| |
By: George Friedman
Some of you may
remember Ukraine. Just a few months ago, it was all the talk. Since
then, war has broken out between Hamas and Israel, a potentially
game-changing summit took place between the United States and China, and
Elon Musk grabbed headlines again. Between the tragic and the absurd,
we have somehow managed to routinize the conflict in Ukraine.
Routinizing
Ukraine is not unreasonable; the war has trended in that direction.
There have been many battles involving advances and retreats. But none
of the movements or battles have been decisive, which means Ukraine
continues to fight for its survival. None of the fears the participants
had about entering the war in the first place are illegitimate. And the
stakes – a potential redefining of Europe – technically remain in place.
Wars in which all
sides have reasonable fears are the most dangerous. No side can quit,
and until one side achieves an overwhelming advantage and imposes a new
reality, the war must go on even if the losses are difficult to endure.
Absent an overwhelming advantage, compromise becomes necessary, but it
can be equally hard. In this war, there are still expectations that
Russia will destroy the Ukrainian army and force the U.S. to silence its
guns. This has not happened. The primary reason is that Russia is short
on troops, and since drafting them into service is extremely unpopular,
Moscow has had to improve its recruitment, relying on large bounties
for enlistees – some 12,000 rubles ($137), according to the Atlantic
Council – and asking for donations from a sympathetic public to purchase
equipment. Mints are a major weapon of war, and it’s unclear if Moscow
is printing any more money. The fear of inflation is likely a
consideration.
Things are
difficult for Ukraine too. The army has had little success in the field
lately, and Poland has blocked trucks from crossing its border with
Ukraine. This is not trivial. Poland has been deeply anti-Russian for
years, has been one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters, and agreed to be a
base for U.S. and European weapon transfers into Ukraine. Poland has
not abandoned Ukraine entirely; the source of the border dispute is a
perception that Ukrainian carriers are unfair competition for their
Polish counterparts. In peacetime, this is a reasonable issue. In
wartime, it is not. How much this will affect the Ukrainian economy is
unclear, but it will certainly affect morale, and it will likely make
the U.S. wonder whether its de facto supply depot will allow weapons to
go to Ukraine in the coming months. (For its part, Russia will correctly
see this as a sign of weakness.)
It is in this
context that U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin arrived in Ukraine to
declare that Washington still stands behind its ally. Though the exact
purpose of Austin’s visit is unclear, it’s never a good sign when an
ally has to declare its continued support under unknown circumstances.
In truth, Austin is there in his capacity as a Cabinet member and
political figure, not a general, and speaking on behalf of his
government, he will likely note that Ukraine is in as bad a position as
Russia. They are losing options – both in their desired outcomes and in
their ability to wage war.
And though I
don’t have any personal knowledge of the matter, I assume Kyiv will try
to negotiate an end to the conflict. I suspect this would not be a
problem for many Ukrainians. The end of the war would have to give
Russia some increased buffer zone without bringing it too close to the
NATO countries on the border with Ukraine. Ukraine will not win, nor
will Russia. Clearly there are talks underway at some level between
Russia and the United States. Whether my solution has merit is dubious.
That we are near the end of the war (expressed in months) is not.
Perhaps the world’s relative indifference to Ukraine and Russia will
send a signal to both. |