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But the most sensitive issues, particularly Cyprus, are no closer to resolution.
By: Caroline D. Rose
The war between
Israel and Hamas is testing relationships throughout the Middle East and
beyond, but a short distance away two historical enemies, Greece and
Turkey, are rapidly making amends. Building upon months of diplomacy,
senior Greek and Turkish officials, including Greek Prime Minister
Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, will
meet in Athens on Dec. 7. Judging from the public agenda, nothing will
be off the table. But Athens and Ankara have tried several times in
recent years to put their relationship on a more stable footing, and
there is little reason to expect a sustainable breakthrough this time
either.
Historical Rivalry
In just the past
half-century, the Greek and Turkish armed forces have had several close
calls. The most intense episode involved the small Mediterranean island
of Cyprus, where in 1974 Turkish troops intervened after Greece
orchestrated a military coup. The island was split into Greek- and
Turkish-speaking areas, with the latter governed by the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus and backed by Ankara. Though the Cypriot government,
Greece and the international community do not recognize the TRNC,
Turkey has explored the territorial waters around Cyprus for natural gas
and regularly deploys its warships in the area, at least in part for
leverage against Greece and the European Union.
In 2010, the
countries set up a high-level cooperation council to reduce tensions and
hash out their disagreements. But despite meeting in 2013, 2014 and
2016, the council failed to settle differences over trade, the rights to
explore and develop gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean,
militarization of Aegean islands, the 2015 migration crisis and, of
course, Cyprus. The council did not convene again after 2016.
![Delimiting Exclusive Economic Zones in the Eastern Mediterranean]()
(click to enlarge)
Relations hit
another low in 2020, when Turkey dispatched a seismic research vessel to
explore a gas field in disputed waters just off the northern coast of
Cyprus. Fearing a Turkish fait accompli, Greece and sympathetic
Mediterranean stakeholders (Egypt, Israel, France and Italy) set up the
Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum to coordinate exploration, production
and investment – without Turkey’s participation. Meanwhile, the Turkish
government challenged the existing maritime boundaries (established by
the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne) through the amplification of its Blue Homeland policy
and the signing of a bilateral agreement with one of Libya’s two rival
governments to redraw their maritime borders in a way more favorable to
Ankara. More recently, Greece has lobbied the U.S. Congress not to sell
advanced F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, which for years has been eager to
modernize its air force.
Inflection Points
Despite this
tumultuous history, circumstances are pushing Greece and Turkey to give
reconciliation another go. For Ankara, the main factor is the economy.
Inflation in Turkey has skyrocketed, with the central bank predicting
year-end inflation as high as 65 percent. Changes in leadership at the
Finance Ministry and the central bank and a dramatic swing toward
conventional monetary policy have not yet brought inflation to heel. The
result is rising political pressure on Erdogan and greater risks for
Turkey in pressing its maritime territorial claims.
![Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbon Reserves: Overlapping Claims]()
(click to enlarge)
In Greece’s case,
the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum’s EastMed pipeline has largely
folded due to soaring costs and a lack of political momentum.
Collaboration has been further hindered by opposition to Israel’s
conduct and objectives in its military offensive in Gaza. Without the
united support of its partners in the gas forum, Greece is severely
weakened in its ability to challenge Turkish gas exploration and
militarization in the eastern Mediterranean.
Meanwhile, the
countries’ shared experience of natural disasters in 2023 has served as
an opportunity to work together. In February, a 7.8-magnitude earthquake
in Turkey killed more than 50,000 people and caused approximately $84
billion in damage. Then in the summer, amid one of the longest heatwaves
in Greek history, some 80 wildfires throughout Greece destroyed an
estimated 161,000 hectares, killed 28 people and caused nearly $2
billion in damage. Finally, in September, flash flooding in both
countries killed a handful of people. Policymakers on both sides
responded with a push to rekindle cooperation over climate-related
disasters.
Finally, the
passage of elections has helped to bring down the temperature. Both
Erdogan and Mitsotakis were up for re-election in 2023. The Turkish race
was especially close. Neither leader felt confident pursuing
rapprochement during their campaigns, concerned that nationalist rivals
might outflank them. But with elections behind them, Ankara and Athens
can again explore a new approach toward their relationship. The first
step came at the summer’s NATO summit in Vilnius, where Erdogan and
Mitsotakis met on the sidelines and agreed on a roadmap to revive the
bilateral high-level council.
Obstacles to Long-Lasting Peace
The first meeting
of the council in December will likely try to establish
confidence-building measures to build momentum for subsequent talks on
the stickiest issues. But the historical evidence suggests that progress
will break down once the topic of Cyprus is introduced. Greece and
Cyprus will not formally recognize the TRNC, and Turkey will not cut
ties with the Turkish Cypriots. Without more fundamental changes in the
status quo, this latest attempt at reconciliation is likely to yield
only fleeting success. |