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The Islamic Republic is approaching an inflection point.
By: Kamran Bokhari
After China and
Russia, Iran is the biggest foreign policy challenge for the United
States, one that has bedeviled successive administrations for nearly
half a century. The Islamic Republic has long exploited chronic
weaknesses in the Arab world, especially with regard to Israel, and
built a broad sphere of influence in the Middle East. Though no single
country in the region can counter Iran, Tehran is approaching the
natural limits of its expansion. The most important of these are
domestic political demands, which require the government’s attention as
it stands on the brink of evolutionary regime change.
![Iran's Topography]()
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On Dec. 31, U.S.
naval forces sunk three Houthi attack boats in the Red Sea. Until then,
Iran’s regional proxies, including the Yemeni Houthis who had been
attacking commercial vessels sailing through the region, had acted
mostly with impunity. Groups in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq understood that
other than the occasional Israeli or U.S. attack on their facilities, no
one was going to check their advances. In fact, Saudi Arabia, the de
facto leader of the Arab world, has urged Washington to exercise
restraint against the Houthis for fear of a wider regional
conflagration.
Riyadh’s reaction
is in some ways understandable; there is domestic pressure on the
kingdom to somehow end the war in Gaza, and the seven-year conflict it
waged in Yemen – a disaster in its own right – has only solidified the
position of the Houthis. Its decision to fight this war stemmed from the
fact that the U.S., having seen its decades-long campaign in Iraq be
followed by years of tumult after the Arab Spring, was no longer
interested in embroiling itself in the Middle East beyond limited
interventions against transnational jihadists. Saudi Arabia and the
Houthis halted hostilities in 2022, and Riyadh has been trying to reach
an accommodation with the Iranians ever since – a process that led to
the restoration of diplomatic relations last June.
The Saudi
government believes these efforts enable it to manage regional security
more effectively. It does not believe these efforts will compel Iran to
abandon its goal to dominate the Middle East. This explains why the
kingdom was feverishly working to normalize relations with Israel – a
goal that was torpedoed by Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack. Riyadh’s strategy to
halt Iran consists of a combination of U.S. oversight, restoring ties
with Tehran and forging diplomatic relations with Israel.
Saudi Arabia’s
ultimate problem is that, whereas the Iran-led Shiite camp is largely
cohesive, the Sunni camp is deeply fragmented. Turkey, for example,
could make for a strong counterweight against Iran, but Arab states do
not want to defeat Iran only to end up being dominated by Turks. For
now, it’s a moot point anyway; not only is Ankara hemmed in by Iran
through both Iraq and Syria, but it is also undergoing a financial
crisis that requires Arab investment to resolve.
Though there are
no regional states capable of decisively confronting the Islamic
Republic, there are other factors endemic to Iran that will prevent it
from dominating the region. For one thing, it is an ethnically Persian
country that would struggle to wield control in Arab countries. It has
been able to circumvent this obstacle by supporting Shiite groups from
its borders to the Eastern Mediterranean. And as is evident with Iran’s
relationship with Hamas, Tehran has been able to bridge the geosectarian
divide by developing some Sunni proxies. Here, it leverages a shared
Islamist ideology with the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, of which Hamas is
an offshoot. Far more significantly though, Iran has positioned itself
as the champion of the Palestinian cause at a time when Arab states are
seen as sympathetic to Israel. Indeed, Turkey and Qatar also support
Hamas, but their behavior is reactive, often coming in response to
Iranian actions.
![Shiite Population in the Middle East]()
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But however
successful Iran’s strategy has been in supporting groups from the
Arabian Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean, it has extended its arc of
influence about as far as it can go. Demographic factors such as the
fact that non-Persians constitute more than half of Iran’s population,
as well as the relative stability of Arab monarchies and strength of
Israel, make it very difficult for Iran to penetrate further into the
region. The massive sanctions regime is another key obstacle to any
further external advances.
![Iran's Ethnic and Religious Composition]()
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Add to this the
pending transition to a new supreme leader at a time when the ruling
elite are bitterly divided, and Iran is left at a pivotal moment – not
just in how it evolves as a country but also in how it maintains its
geopolitical holdings in the region. |