A Huthi military helicopter flies over the Galaxy Leader cargo ship in the Red Sea on November 19, 2023
Since late 2022, Ansar Allah and the Saudi authorities have
negotiated directly. An agreement would enable the Saudis to declare a
‘successful’ end to their involvement in the Yemen civil war, their
objective for at least three full years. In April 2023, a senior Saudi
delegation visited Sana’a officially and agreement appeared close. It
did not happen. In September a senior Ansar Allah delegation visited
Riyadh and was officially received by Prince Khaled bin Salman, the
defence minister but, again, contrary to expectation, no agreement was
announced.
Since then, negotiations have continued and recent statements have
suggested that agreement is about to be reached. The main Huthi
concession to date has been to agree that Saudi Arabia would sign as
mediator, not participant, as the latter would leave the kingdom open to
legal accusations of war crimes for its actions in the war. This means
that any agreement would be formally between the Huthis and the
Internationally Recognised Government (IRG), despite the latter having
had no input of substance in negotiations. In addition to a ceasefire
and ending cross-border attacks by both sides, the Saudis agree to pay
all Yemeni government staff salaries for a year including Huthi military
and security forces, the full re-opening of Hodeida ports, and
additional destinations for flights from Sana’a airport. The Huthis
would ‘allow’ the IRG to export oil (interrupted since November 2022
following Huthi strikes on ships in the Arabian Sea exporting ports).
The UN Special Envoy’s team would be left with the task of forming
economic, political and military committees to prepare ‘peace’
negotiations between the two Yemeni parties. Such a deal would only mean
ending Saudi open involvement. On the ground it would further weaken
the anti-Huthi front.
While the likely Ansar Allah reluctance to formally put an end to the
war against the Saudis remains an issue, (see our posting of January 2023)
the new element, which may well sink the agreement, is the war in Gaza.
Within weeks of Israeli genocidal bombing in Gaza, the Huthis have
taken military action to support the Palestinians (our posting of October 2023).
By contrast with the situation in Iraq and Syria where the US has
responded militarily to attacks, it has been remarkably mild in its
response to Huthi strikes against Israeli connected shipping in the Red
Sea.
Since mid-October Huthi missiles and drones are frequently launched
northwards, attempting to reach sites in southern Israel. Most of them
are intercepted in the Red Sea by US and other naval forces and, given distance and range, the Huthis are not a serious military threat to the Israelis.
By contrast, their ability to attack ships in the Red Sea is more
effective. The seizure of the Galaxy Leader on 19 November has enabled
the Huthis to turn it into a tourist attraction
staging cultural events onboard. The movement has increased its attacks
on ships with any connection to Israel, including hitting the Norwegian Strinda on 11 December and the Maersk Gibraltar
on 14 December and others causing, at most, minor fires. Ships with
Israeli connections have been diverted and re-routed creating additional costs
of up to US$ 3 billion for Israel whose officials have pointed out that
they will take action unless the international community does. Most
significantly, they have diverted their fleets away from the Red Sea, an
expensive decision.
Huthi actions are deeply embarrassing for both the Saudis and the US.
The Saudis want their deal with the Huthis to be signed and sealed
before the situation deteriorates further and it becomes politically
impossible to proceed and thus scupper their determination to declare an
end to the Yemeni war. At the same time, they cannot publicly object to
attacks against Israel and draw attention to their own passivity as
Palestinians are being killed by the thousands. So they have gone so far
as to encourage the US to exercise restraint in response to Huthi attacks in the Red Sea.
For the US administration, the situation is, if anything, worse.
Having deployed massive naval hardware in the region, lack of response
raises questions at home and in Israel. The Biden regime is caught
between unquestioned support for Israel and its objective to end the war
in Yemen, an early ambition of his presidency and one of its few
potential successes, given the stalemate in the ongoing war in Ukraine
and the growing unpopularity of support for Israel. On 5 December US
National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said
“We are in talks with other countries about a maritime task force of
sorts involving the ships from partner nations alongside the United
States in ensuring safe passage,” and on Thursday 14 December he said
that Washington wanted the "broadest possible" maritime coalition to
protect ships in the Red Sea and he signalled to the Huthis that
"attacks would not be tolerated." It isn’t clear whether Yemen’s IRG has
been invited to join the maritime coalition. On 17 December, it was
reported that Secretary for Defence Austin would announce its
composition during his current trip to the region.
In the fog of wars at the end of 2023 the situation in Yemen remains
fraught and the population’s suffering is worsening. Huthi actions in
support of Palestine may lead to military attacks on Yemen. The
Saudi-Huthi agreement hangs in the balance. As elsewhere prospects for
2024 are grim.