[Salon] Gaza and the regional order: back to the drawing board… again



Gaza and the regional order: back to the drawing board… again

Summary: as the Gaza wars rages on a lesson that should be remembered is that after a decade of upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa states in the region used diplomacy, not military action, to ease tensions and achieve a stable regional order.

We thank Tobias Borck for today’s newsletter. Tobias is a Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security Studies at the International Security Studies department at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London. He specialises in Middle Eastern politics and security, particularly the foreign, defence and security policies of countries in the region. His latest book Seeking Stability Amidst Disorder: The Foreign Policies of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, 2010–20 has just been published by Hurst. 

The Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October and the war that has since followed represent yet another inflection point for the Middle East and its search for a stable regional order. Before 7 October, there had been a trend towards de-escalation and the lowering of tensions; since 7 October, fears that the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza could escalate into a regional conflagration are pervasive. Even if the current crisis can at least geographically remain contained, it is already clear that the search for a workable and sustainable security order in the region has to begin anew – not for the first time this century.

Chaos in the 2010s

The de-escalation and rapprochement trend of the past four years was itself an outcome of, and reaction to, a breakdown in the regional order. The Arab Uprisings  of 2011 upended regimes that had lasted decades in just a few weeks. The United States, the Middle East’s hegemonic security guarantor of the 1990s, was exhausted and disillusioned after its failed attempt to reshape the region beginning with forceful regime change in Iraq. Its desire to focus on the Indo-Pacific and reluctance to decisively intervene to influence outcomes of conflicts and political transitions in Egypt, Libya, Syria or Yemen, left a vacuum that was filled by Russia and – most importantly – regional powers.

The 2010s, then, were characterised by intense regional competition between three major camps: Iran continued to build its ‘Axis of Resistance’ by partnering with and nurturing armed non-state actors – from Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza to militias in Syria and Iraq, to the Huthis in Yemen. Türkiye and Qatar embraced the notion of change towards more popular and populist politics in many Arab countries, supporting groups – including Islamists – working to change regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and post-2013 Egypt pushed back against both Iran’s regional strategy and the forces of bottom-up revolutionary change.

The outcome was escalating conflicts and tensions. Libya descended into chaos; the Assad-regime in Damascus, backed by Russia and Iran, brutally crushed the Syrian uprising; the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen’s civil war turned into a still ongoing quagmire; Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain imposed a nearly four-year economic and political blockade on Qatar; Türkiye feuded with the UAE throughout the region;  Israeli governments moved ever-further to the right, and the Palestinian Authority became evermore hapless, relegating the Middle East Peace Process to existing only on paper. The US only actively intervened to destroy Daesh’s terrorist proto-statelets in Iraq, Syria and Libya; and arguably contributed to the instability with an Iran-policy that swung violently from the Obama administration’s attempt at engagement to President Trump’s erratic maximum pressure.


Hamas' shock 7 October military offensive abruptly put an end to the dynamic of de-escalation in the region [photo credit: @Aldanmarki]

Turn to De-Escalation

Towards the end of the decade, governments across the region gradually came to the conclusion that what they were trying to do was not working, that zero-sum competition was ultimately hurting everyone. Exhausted, humbled by failures, hurt by the global economic downturn spurred by the COVID pandemic, and adapting to the changing global order, they adopted a new paradigm for interacting with each other. They did not resolve their political and ideological differences, but instead agreed to disagree on some issues while finding ways to pragmatically work together where possible.

Saudi Arabia pushed the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt to reconcile with Qatar; and Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Cairo rebuilt at least transactional relations with Ankara. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also changed tact on engaging with Iran; neither stopped seeing Tehran as a threat and major regional destabiliser, but resolved that having a functioning direct channel to their neighbour across the Gulf was less risky than being locked into potentially uncontrollable tensions. The UAE (and Bahrain), working closely with the Trump administration, pioneered a new approach to relations with Israel, namely normalising bilateral ties without waiting for a seemingly illusive final resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Instead of single-mindedly pursuing their competing versions of regional order, states across the Middle East appeared to coalesce around making their own economic development the new North Star of regional politics. There was no time to truly resolve conflicts and problems that seemed too intractable to fix anyway. Hatchets were buried and pragmatism championed. Notably, this turn away from zero-sum international relations occurred just as the US and the West started to advocate for more black-and-white positions: against China, against Russia, and against  an Iran that was now supplying Russia with drones for its war in Ukraine.

Hamas Shatters the New Paradigm

7 October has abruptly put an end to this dynamic of de-escalation and avoidance of conflict and tensions. While the ultimate implications of Hamas’ unprecedented terrorist attack and Israel’s uncompromising war in Gaza will only become apparent over time, one thing is already clear: left unresolved, conflicts in the region (and elsewhere, for that matter) are liable to become only ever more combustible. The wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen may appear contained or containable for the moment, but they can also re-erupt at almost any time; economic crisis and state fragility in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Tunisia may seem routine, but a sudden collapse cannot be ruled out. In short, stability in the Middle East will remain out of reach until conflicts and structural and governance weaknesses are addressed – however, intractable and insurmountable they may appear.

The good news – amidst all the bad – is that 7 October has not reset everything, or at least it does not have to. The lesson governments across the region learned in the 2010s remains valid: uncompromising regional competition only leads to more instability. Moreover, the relationships that have been built in recent years are real and matter. Riyadh and Tehran, Ankara and Abu Dhabi, Doha and Cairo – they can all talk to each other more directly and pragmatically today than they were able to four years ago.

That can only be a good thing, and anyone with an interest in stability in the Middle East – and that includes pretty much the entire world, including and especially, the West – should do whatever they can to support the countries of the Middle East as they return to the drawing board and work out a new regional order. In fact, policymakers in Washington, London and Brussels should recognise that whatever leverage and influence they have left after so strongly siding with Israel not just in response to 7 October but also as the catastrophe in Gaza has worsened from day to day in the weeks since, is best invested in backing diplomacy as the only way out of the region’s myriad crises.


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