A rally in Sana'a in support of Hamas and in protest against recent
US-UK air and missile strikes against the Huthis, Friday 12 January
[photo credit: Ansar Allah]
The Huthis have explicitly stated that their actions are in support
of Palestine and will cease as soon as the war and the blockade on
supplies to Gaza end. Their attacks were exclusively directed at ships
with an Israeli connection, whether destination or other. They have also
said that any ships which explicitly state that they have no Israeli
connections are welcome to use the Red Sea, and pointed out
that such a statement is ‘a low cost solution that will incur no
financial expenditures for any business. This measure does not need the
militarisation of the Red Sea and will not jeopardise international
navigation.’ While traffic in the Red Sea has reduced, it remains
considerable. Of course, having been targeted by the US and UK, the
Huthis have now expanded their own target list to include US and UK
naval forces.
Huthi popularity which had already increased massively in recent
months has further rocketed not only within Yemen but worldwide among
all those opposing the genocide in Gaza, including among thousands who
had previously never heard about them. Second, as has also been widely
stated, anti-Israeli positions from Russia, China, Iran and many others
are strengthening as an opinion piece in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz
pointed out. Third, the reputation of the US, UK and the west in
general as upholders of international law, human rights, and values of
basic morality is in tatters. Fourth these attacks confirm the
extraordinary level of ‘double speak’ which the US and UK are practising
in their current foreign policy. Contrary to their own statements and
those of many others, rather than try to calm the situation in the
Middle East, this action was an egregious case of serious escalation,
So what are the likely consequences of the new situation?
Internationally, the risk of further escalation is high. Is the US
willing to enter another ‘forever war’ in an election year, when Biden’s
chances of re-election, weak at the best of times, have dramatically
dropped as a result of his unquestioned support for Israel in Gaza? Iran
has, to date, issued formal support for Huthi actions, after having
withdrawn the ship it had sent to the Red Sea only weeks ago, giving the
impression that it is willing to fight Israel and support Palestine ‘to
the last Yemeni’. Despite media and other systematic accusations of
being the ‘backers’ ‘sponsors’ etc of the Huthis, the Iranians are wary
of getting involved directly. Besides it is important to remember that
Ansar Allah’s own ideology is the reason for Huthi actions, not its
relationship with Iran. In the Red Sea area itself, the most
significant impact will be on costs and delays for goods transiting from
Asia to Europe which, although meaningful, are financially minor by
comparison with any number of other crises. Finally, the Egyptian
regime, already in a massive debt crisis, will suffer considerably by
the loss of income from the Suez Canal.
For Yemen and Yemenis, the picture is far more serious. Given the
current situation, the predicted ceremonial signature of the end of
hostilities between Saudi Arabia and the Huthis, which would have taken
the form of an agreement between the Internationally Recognised
Government (IRG) and the Huthis, with Saudi Arabia [and probably Oman]
as mediators is, at best, indefinitely postponed. Despite this setback,
the UN Special Envoy is still attempting to proceed with preparations
and actions to get his ‘road map’ towards peace off the ground.
Increased Huthi strength resulting from the new developments
automatically ensures further weakening of the divided IRG, meaning that
UN mediation efforts are unlikely to help change the balance of forces
between the factions, and possibly enabling the Huthis to expand their
authoritarian and oppressive rule.
The humanitarian situation in Yemen, already disastrous (though by no
means comparable to the horrors of Gaza) is seriously at risk of
worsening. Financing of the UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan has dropped
from 55% of requirement in 2022 to 38% in 2023 and it has not even been
announced for 2024. Here two points are of concern: first most of
Yemen’s imports come through Hodeida port [and remember that the country
depends on imports for 90% of its basic staples], so should that port
be struck and become inoperable, consequences would be severe. Second,
in recent years, more than 50% of the funding has come from the US and
most of this is needed in Huthi controlled areas, so is at risk of US
retaliation by way of cuts to part or even all of the aid. Unless and
until the Gaza war is de-escalated prospects for Yemenis in 2024 are at
least as grim as elsewhere.