Notably absent until now from the Western
narrative regarding
the current war in
Ukraine and how it
might end has been
any suggestion that
the wishes of the
people who lived
prior to February
24, 2022 in the four
eastern and southern
oblasts whose
sovereignty has
since September 2022
been formally
contested between
Russia and Ukraine
might be of any
conceivable
relevance.
Realistically, there are only two ways for this
sovereignty dispute
to be decided: (i)
by further and
potentially
intensified deaths
and destruction
until one side of
the other achieves
“victory”, however
defined, in a war
which neither Russia
nor the United
States believes it
can afford to lose
or (ii) by the votes
of a majority of
those resident in
each oblast prior to
February 24, 2022 in
referendums
organized by the
United Nations or
another agreed
international
organization, with
both sides committed
to accept the
referendum results.
The vast majority of mankind, whose only
interest in this war
is that it should
end, would certainly
prefer the second
way. Unfortunately,
the leaders on both
sides, who have
expended massive
investments of
resources, prestige
and ego toward
“winning” this war,
currently appear to
be dead-set and
hell-bent on
continuing to pursue
the first way.
While one may speculate as to Russia's
territorial
ambitions when it
launched its
invasion, its
inability so far to
establish full
control over the
territories of the
four oblasts as to
which it has since
claimed sovereignty
and where virtually
all ground combat
has been pursued in
recent months
strongly suggests
that its territorial
ambitions today do
not extend beyond
them and, in the
absence of a radical
escalation by the
other side, are
unlikely to do so in
the future.
If it were possible to “shrink” the public
conceptions of the
objectives of both
sides in the
conflict and of the
issues at stake in
it to a dispute over
sovereignty over
these four
Russian-majority
oblasts and if
either side or
another credible
state actor were to
propose publicly to
stop the fighting
and let the people
choose, the
leaderships of both
sides would be
offered an essential
face-saving
“off-ramp”.
Opting for a democratic choice would not
require any
politicians
themselves to agree
to relinquish their
sovereignty claims,
for which they could
expect, at a
minimum, to be
harshly criticized.
Notwithstanding the
overwhelming results
of the September
referendums, which
were rushed, were
held only in the
portions of these
oblasts then under
Russian control and
understandably
attracted few voters
who were not
pro-Russian, the
results of new,
internationally
organized
referendums would be
genuinely uncertain.
Politicians on both
sides could express
complete confidence
that the people
would vote “their
way”. If, months
after the fighting
ended, some or all
of them did not, at
least the war would
have ended.
If Western leaders believe that a majority of
those who were
living prior to
February 24, 2022 in
any of these
four oblasts would
prefer their oblasts
to be part of
Ukraine, they should
call promptly for a
ceasefire and
internationally
organized
referendums to
choose
democratically
between the two
claimants,
rationally viewing
such an approach as
offering vastly
better possibilities
for restoring the
greatest possible
degree of
territorial
integrity for
Ukraine than the
current approach of
perpetuating the
appalling deaths and
destruction in
Ukraine and the
worldwide collateral
damage “for as long
as it takes”.
Furthermore, if the West were to propose an
armistice and
potential peace on
this basis, if
Ukraine were to
accept the proposal
(as would presumably
be assured in
advance) and if
Russia were to
reject it, Russia
would be effectively
telling the world
that it fears that a
majority of the
people in one or
more of these
oblasts would prefer
their oblast to be
part of Ukraine and
that it therefore
prefers to seek to
enforce its
sovereignty claim by
military force
rather than to let
the issue be decided
democratically by
the people most
directly concerned.
In this event, the
current tolerance of
governments
representing the
vast majority of
mankind for Russia’s
“special military
operation” would be
seriously
compromised.
If, faced with such a Solomonic choice, Russia
were to accept the
proposal, which is
not inconceivable,
the conflict would
end with the
proclaimed struggle
between democracy
and authoritarianism
being resolved
through exercises of
democratic choice.
Unless Western leaders accept the Russian
contention that a
majority of the
people in all four
oblasts genuinely
prefer that their
oblasts be part of
Russia and view this
potential popular
choice as
intolerable, what is
the West waiting
for?
Western governments which are currently
trumpeting the
absolute and
universal
applicability of the
principle of the
territorial
integrity of states
had no problem with
supporting and
prioritizing the
principle of the
self-determination
of peoples in
Eritrea, East Timor,
South Sudan and,
with a heavy helping
hand from 78 days of
NATO bombing in
flagrant violation
of international
law, Kosovo.
In all these cases, the self-determination
choice of the people
was confirmed by
internationally
organized
referendums. Of
course, in these
four instances, the
results of the
referendums were
never in doubt,
whereas no one can
be certain of the
results of
internationally
organized
referendums in these
four contested
oblasts. This
distinction should
not make the
self-determination
referendum precedent
less relevant.
Indeed, it should
make it more
relevant and
promising for those
genuinely seeking a
face-saving way for
the relevant
politicians to end
this war.
Those on either side of this conflict who
prefer to decide the
sovereignty issue
with respect to
these four oblasts
by yet more deaths
and destruction in
Ukraine, necessarily
entailing yet more
worldwide collateral
damage, with no
guarantee of their
eventual “victory”
and with a genuine
risk of escalation
to nuclear war if
either Russia or the
United States felt
itself to be facing
a humiliating
defeat, rather than
by the democratic
choices of the
people most
concerned should be
obligated to explain
and try to justify
their preference.
John V. Whitbeck
is a Paris-based
international
lawyer.
https://www.counterpunch.org/2023/03/17/a-democratic-end-to-ukraines-war