




Study of U.S. Public Attitudes on the Trump Indictment, Zionism and Antisemitism in America, and the Ukraine War

Shibley Telhami and Michael Hanmer, Principal Investigators


Over a quarter of Americans said they viewed Trump less favorably since his indictment, but two-thirds said their views were unaffected

Q. As you may have heard, former President Donald Trump has been indicted by the Justice Department over his handling of classified documents. How does this impact your view of Donald Trump? It makes it:




Most Americans were unfamiliar with Zionism, but more respondents expressed negative than positive impressions

Q. What is your impression of Zionism? [A Lot/Somewhat]




Nearly half of Americans did not know if anti-Israeli policy views constituted antisemitism, but most of those with opinions said such views were not antisemitic

Q. Which of the following attitudes constitute antisemitism? [Against Israeli Policies]



Number of Americans who wanted to 'stay the course' in Ukraine for as long as it takes increased since March 2023, but the partisan divide remained wide

Q. How long should the U.S. stay the course in supporting Ukraine? [As long as it takes]



Study of U.S. Public Attitudes on the Trump Indictment, Zionism and Antisemitism in America, and the Ukraine War

In 2023, the University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll with Ipsos fielded two large, nationally representative polls related to top domestic and foreign issues, including former President Donald Trump's indictment, Americans' views on antisemitism and Zionism, and the ongoing Ukraine War. In addition, in October 2023, the Critical Issues Poll fielded an omnibus poll with Ipsos asking respondents about the war in Ukraine. This report analyzes the resulting attitudes of Americans on these issues.

Examining American Public Views on the Trump Indictment

The Critical Issues Poll fielded June 20-27, 2023 asked Americans about their views on the June 9, 2023 indictment of former President Donald Trump by a Florida grand jury over his retention of classified documents after leaving the office of the presidency, where he was [charged](#) with thirty-seven felonies. It should be noted however, that on June 27th, the federal prosecutors issued a superseding indictment adding three additional felony charges. This was the second indictment Trump had received at the time this poll was fielded, with the first being the one on March 30, 2023, when Trump was [indicted](#) by a New York grand jury and charged with thirty-four felony counts related to the falsifying of business records. In the months after this poll was fielded, Trump has been indicted in two additional cases relating to the 2020 Georgia election interference and the January 6th insurrection. However, this poll was focused on only the indictment relating to the retention of classified documents, and the responses were captured before the indictment on the classified documents was revised and before the two additional indictments.

While a majority of Americans' views of Donald Trump were unchanged after his indictment, over a quarter viewed Trump less favorably

Respondents in the June 2023 poll were asked three questions about Trump's indictment regarding retention of classified documents. The first question was whether the indictment had an impact on respondents' views of Donald Trump, the second was whether it impacted their likely vote in the next election, and the third was on how the U.S. Justice Department was treating Trump. As expected, there was a large partisan divide with all three questions.


When asked about how the indictment related to Trump's handling of classified documents impacted respondents' views, while a majority of Republicans said it did not change their view of Trump, 16% of Republicans said it made their view more favorable. However, almost the same number (15%) said it made their view less favorable. A majority of Democrats (62%) said the indictment did not change their view of Trump,

but 36% said their view was less favorable. Only 5% of independents said it made their view more favorable, with 29% saying their view was less favorable now and 66% saying it did not change their view.

Overall, the net favorability (the difference between more favorable and less favorable) was -20%, including -34% among Democrats, -24% among independents, and +1% among Republicans.

Over a quarter of Americans viewed Trump less favorably following his indictment

Q. As you may have heard, former President Donald Trump has been indicted by the Justice Department over his handling of classified documents. How does this impact your view of Donald Trump? It makes it:




However, even though 15% of Republicans said they viewed Trump less favorably after the June indictment, one-third of Republicans said they were more likely to vote for Trump now. In comparison, only 10% of independents said the same, with 28% of independents and 40% of Democrats saying they were more likely to vote for someone else following the June indictment. Although a majority of Republicans (54%), Democrats (56%), and independents (61%) said it did not change their position on voting for or against Trump.

While a majority of White, Black, and Hispanic respondents all said the indictment did not change their position on voting for or against Trump, 42% of Blacks and 32% of Hispanics said they would be more likely to vote for someone else following the indictment, with only 5% of Blacks saying the indictment made them more likely to vote for Trump. In comparison, 24% of Whites said they were now more likely to vote for someone else and 16% of both Whites and Hispanics said they were more likely to vote for Trump following the indictment over the handling of classified documents. However, a majority (54%) of the Black respondents who said they were more likely to vote for an

alternative candidate were Democrats and 39% of the Hispanic respondents who said they were more likely to vote for an alternative candidate were either Democrats or independents.

Black and Hispanic Americans more likely to vote for an alternative candidate than White Americans but majority said indictment had no impact on voting intentions

Q. How does the indictment impact your likely vote in the next presidential election, if Trump is the Republican candidate?




Looking at variation by age, 57% of both respondents who were under the age of 35 and those 35 and older said that the indictment did not change their position on voting for or against Trump. However, while 16% of older respondents said they were more likely to vote for Trump, only 12% of younger respondents agreed, with 31% saying they intended to vote for someone else (compared to 26% of those 35 years or older). While the sample was too small to draw full conclusions, the data suggests that even among young respondents, partisanship on this issue remains a key factor, with 36% of young Republicans saying they were more likely to vote for Trump compared to 40% of young Democrats who said they were more likely to vote for an alternative candidate. Thirty-one percent of independents also said they were more likely to support an alternative candidate. However, a majority of young Republicans, Democrats, and independents still said it did not change their vote. Keep in mind that when respondents said they are more or less likely to vote for Trump, it does not mean that they had not intended to vote for or against him prior to the indictment. It is strictly a measure of perception

against the baseline of respondents' attitudes not being affected by the indictment.

Young Americans less likely than older Americans to vote for Trump following indictment

Q. How does the indictment impact your likely vote in the next presidential election, if Trump is the Republican candidate?




Americans on the justice system: Trump is being treated differently than most people charged with similar crimes

When asked about the Justice Department's treatment of Trump, only 16% of respondents said that he was being treated like most people charged with similar crimes, but Democrats and Republicans felt very different about whether Trump was being treated better or worse than most people. One-third of respondents said the Justice Department treated President Trump better, including 59% of Democrats. Thirty percent said he was being treated worse, including two-thirds of Republicans.

Americans said Trump treated differently by Justice Department but there is deep partisan divide over whether treatment was better or worse than most charged with similar crimes


Q. How do you think Trump is being treated by the U.S. Justice Department?



However, partisanship was not the only major dividing factor for this issue. Thirty-seven percent of Whites said Trump was being treated worse compared to a quarter of Hispanics and only 10% of Blacks. Forty-six percent of Blacks and 34% of Hispanics said Trump was being treated better than other people with similar crimes, compared to 30% of Whites. The disparity between White and Black respondents could be partially explained by the fact that Blacks are less likely to think the justice system in the United States treats all people fairly. According to a [2015 Kaiser Family Foundation/CNN Survey on Americans on Race](#), 86% of Blacks said that the criminal justice system favors Whites over Blacks, compared to 48% of Whites who said the same. Another survey by [Pew in 2019](#), found that 87% of Blacks said that Blacks are treated less fairly than Whites by the criminal justice system, compared to 61% of Whites and 65% of all respondents.

Black Americans more likely to say Trump treated better than most charged with similar crimes

Q. How do you think Trump is being treated by the U.S. Justice Department?



There was also a divide between older and younger Americans. Thirty-three percent of respondents who are 35 years or older said that Trump was being treated worse compared to 21% of respondents under 35 years old. However, 34% of older respondents said that Trump was being treated better than others charged with similar crimes, compared to 31% of younger respondents. One explanation for these results could be that, as with the impact of the indictment on the views and likelihood of voting for Trump, partisanship was still a major factor. While the data for young respondents broken down by party was too small to draw conclusions, the data for older respondents showed the partisan divide. Breaking down the responses by respondents 35 years and older by party, we found that 70% of Republicans 35 years or older said Trump was being treated worse, compared to just 7% who said he was being treated better. Sixty-two percent of Democrats 35 years and older said he was being treated better compared to just 4% who said he was being treated worse. Independents were more split, with 26% of those 35 years or older saying Trump was being treated worse but 40% saying he was being treated better. However, the one point all Americans, regardless of party or age, agreed upon was that Trump was not being treated like most people, with only 15% of respondents under 35 years of age and 16% of respondents 35 years or older saying he was treated like most people charged with similar crimes, including 9% of Republicans, 23% of Democrats, and 16% of independents aged 35 years or older.

Americans who earned at least a college-level degree also said that Trump was being treated better than most people charged with similar crimes. Thirty-nine percent of respondents with bachelor's degrees or higher had that opinion, compared to 28% of

those with a high school diploma or less education than high school. Only 21% of respondents with a bachelor's degree or higher and 16% of respondents with a high school diploma or less education than high school said Trump is being treated like others charged with similar crimes.

U.S. Public Attitudes on Zionism and Antisemitism in America

Most Americans were unfamiliar with “Zionism” but among those who were familiar, more said their impression was negative than positive


With the [increase](#) in antisemitic incidents in America in recent years, we decided to ask Americans their views on Zionism and antisemitism to see how familiar Americans were with the concept and whether they saw various attitudes as antisemitic. As [explained](#) in the July article which analyzed the initial findings, when asking about what attitudes constitute antisemitism, we included attitudes against both Judaism and Jews because “we found that Americans tend to express more prejudice against religions than people, as our [2015 poll](#) on Islam and Muslims found, with some speculations about possible reasons.”

Sixty-two percent of respondents either lacked knowledge of or were unfamiliar with Zionism, but 19% of respondents held neutral opinions about Zionism (neither positive nor negative) and more respondents viewed Zionism negatively (12%) than positively (8%). The unfamiliarity with Zionism spanned various groups and ideologies. For example, 57% of Republicans, 64% of Democrats, and 59% of independents were either unfamiliar with or lacked knowledge of the concept. However, among respondents who are familiar with the concept, almost a majority (49%) said they had neither a positive nor negative impression of Zionism, including 50% of Republicans and 43% of Democrats. But even among those who were familiar, more respondents held negative impressions than positive ones. Thirty-one percent, including 36% of Democrats and 33% of independents, held negative impressions of Zionism compared to 21% of respondents who held positive views, including 20% of Democrats and 14% of independents. Republicans were the only political group that had more of a positive

impression (32%) than negative (18%).

Most Americans were unfamiliar with Zionism, but held a more negative impression than positive one

Q. What is your impression of Zionism?
 [Combining Somewhat/A Lot]



A similar pattern is seen with different races and ethnicities: 59% of Whites, 73% of Blacks, and 62% of Hispanics do not know or are unfamiliar with Zionism, but all held more negative than positive impressions of Zionism. While 15% of Blacks and 20% of Hispanics said they held neutral impressions, 8% and 13% of Blacks and Hispanics, respectively, said their impression was negative compared to just 5% of both Blacks and Hispanics who said it was positive. Among those who did know, 46% of Whites had a neutral impression and 29% held a negative view compared to 24% who had a positive view. Due to the large number of Blacks and Hispanics who said they did not know, the sample was too small to draw full conclusions but suggested that a majority of Black and Hispanic respondents who had an opinion had neither a negative nor positive impression (55% and 53%, respectively) but more said negative (28% and 33%, respectively) than positive (17% and 14%, respectively).

Seventy-one percent of respondents under the age of 35 and 59% of respondents 35 years or older said they were unfamiliar with the term or did not know. Looking at only those who knew, older respondents were more split between whether Zionism is a positive or negative concept, with 23% saying positive and 28% saying negative (49% were neutral). Younger respondents (those under 35 years of age) were more likely to say they held a negative impression of Zionism (38%) more than a positive one (15%), although a plurality (46%) said it was neither negative nor positive.

The unfamiliarity, however, decreased as the education level increased. Seventy-five percent of both respondents with no high school diploma and respondents who received

only a high school diploma or GED did not know this concept. That dropped to 51% of respondents with a bachelor's degree and 44% of people with a master's degree responded that they were unfamiliar with the term. Among those who knew, a majority (53%) of those with only a high school diploma or less than a high school diploma said they held a neutral impression of Zionism, compared to 45% of those who received a bachelor's degree or higher post-graduate education. Those with only a high school diploma or who did not graduate high school were more split on whether their impression of Zionism was positive or negative, with 25% saying negative to 22% saying positive. Those with at least a bachelor's degree were less split and their impression was more negative (35%) than positive (20%).

Looking at religion, 64% of Catholics and 61% of Evangelical or Protestant Christians were unfamiliar with or did not know about Zionism. Looking specifically at Evangelicals, who are [largely](#) pro-Israel, especially as a voting block in America, 60% of Evangelical Christians are unfamiliar with or do not know about Zionism, compared to 64% of non-Evangelical Christians. Fourteen percent of Evangelical Christians, compared to just 7% of non-Evangelical Christians, said they held a somewhat or very positive view of Zionism. Of those who were familiar, 34% of Evangelical Christians said they held a positive impression of Zionism, compared to 18% of non-Evangelical Christians and 24% of all respondents.

Americans were less likely to say attitudes against Judaism constituted antisemitism than attitudes against Jews

Fifty-eight percent of respondents, including 56% of Republicans and 63% of Democrats, said that attitudes against Jews constituted antisemitism. However, 31% of respondents, including one-third of Republicans and 28% of Democrats said they did not know. While 32% of respondents under the age of 35 and 30% of respondents 35 years and older did not know whether attitudes against Jews constituted antisemitism, 51% of young respondents and 61% of respondents 35 years or older said that it was antisemitic.


However, when asked if attitudes against Judaism constituted antisemitism, only 47% of respondents said yes. While half of Democrats said attitudes against Judaism constituted antisemitism, 46% of Republicans said the same. The younger generation was even less confident that these types of attitudes constituted antisemitism, with 42% of respondents under the age of 35 saying it did, compared to 49% of respondents 35 years and older. While the sample size of young respondents broken by political party affiliation was too small to draw any full conclusions, the data suggested that young Republicans were the least likely to identify attitudes against Judaism as antisemitic, with only 29% saying it was and 40% saying they did not know. Meanwhile, 52% of young Democrats said it was.

These findings fit with the trend we [noted](#) with our 2015 poll about Muslims and Islam, that Americans tend to express more prejudice against religion than people.

Americans were less likely to see attitudes against Judaism as antisemitic than attitudes against Jews


Q. Which of the following attitudes constitute antisemitism?

Against Jews



Q. Which of the following attitudes constitute antisemitism?


Against Judaism



We also asked whether it was antisemitic to be against Zionism and Israeli policies. Sixty-two percent of respondents said they did not know if it was antisemitic to be against Zionism. Among those who offered an opinion, a majority (56%) said attitudes against Zionism are not antisemitic, including 64% of Democrats but only 44% of Republicans. A majority of Republicans (52%) said it was antisemitic to be against Zionism. Examining the views of those who offered an opinion by race and ethnicity, 53% of Whites said that anti-Zionism attitudes were not antisemitic, compared to 59% of Blacks and 65% of Hispanics.

More Americans said attitudes against Zionism were not antisemitic, but Republicans were split


Q. Which of the following attitudes constitute antisemitism?
Against Zionism



For attitudes against Israeli policies, while 48% of respondents said they did not know, only 15% said it was antisemitic and 37% said it was not. Forty-five percent of Democrats said they did not know but 42% said it was not antisemitic to be against Israeli policies. Republicans were again more split, with 48% saying they did not know while 22% said it did constitute antisemitism and 29% said it was not antisemitic. When looking at only those who did know, 70% of respondents said attitudes against Israeli policies did not constitute antisemitism, including 76% of Democrats. Republicans who did know were still split, but 56% still said it was not antisemitic.

Over one-third of Americans said it was not antisemitic to oppose Israeli policies


Q. Which of the following attitudes constitute antisemitism?
Against Israeli Policies




While most respondents said attitudes against Jews constituted antisemitism, including 65% of Whites and 49% of Hispanics, only 36% of Blacks said it was antisemitic, with 47% saying they did not know. Again, with attitudes against Judaism, while 55% of Whites said it was antisemitic, only a quarter of Blacks said the same, with a majority saying they did not know. Hispanics were almost tied with 39% saying it was antisemitic and 38% saying they did not know. Black respondents were the largest racial/ethnic group to say they did not know for either Jews or Judaism, by over 10 percentage points when compared to Hispanic or White respondents. However, the trend that people tend to hold more prejudice against religion, is still seen among Black respondents, where 11 percentage points more Blacks said attitudes against Jews constituted antisemitism than attitudes against Judaism. This was also seen among Hispanic respondents (49% compared to 39%, respectively) and White respondents (65% compared to 55%, respectively). Among those who knew, the trend was even more evident, where 67% of Black respondents who knew said attitudes against Jews were antisemitic, compared to 49% who said the same about Judaism. Among Hispanic respondents who knew, it was 74% to 63%, respectively, and among White respondents who knew it was 90% to 81%, respectively.

Black Americans were more likely to say they didn't know whether attitudes against Jews or Judaism constituted antisemitism

Q. Which of the following attitudes constitute antisemitism?
Against Jews



Q. Which of the following attitudes constitute antisemitism?
Against Judaism



Nevertheless, 37% of respondents said that the level of antisemitism in the United States was increasing compared to five years ago, while 25% said it remained about the same, and 32% were unsure about this matter. This issue was also divided along party lines, with 47% of Democrats reporting that antisemitism was on the rise, in contrast to 24% of Republicans. When looking only among those who knew, a majority of respondents (55%) including 62% of Democrats said antisemitism was increasing. While a plurality (48%) of Republicans agreed, 42% said the levels were about the same compared to five years ago.

Regarding race, Blacks were still more reserved regarding antisemitism. Twenty-seven percent of Blacks said antisemitism was increasing, compared to 39% of Whites and 36% of Hispanics. Forty-two percent of Blacks said they did not know. Among those who knew, a majority of Whites (56%) and Hispanics (54%) said antisemitism had increased in the last five years. Forty-seven percent of Blacks said antisemitism had increased within the last five years, with 45% saying it has stayed about the same. Education also played a role in the perception of antisemitism. Thirty percent of respondents with a high school diploma or who did not graduate high school said it had increased, compared to 43% of respondents with at least a bachelor's degree. However, whereas 18% of those with at least a bachelor's degree said they did not know, 45% of those with only a high school education did not know. Excluding those responses, the gap shrank, with 54% of those with only a high school education saying antisemitism has increased and 53% of those with a bachelor's degree or higher saying the same.

While 41% of older respondents said the level of antisemitism had increased, only 27% of younger respondents (under 35 years old) said the same, with a quarter of young respondents and 26% of older respondents said that it had stayed about the same. Twenty-nine percent of older respondents said they did not know, 41% of younger respondents said the same. However, when excluding those responses, young respondents still lagged behind older respondents in their belief that antisemitism has increased, with only 45% of young respondents saying such compared to 58% of older respondents.

Nearly half of respondents (48%) had the impression that the labeling of people as antisemitic was being used by the American political discourse to describe people who are genuinely antisemitic, with a majority (51%) saying it was being used to delegitimize political opponents. Forty-nine percent also said it was used to delegitimize critics of Israel. While 57% of Democrats said the labeling of people as antisemitic was being used to describe genuine antisemites, only 45% of Republicans said the same. The variation comes in those who said it was used frequently versus sometimes. Where 32% of Republicans and 30% of Democrats said it was used sometimes to label genuine antisemites, double the number of Democrats (28%) said it was used frequently compared to Republicans (14%). Looking at whether the label is used to delegitimize political opponents, there was less partisan division. Fifty-six percent of Republicans and 52% of Democrats said it was frequently or sometimes used to do so, however, more Republicans said it was used frequently (26% compared to 17% of Democrats) and more Democrats said it was used sometimes (34% compared to 29% of Republicans). For being used to delegitimize critics of Israel, 52% of Republicans and 53% of Democrat said the antisemitic label was being used for that purpose. Unlike the other options, Republicans and Democrats both similarly said it was used frequently (22% and 23%, respectively) and sometimes (30% of both).

Younger respondents were less likely to say that the label was used on people who genuinely are antisemitic. Where over half (51%) of older respondents said it was, only 40% of respondents under 35 years of age agreed. While 40% of younger respondents did say they did not know, compared to only one-third of older respondents, when excluding those responses, there is still a 9-percentage point gap between young and older respondents who believe it was used to genuinely describe antisemites (67% to 76%, respectively). A similar trend was seen with the both the label 'antisemitic' being used to delegitimize political opponents and critics of Israel. Forty-five percent of younger respondents said it was used to delegitimize political opponents (compared to 53% of older respondents) and 41% said it is used to delegitimize critics of Israel (compared to 52% of older respondents). However, with political opponents, 42% of younger respondents said they did not know, compared to 34% of older respondents. Once those responses were excluded, the gap was significantly smaller, with 78% of

young respondents and 80% of older respondents saying it was used frequently or sometimes to describe political opponents. Looking at its use against critics of Israel, there was still a significant gap when excluding the 46% of young respondents who said they did not know (and the 37% of older respondents who did not know), 75% to 82% of older respondents.

Trends in American Public Opinion on the Ukraine War

The war in Ukraine remains a highly partisan issue, with Republicans and Democrats becoming [increasingly](#) divided in Congress on whether to continue to support Ukraine which escalated to a degree that it nearly [caused](#) a shutdown of the entire U.S. government at the end of August 2023. The Critical Issues Poll has been analyzing U.S. public opinion on the war since March 2022, one month after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In the beginning, the polling showed strong bipartisan support for the war, and then it began to show signs of increasing partisanship over the issue of supporting Ukraine. However, as noted in our [January 2023 report](#), support for Ukraine remained strong among Americans through October 2022 and although young Americans were less likely to see Ukraine as winning, they were more willing to bear the costs of supporting Ukraine. By April 2023, the results had shifted. As reported in an [April 2023 Brookings article](#), Americans were beginning to “show signs of impatience with [the] Ukraine war,” with a plurality of Americans saying the U.S. should only stay the course in supporting Ukraine for one to two years (46%) and when looking at whether Americans were willing to pay a price in rising energy costs, higher inflation, and the loss of lives in U.S. troops for supporting Ukraine, there was “a marked drop on all three measures ranging from 9-15 points.” The June and October 2023 polling conducted by the Critical Issues Poll saw these trends of declining support and the American public’s disengagement from the war continue.


American public support for Ukraine has dropped since October 2022 as fewer Americans believe Ukraine is winning

In the June 2023 poll, while 38% of respondents said Russia was failing, only 28% said Ukraine was succeeding. Compared to a year ago, more respondents said Russia was failing in its war efforts (from 29% to 38%), although the number of respondents who said Russia was failing decreased significantly from October 2022, when it was 48%. But in June 2023, the majority still did not know about the performance of Ukraine (30%) or said the country was neither succeeding nor failing the war (31%), consistent with the June 2022 poll (40% said neither) and the March-April 2023 poll (38% said neither). With the exception of October 2022, when 43% of respondents said Ukraine was succeeding, only around a quarter of respondents have said Ukraine was succeeding in

its war efforts since we began asking this question in June 2022. In October 2023, we again asked if respondents saw Russia and Ukraine as succeeding or failing in their war efforts. While the change from June for respondents who said Russia was failing was within the margin of error at 37%, there was a slight drop (26% from 28%) in respondents who said Ukraine was succeeding in October 2023.

Most Americans do not know if Ukraine or Russia are succeeding or failing, but assessments have remained the same since March-April 2023


Q. What is your impression of the performance of the following parties in the war in Ukraine?



Respondents were also less prepared to pay the costs of supporting Ukraine in June 2023. Compared to June 2022, respondents were 12 percentage points less willing to endure higher energy costs (from 62% to 50%) and 10 percentage points less willing to see increased inflation (58% to 48%, respectively). It should be noted that a majority of respondents were no longer prepared to see increased inflation as a cost of supporting Ukraine in June 2023, a trend continuing from March-April 2023, when it first dropped below a majority at 46%. The willingness to endure the loss of lives of U.S. troops also dropped 10 percentage points from 38% to 28%. Even among those who said Ukraine was succeeding, 58% said they were prepared for higher energy prices as a cost of supporting Ukraine, and 56% were prepared for increased inflation in June 2023, compared to June 2022 where it was 74% and 68% respectively.

Americans less willing to bear the costs of supporting Ukraine since March-April 2023


Q. How much of a cost are you prepared to see the U.S. pay in helping Ukraine?
 [A lot/Somewhat]



It should be noted that the June 2023 poll was in the field during the [mutiny](#) in Russia, carried out by the paramilitary group Wagner. We saw a small increase in support from March-April 2023 to June 2023 as a result; however, the biggest impact of the mutiny observed in our polling was the increase in partisanship between Democrats and Republicans. As [noted](#) in a July article after the data was first released, “the partisan divide on Ukraine appeared larger after the mutiny...One reason for this divergence in the reaction to the mutiny between Democrats and Republicans may be that we are entering our presidential campaign season, which is always polarizing. If the mutiny is seen as a possible success for President Joe Biden’s policy in Ukraine, this could further encourage Democrats to stay the course and raise Republican fears that events will help Democrats in the election.” Examining this partisanship from March-April 2023 to October 2023, it appears the brief jump in support from Democrats quickly faded. In the March-April 2023 poll, 35% of Democrats said that Ukraine was succeeding, this rose to 39% in June 2023 with the mutiny but has since dropped to 31% in October 2023.

There is a deep partisan divide on whether Ukraine is perceived as succeeding in its war efforts

Q. What is your impression of the performance of the following parties in the war in Ukraine? Ukraine is succeeding



The question of whether Americans were prepared for the costs of supporting Ukraine was not asked in October 2023, but we did ask two additional repeat questions from June 2023 to October 2023 that can give insight into how support for Ukraine was affected due to the mutiny. When asked about the current level of military expenditures, in June 2023, 45% of Democrats said it was about the right level. By October, 41% said it was the right level, returning it to nearly pre-mutiny levels of 40% in the March-April 2023 poll. There was also a decrease among Republicans in respondents saying the current level of military expenditure was about the right level, from 23% in June to 18% in October, which was lower than in March-April 2023 when it was 21%. Forty-eight percent of Republicans said the expenditure was too much in October 2023, compared to 45% in June; however, it remained lower than in March-April (50%).


Among those who said that Russia was failing in October 2023, 41% said that military expenditure was about the right level, compared to 46% in June. Among Republicans, it dropped from 40% to 24%, with 48% saying it was too much in October, compared to 35% in June. Among Democrats, it dropped from 56% to 51%. Looking at respondents who said Ukraine was succeeding, in October 2023, 49% said that military expenditures were at the right level, compared to 51% in June. Among Republicans, the decrease was from 42% to 31%. Among Democrats, it was from 62% in June to 57% in October.

However, despite the growing pessimism on whether Ukraine is succeeding and the decrease in support for military expenditures for Ukraine, Americans, and specifically Democrats, remain committed to supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes. Among Democrats, 57% said they want the US to stay the course in supporting Ukraine for as


long as it takes in both June 2023 and October 2023. This is an increase from March-April 2023, when 51% of Democrats said they were willing to support Ukraine for as long as it takes. However, the partisan divide remained large on this issue and there was a small decline among Republicans from June to October (31% to 29%). Support among Republicans still remained higher than in March-April 2023, when only a quarter of Republicans supported staying the course for as long as it takes. But in October 2023, just over half of Republicans (51%) instead preferred for the U.S. to only stay the course for an additional one to two years. This is a slight increase since June 2023 when it was 49%, however it has declined since March-April 2023, from 62%. Among Democrats, only 22% said the same, and Democrats support for this option has consistently declined since March-April 2023.

Number of Americans who want to stay the course in Ukraine for as long as it takes has increased since March 2023, but the partisan divide remains wide

Q. How long should the U.S. stay the course in supporting Ukraine?
1-2 years



Q. How long should the U.S. stay the course in supporting Ukraine?
As long as it takes



Among those who said Russia was failing, 55% said the US should stay the course for as long as it takes in both June and October. Among those who said Ukraine was succeeding it was nearly the same as well, 64% in October compared to 65% in June. Specifically looking at Democrats who said Ukraine was succeeding it decreased just three percentage points, from 73% to 70%, but among Republicans, it decreased from 55% to 43%.

Young Americans and non-Whites remain more willing to endure the costs of war in June 2023... but support is declining


Looking at the June 2023 data by age, the trend of young Americans being more willing to bear the costs of supporting Ukraine than older generations first reported in the

January 2023 report continues, but even young Americans are overall less prepared to pay the costs. Fifty-three percent of respondents under 35 years old were willing to pay higher energy prices compared to 50% of older respondents and 52% of young respondents were willing to see increased inflation compared to 47% of respondents 35 years and older. But compared to June 2022, these numbers decreased by 13 percentage points for higher energy costs (66% in June 2022) and increased inflation (65% in June 2022) among young respondents. However, the willingness to risk the lives of U.S. troops stayed consistent since June 2022, from 36% to 35% in the June 2023 poll, which is also eight percentage points higher than the willingness of older respondents (27%).

Blacks and Hispanic respondents also remained more willing to endure the costs of supporting Ukraine compared to White respondents. Fifty-five percent of Blacks and 56% of Hispanics were prepared to pay higher energy prices, compared to 48% of Whites. With increased inflation, 52% of Blacks and 57% of Hispanics were willing to bear this cost compared to 46% of Whites. Finally, Black and Hispanic respondents were more willing to risk the lives of U.S. troops (39% and 37% respectively) compared to only a quarter of White respondents. Comparing the June 2023 data to June 2022, Whites had a higher decline of support compared to Blacks when it came to enduring higher energy prices in supporting Ukraine, with an 11-percentage point decrease (from 59% to 48%) compared to just a three-percentage point difference for Blacks (from 58% to 55%). But on increased inflation and loss of lives of U.S. troops, White and Black respondents' support dropped nearly the same rate. Whites had a seven-percentage point and two-percentage point difference, respectively, and Blacks had a six-percentage point and one-percentage point difference, respectively. Overall, it was Hispanic respondents who showed the highest decline in support for Ukraine, with an 11-percentage point decrease in willingness to endure higher energy costs (from 67% to 56%), a 13-percentage point decrease for increased inflation (70% to 57%), and a six-percentage point decrease for loss of lives of U.S. troops (43% to 37%).

Black and Hispanic Americans are more willing to bear the costs of supporting Ukraine, but support is declining

Q. How much of a cost are you prepared to see the U.S. pay in helping Ukraine?



However, some of the disparity between White and non-White respondents could be explained by partisanship as 36% of the White respondents were Republican and 18% were Democrats, compared to 49% of the Black respondents and 33% of the Hispanic respondents who were Democrats. Seventeen percent of the Hispanic respondents and only 4% of the Black respondents were Republicans. While the data was too small to draw full conclusions, looking at the results broken by party and race, Black and Hispanic Democrats were less likely to be willing to endure higher energy costs and increased inflation compared to White Democrats. Sixty-seven percent of White Democrats were willing to endure higher energy costs and 59% were willing to endure increased inflation. In comparison, 53% of Black Democrats and 61% of Hispanic Democrats said they were willing to endure higher energy costs and 57% each of Black and Hispanic Democrats were willing to endure increased inflation. There is a nine-percentage point difference between White and non-White Democrats in their preparedness to see higher energy costs; and a three-percentage point difference between White and non-White Democrats on increased inflation, with White Democrats being more prepared to endure both. Black and Hispanic Democrats were more willing to risk the loss of lives of U.S. troops than White Democrats, (39% of Black and 35% of Hispanic, respectively to 22% of White).

As [noted](#) in our January 2023 report on Ukraine, by October 2022, Americans who were most likely to be impacted by the economic costs of supporting Ukraine remained more supportive than Americans with higher incomes who would be less impacted by rising energy costs or inflation. This was reversed from June 2022, when those who made

under \$100K were less willing to endure these costs compared to those who made over \$100K. By March-April 2023, income did not have a significant impact on willingness to endure higher energy costs, with 52% of those making less than \$100K a year and 51% of those making over \$100K a year willing to endure that cost. However, while 49% of those who made under \$100K were willing to see increased inflation in support of Ukraine, it was only 43% of those making \$100K or more. This trend continued in June 2023 when 51% of respondents who made under \$100K a year were willing to see higher energy costs in support of Ukraine compared to 49% of those who made over \$100K and 52% of respondents who made less than \$100K were willing to see increased inflation, compared to 44% of those who made over \$100K a year.

However, from October 2022, when we first observed the trend that those making less than \$100K were more supportive than Americans with higher incomes, the willingness to bear higher energy costs decreased by 11 percentage points among respondents making less than \$100K (from 63% in October 2022 to 52% in April 2023). For increased inflation, it decreased by 10 percentage points. From April 2023 to June 2023, there was a small increase within the margin of error in preparedness for higher energy costs and increased inflation. This increase could also be attributed to the mutiny in Russia giving Americans a greater sense that Ukraine could be succeeding which, as discussed above, led to a brief jump in support for U.S. efforts.

Education does not play a large role in whether Americans were willing to see higher energy prices or increased inflation, 50% of those who received a high school diploma or less than a high school level education were willing to pay higher energy costs compared to 54% who received a bachelor's degree or higher post-graduate degree and for increased inflation, it was 50% to 48%, respectively. The biggest impact of education level was the willingness to risk the lives of U.S. troops. While 38% of those who received a high school diploma or less than a high school education said they were prepared to risk the lives of U.S. troops, only 22% of respondents who received a bachelor's degree or higher post-graduate degree said the same.

The media's impact on support for Ukraine: Fox News viewers are less likely to say Ukraine has been successful and are less willing to bear the costs of supporting Ukraine

In the March 2022 Critical Issues Poll, conducted one month after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we examined how media played an important role in Americans' views on imposing a no-fly zone in Ukraine. As stated in an [April 2022 article](#), respondents whose primary source of political information was from Fox News were less likely to support no-fly zones compared to respondents who watched MSNBC or CNN. The article also highlights that the impact of media appears to supersede partisanship, stating, "both Republicans and Democrats who turn primarily to newspapers and magazines for news

were less likely to support a no-fly zone (36% and 51%, respectively) than Republicans and Democrats generally (52% and 61%, respectively).”

In March-April 2023, we asked again where respondents received their primary source of political information. Those who received their political information from Fox News held a different perception of the war compared to respondents who primarily got their political information from a different news source. Only 26% of Fox News viewers said Russia was failing compared to 49% of newspaper readers and 35% of network TV broadcast viewers. Eighteen percent of Fox News viewers said Ukraine was succeeding, compared to 36% and 26% of newspaper and network TV viewers, respectively.

Respondents who watched Fox News were also less likely to support U.S. involvement in the Ukraine war. Forty-six percent of Fox News viewers said that U.S. military expenditure was too much, compared to 27% of viewers who got their political information from network TV news (such as ABC, NBC, or CBS) or 33% who got it from newspapers and news magazines. Over a majority of respondents who got their political information from Fox News (65%) said the U.S. should only stay the course in supporting Ukraine for one to two years, compared 37% and 41% of respondents who said newspaper or network TV, respectively. Forty-six percent of respondents who got their news from newspapers and news magazines and 41% who got their news from network TV said the U.S. should stay the course for as long as it takes, compared to only 24% of respondents who got their news from Fox News. While Fox News viewers were less willing to endure higher energy costs (39%) than newspaper viewers (55%) or network TV viewers (53%) and were less prepared to see increased inflation (36%) compared to respondents who read newspapers (49%) or watched network TV (48%), they were more prepared to risk the lives of U.S. troops (33%) than those who said newspaper (22%) or network tv (29%).

Conclusion

While a majority of Americans remain supportive of U.S. aid to Ukraine, that support is beginning to decline, especially among certain ethnic and socio-economic groups, and the media continues to play a large role in how Americans perceive the war. Looking domestically, Americans remain widely partisan on most issues, including Donald Trump’s indictment and the prevalence of antisemitism in the U.S. In addition, Americans indicated that they did not believe the justice system was treating Donald Trump similarly to others charged with similar crimes, which could lead to further polarization and division even before and regardless of the outcome of the trials, especially during the 2024 election cycle.

Methodology

March-April 2023: [Ukraine War](#)

The survey was carried out March 27-April 5, 2023, among 1,203 respondents, with a margin of error of +/- 3.2%. The survey was conducted using Ipsos' KnowledgePanel®, a probability based online panel designed to be representative of the U.S. population. Initially, participants are chosen scientifically by a random selection of telephone numbers and residential addresses. Persons in selected households are then invited by telephone or by mail to participate in the web enabled KnowledgePanel. For those who agree to participate, but do not already have Internet access, Ipsos provides at no cost a laptop/netbook and ISP connection. People who already have computers and Internet service are permitted to participate using their own equipment. Panelists then receive unique log-in information for accessing surveys online, and then are sent emails throughout each month inviting them to participate in research.

June 2023: [Trump Indictment](#), [Zionism and Antisemitism](#), [Ukraine War](#)

The survey was carried out June 21-27, 2023, among 1,439 respondents, with a margin of error of +/- 2.9%. The survey was conducted using Ipsos' KnowledgePanel®, a probability-based online panel designed to be representative of the U.S. population. Initially, participants are chosen scientifically by a random selection of telephone numbers and residential addresses. Persons in selected households are then invited by telephone or by mail to participate in the web enabled KnowledgePanel. For those who agree to participate, but do not already have Internet access, Ipsos provides at no cost a laptop/netbook and ISP connection. People who already have computers and Internet service are permitted to participate using their own equipment. Panelists then receive unique log-in information for accessing surveys online, and then are sent emails throughout each month inviting them to participate in research.

September-October 2023: [Ukraine War](#)

The survey was carried out September 29-October 1, 2023, among 1,025 respondents, with a margin of error of +/- 3.3%. The survey was conducted using Ipsos' KnowledgePanel®, a probability-based online panel designed to be representative of the U.S. population. Initially, participants are chosen scientifically by a random selection of telephone numbers and residential addresses. Persons in selected households are then invited by telephone or by mail to participate in the web enabled KnowledgePanel. For those who agree to participate, but do not already have Internet access, Ipsos provides at no cost a laptop/netbook and ISP connection. People who already have computers and Internet service are permitted to participate using their own equipment. Panelists then receive unique log-in information for accessing surveys online, and then are sent emails throughout each month inviting them to participate in research.

Leadership for the Critical Issues Poll



Shibley Telhami is the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, College Park, and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Before coming to the University of Maryland, he taught at several universities, including the University of California at Berkeley, where he received his doctorate in political science. He has authored and edited numerous books, including one forthcoming book: *Peace Derailed: Obama, Trump, Biden, and the Decline of Diplomacy on Israel/Palestine, 2011-2022* (co-authored). His most recent book is a co-edited with contributions volume, *The One State Reality: What is Israel/Palestine?* which was published in March 2023 with Cornell University Press. He has advised every U.S. administration from George H.W. Bush to Barack Obama. Telhami was selected by the Carnegie Corporation of New York along with the New York Times as one of the "Great Immigrants" for 2013 and the Washingtonian Magazine listed him as one of the "Most Influential People on Foreign Affairs" in both 2022 and 2023. He is also the recipient of many awards including the University of Maryland's Distinguished Service Award and the University of Maryland's Honors College Outstanding Faculty Award.



Michael Hanmer is the Director of the Center for Democracy and Civic Engagement and a professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. He earned his PhD in Political Science at the University of Michigan in 2004. He specializes in American politics with an emphasis on voting rights, civic engagement, public opinion, and political methodology. He is the author of *Discount Voting: Voter Registration Reforms and Their Effects* (Cambridge University Press, 2009) and the co-author of *Citizens of the World: Political Engagement and Policy Attitudes of Millennials across the Globe* (Oxford University Press, 2023) and *Voting Technology: The Not-So-Simple Act of Casting a Ballot* (Brookings Institution Press, 2008). His current research investigates the expansion of voting rights, the intersection of sports and politics, how mobilization influences the use of new voting methods, vote over-reporting, how individuals evaluate the responsiveness of political leaders, and question-wording effects in surveys.

Analyst: Juan David Gelvez Ferreira, Doctoral Student in the Government and Politics Department

Coordinator and Analyst: Kirsten Langlois, Program Coordinator and Executive Assistant for the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development; Coordinator for the University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll

Advisory Committee for the Critical Issues Poll



Antoine Banks is Professor and the Interim Chair of the Government and Politics Department at the University of Maryland. He is also the Associate Chair and Director of the Government and Politics Experimental Lab. His research interests include racial and ethnic politics, emotions, political psychology, and public opinion. His book, *Anger and Racial Politics: The Emotional Foundation of Racial Attitudes in America*, published by Cambridge University Press, explores the link between emotions and racial attitudes and the consequences it has for political preferences. His articles have appeared in journals such as *American Journal of Political Science*, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *Political Behavior*, *Political Analysis*, and *Political Psychology*.



Ernesto Calvo is the Director of the Interdisciplinary Lab for Computational Social Science (iLCSS) and Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. His research centers on the study of comparative political institutions, social media, political representation, and social networks. His work lies at the intersection of big data, survey experiments, and institutions. He is the author of a number of books on comparative institutions and social media, including *Non-Policy Politics: Rich Voters, Poor Voters, and the Diversification of Electoral Strategies* (Cambridge University Press 2019) with María Victoria Murillo. Calvo has authored over 70 publications in the United States, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe. His research has been recognized by the American Political Science Association with the Lawrence Longley Award, the Luebbert Best Article Award, and the Michael Wallerstein Award.



Janelle Wong is Professor in the Departments of Government and Politics and American Studies and a core faculty member in the Asian American Studies Program. Wong authored two books, *Immigrants, Evangelicals and Politics in an Era of Demographic Change* (2018, Russell Sage Foundation), *Democracy's Promise: Immigrants and American Civic Institutions* (2006, University of Michigan Press) and co-author of two books on Asian American politics, including *Asian American Political Participation: Emerging Constituents and their Political Identities* (2011, Russell Sage Foundation), based on the first national, multilingual, multiethnic survey of Asian Americans. She was a co-principal investigator on the 2016 National Asian American Survey and on the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation). Wong is a Senior Researcher with AAPI Data.