iran.
Jeopardizing Diplomatic Progress
As
its leaders try to cope with this new reality, the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) states find themselves forced to reevaluate their
traditional reliance on American security guarantees, upon which
rapprochement with Israel relies. The countries of the GCC are concerned
about the potential for the Gaza crisis to undo Iraq’s already
precarious relationships with its neighbors, not to mention its capacity
to maintain domestic order. The past three weeks have seen an upsurge
in threats to American military units in Northern Iraq and those
deployed in support of the Kurdish militias in Syria. To further
complicate matters, Turkey, a U.S.-aligned NATO member that has
expressed outright support for Hamas, stepped up attacks on Kurdish
militias aligned with the United States. All these trends indicate that
the United States’ ability to respond to multiple regional flashpoints
may be diminished for the foreseeable future.
Elsewhere,
internal discord sparked by the Israel-Hamas conflict threatens to
undermine the stability of regional nations that boast historically
friendly relationships with the Gulf Arab states. The situation in
Jordan should be of particular concern to the GCC states and Iraq.
Jordanian police have fired tear gas to disperse thousands of people
protesting at the Israeli embassy in Amman after the deadly Gaza
hospital strike that killed hundreds of people. Anecdotally, Jordanian
friends tell me that the situation in the Hashemite Kingdom has reached a
boiling point, so much so that Jordanian security forces have taken the
extraordinary measure of blocking the roads to the Jordan Valley to
prevent enraged young men from taking it upon themselves and attacking
Israel directly. The Jordanian economy has teetered on the edge of
collapse for years, providing fertile ground for unrest; the war will
only aggravate Jordan’s existing weaknesses and further destabilize the
region.
Moreover,
the GCC states’ mixed responses to the unfolding crisis indicate that
these countries are riven by their own internal divisions. Qatar was the
first to condemn Israel, denouncing its 60-year occupation of
Palestinian lands without any hope of relief or resolution. When the
crisis began, Saudi Arabia criticized Hamas and Israel in equally harsh
terms. Now, Riyadh is calling for an immediate ceasefire and an end to
the siege of Gaza, shifting against the Israeli and U.S. position. The
UAE has temporized—condemning the violence, calling for a ceasefire, and
maintaining communications channels with Iran.
Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, the Gaza crisis highlights the conceptual
disconnect between American expectations for the Abraham Accords and
normalization and those of the GCC states. Bahrain, one of the first
Abraham Accords signatory from the GCC has now withdrawn its Ambassador
to Israel, and others may yet follow. While the Americans argue that the
GCC states joined the Accords primarily to protect themselves from
Iran, this is a misunderstanding of the Arab states’ motivations. Arab
governments in the region have worked assiduously to reduce tensions
with Iran, even as they pursue normalization with Israel. Those states
have made it clear that access to investment opportunities and Israeli
technology—not primarily security concerns—drove their diplomatic
overtures. Improving relations with both Israel and Iran helps the GCC
states stay out of any future conflict between the two rivals. Indeed,
the crisis has already shown the benefits of Saudi-Iran rapprochement.
Both Riyadh and Tehran are likely relieved that they have established
channels of communication. Along with the rest of the GCC, Saudi Arabia
does not want to become an unwilling participant in an Iranian Israeli
war, not to mention a war between the United States and Iran. An Israeli
(or American) attack on Iran could provoke an asymmetric response from
Iran that would strike at the GCC states’ critical state oil and gas
infrastructure, undercutting state revenues and domestic stability.
Restraining Hezbollah
All
of this is not to say that Iran and Israel necessarily desire direct
conflict with one another. War with Lebanon’s Hezbollah, a member of
Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” is not inevitable despite a recent spate of
clashes with the Israel Defense Forces. Israel’s priority right now is
carrying out its military campaign in Gaza. Tel Aviv does not desire a
full-scale war with Hezbollah, and, in fact, may not be able to
prosecute it effectively given the deployment of most of the Israeli
military in the Gaza Strip. It is quite possible that the Israeli
leadership understands this reality. By evacuating thousands of Israelis
from northern border villages, Tel Aviv may avoid civilian casualties
that could further aggravate an already inflamed domestic public opinion
and push the Israeli government to open a second front in Lebanon
Hezbollah
faces pressures at home that make direct conflict with Israel unlikely,
too. Despite the outpouring of anger against Israel’s heavy-handed
bombardment of Gaza in recent weeks, the Lebanese population remains
frustrated about an array of grave domestic crises that a military
engagement with the Jewish state would only worsen. Hezbollah may also
be wary of escalating the conflict with Israel in part because a
full-scale war could draw in the United States, which has deployed
several carrier strike groups to the Eastern Mediterranean in recent
weeks. On the other hand, this is a rapidly evolving situation and an
upsurge in violence on the Israeli Lebanese border could get out of
hand.
Rather
than provoke an all-out war, the primary aims of Hezbollah’s recent
skirmishes are two-fold. First, it seeks to signal its solidarity with
Hamas, and second it hopes to divert resources and attention from
Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. For its part, Iran would appear to
have little incentive to open a Lebanese front and risk severe losses to
its most capable ally. Indeed, Hezbollah is far more effective as a
potential threat than as a belligerent to this conflict. Hezbollah
leader Hassan Nasrallah essentially confirmed these comments in his
November 3rd speech, in which he declared that Hezbollah will not go to
war unless attacked or Israel commits an unspecified outrage that cannot
be ignored.
GCC-Israel Normalization Falters as Iran’s Influence Grows
Outsiders
often forget that not one, but two normalization processes were on the
table before October 7. The first, to which the United States paid the
most attention, was the normalization between Arab States and Israel—the
Abraham Accords. The second, which has no official name but is equally
important, is the general rapprochement between GCC states and Iran.
The
war in Gaza has put the kibosh on the Abraham Accords, as the GCC
states find it increasingly difficult to pursue normalization with
Israel. The United States placed enormous emphasis on the Abraham
Accords assuming the framework would build an alliance aimed at
deterring Iran. To the contrary, none of the Gulf States have any
interest in military conflict with Iran; they do not have to normalize
ties with Israel to prevent conflict. Instead, moving closer to Israel
at a time when public opinion within the GCC has swung decisively behind
the Palestinian cause would be disastrous. Nor should observers ignore
the sentiments of individual leaders when reacting to the carnage in
Gaza. For Saudi Arabia, as the Custodians of the Two Holy Shrines, the
status of al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem affects the legitimacy of the
regime, even one as liberalized as Mohammed bin Salman has created.
By
contrast, support for improved ties with Iran has blossomed as the
bombardment of Gaza continues. Every GCC state but Bahrain has
reestablished diplomatic relations with Tehran and exchanged high level
visits, and there is little to suggest that the geopolitical and
strategic benefits of rapprochement will dissipate any time soon.
Although the United States remains an important actor in the Gulf
region, it can no longer leverage its influence over the GCC states to
prevent its partners from growing closer to Iran. Indeed, Washington’s
support for Israel will likely cause deep damage to its ties to the Gulf
states. Just how far U.S. standing among the GCC states falls, of
course, depends on two factors: how soon the fighting stops, and what
political situation emerges after the guns fall silent.
The
views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.