"The Road to Peace Starts in Jerusalem: The Condominium Solution"
By John V. Whitbeck
There will never be a durable peace in the Middle East without a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict acceptable both to most Israelis and to most Palestinians. That is a fact. There will also never be a lasting settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without a solution to the status of Jerusalem acceptable both to most Israelis and to most Palestinians. That is also a fact, one which, as the September 2000 deadline for reaching a permanent status agreement approaches, is increasingly difficult (and dangerous) for anyone to ignore.
It is still widely assumed that no such solution exists. As a result, doubts, distrust and even despair are still widespread on both sides. Many people, on both sides as well as abroad, have no faith in the current "peace process" and no desire to become involved in it and to help it to succeed because they see at the end of the road a great immovable boulder named Jerusalem which they believe condemns any "peace process" to ultimate and inevitable failure.
Nothing is more likely to revive a constructive confidence in the eventual success of the "peace process" and to accelerate the essential moral, spiritual and psychological transformation toward a cooperative, rather than a confrontational, view of the future of the Middle East than a prompt recognition that a solution to the status of Jerusalem does exist. Fortunately, there is one solution which has a real chance of being acceptable both to most Israelis and to most Palestinians.
When Israelis and Palestinians speak about Jerusalem, they are not simply laying out negotiating positions. Jerusalem has too tight a grip on hearts and minds. Their repeated and virtually unanimous positions must be taken seriously. If one accepts, as one must, that no Israeli government could ever accept a redivision of Jerusalem, and if one accepts, as one must, that no Palestinian leadership could ever accept a permanent status solution which gave the Palestinian State (and, through it, the Arab and Muslim worlds) no share of sovereignty in Jerusalem, then only one solution is conceivable - joint sovereignty over an undivided city. In the context of a two-state solution, Jerusalem could form an undivided part of both states, be the capital of both states and be administered by an umbrella municipal council and local district councils. In the proper terminology of international law, the city would be a "condominium" of Israel and Palestine.
Joint undivided sovereignty, while rare, is not without precedent. Chandigarh is the joint undivided capital of two neighboring Indian states, Haryana and Punjab. For half a century prior to its independence in 1956, Sudan was a condominium of Britain and Egypt, officially named "Anglo-Egyptian Sudan". For more than 70 years, the Pacific nation of Vanuatu (formerly the New Hebrides Condominium) was under the joint undivided sovereignty of Britain and France, with each resident free to choose whether to be subject to British laws or French laws. For more than 700 years, until a 1993 constitutional revision, the Principality of Andorra was under the joint undivided sovereignty of French and Spanish "co-princes" (since 1607, the head of the French state and the Bishop of Seo de Urgel) while its administration has in recent years been entrusted to an elected General Council. (Since 1993, the co-princes have served as co-heads of state of a conventionally sovereign U.N. member state rather than as joint sovereigns.) In March 1999, the arbitrator appointed by the International Court of Justice ruled that the contested Bosnian municipality of Brcko should be a condominium shared by Bosnia'’s Serb Republic and its Muslim-Croat Federation, with its own local administration.
As a joint capital, Jerusalem could have Israeli government offices principally in its western sector, Palestinian government offices principally in its eastern sector and municipal offices in both. A system of districts or French-style arrondissements could bring municipal administration closer to the different communities in the city (including the ultra-orthodox Jewish community). To the extent that either state wished to control persons or goods entering it from the other state, this could be done at the points of exit from, rather than the points of entry to, Jerusalem. In a context of peace, particularly one coupled with economic union, the need for such controls would be minimal.
In a sense, Jerusalem can be viewed as a cake which could be sliced either vertically or horizontally. Either way, the Palestinians would get a share of the cake, but, while most Israelis could never voluntarily swallow a vertical slice, they might just be able to swallow a horizontal slice. Indeed, by doing so, Israel would finally achieve international recognition of Jerusalem as its capital.
Jerusalem is both a municipality on the ground and a symbol in hearts and minds. Undivided but shared in this way, Jerusalem could be a symbol of reconciliation and hope for Jews, Muslims, Christians and the world as a whole. Furthermore, since a city needs no army but only police, Jerusalem could also be fully demilitarized, finally becoming the "City of Peace" which all three religions have long proclaimed it to be.
Among peace-oriented Israelis and Palestinians there is a broad consensus that, in any permanent status solution, Jerusalem should remain physically undivided. However, there is no consensus on how the problem of sovereignty should be solved. That issue remains almost too hot to handle. Indeed, it is a bit like death. Everyone knows that it is at the end of the road, but virtually no one wants to talk about it because virtually no one can see any solution or happy ending.
The issue of sovereignty over Jerusalem is such an emotional one, and the consensus within each community behind its own uncompromising position is (or is at least proclaimed and perceived to be) so nearly universal, that there is no incentive for those within the communities directly engaged to stick their necks out by proposing any original or unorthodox ideas on the subject. Even today, any Israeli or Palestinian who sought publicly to promote a compromise solution to the issue of sovereignty over Jerusalem which he honestly believed could be acceptable to the other side would risk being castigated as a traitor or a heretic by the vocal majority of his compatriots or coreligionists.
When the Israeli Moshe Amirav and the Palestinian Hanna Siniora published their courageous and thoughtful joint article entitled "Jerusalem: Resolving the Unresolvable" during the winter of 1991/92, they did not shy away from making controversial proposals, notably including their calls for parity between Israelis and Palestinians in all aspects of civil, political and religious life in the city, for a four-fold expansion of the area within the municipal boundaries so as to equalize the size of the two communities and for strict "immigration" controls to maintain this demographic balance. However, even they did not dare to address directly the question of sovereignty, "so as to appear non-threatening to Israelis", but sought instead to make it "manageable by breaking it down into its various components" and tackling each one separately.
"Joint undivided sovereignty" is a concept which even highly intelligent people are often unable to comprehend. Perhaps, paradoxically, it is too simple to be easily understood. While sovereignty is commonly viewed as the state-level equivalent of title or ownership, joint undivided ownership of land or a house (between husband and wife or, through inheritance, among distant cousins) is scarcely uncommon. Such joint undivided ownership is clear as a matter of law and comprehensible as a matter of practice. It is up to the joint owners to determine how their common property is to be administered.
In seeking a solution to the status of Jerusalem, it is essential to distinguish between sovereignty and municipal administration. Questions of municipal administration, including the division of authorities between an umbrella municipal council and local district councils, exist for any sizable city, regardless of any questions of sovereignty. In Jerusalem's case, it would clearly be desirable, employing the European Union's principle of "subsidiarity", to devolve as many aspects of municipal governance as possible to the district council level, reserving to the umbrella municipal council only those major matters which can only be administered efficiently at a city-wide level (potentially very few matters, since, notwithstanding the election of a new Greater London Authority and a mayor this May, London has continued to function quite efficiently with only local district councils and with no umbrella municipal council since the Greater London Council was abolished in 1986). Since there are currently no integrated neighborhoods in Jerusalem, assuring that Israelis are subject to Israeli administration, and Palestinians to Palestinian administration, at the district council level would present no practical problems.
If the devolution of authority to the district council level was broad and deep, the potentially inflammatory issue of the percentage representations of the two communities on the umbrella municipal council would be much less problematic. If elected district councils named their own representatives to the umbrella municipal council, a more technocratic and less demagogic style of municipal government might be possible. If the percentage representations of the two communities, through their respective municipal districts, on the umbrella municipal council were fixed at an agreed level (whatever that level might be) and made impervious to subsequent demographic changes within the municipal boundaries, the issue of post-peace "immigration" of Israelis and Palestinians into Jerusalem would become a non-issue and the purely political motivation for building more Jewish residential districts in expanded East Jerusalem or for expanding the current municipal boundaries even further to incorporate additional Jewish population centers would evaporate.
While municipal administration involves numerous practical questions, sovereignty over Jerusalem is fundamentally a symbolic, psychological and virtually theological question. Symbolism, psychology and theology are extraordinarily important in connection with Jerusalem (more so than with any other city on earth), but it is important to recognize that this is the nature of the question. An "internationalization" of the city, with neither Israel nor Palestine possessing sovereignty, was recommended in 1947 by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181. This recommendation has never been revoked and continues to enjoy significant international support and moral authority. However, "internationalization" would serve no useful symbolic or psychological purpose for those most directly involved and thus cannot be a realistic option today.
Assigning sovereignty over an undivided city both to Israel and to Palestine should satisfy to the maximum degree possible the symbolic and psychological needs of both Israelis and Palestinians. It could also produce profound positive psychological benefits for the quality of "life after peace" by requiring in spirit and in practice a sharing of the city and cooperation with "the other" rather than a new partitioning of the city and mere toleration of "the other" or the continuing domination of one people over another, with all the poisonous frictions which such a domination inevitably provokes.
One of the strengths and beauties of joint undivided sovereignty, and a potential advantage in making it acceptable to both peoples and to their leaderships, is that it would not require either Israel or Palestine to renounce sovereignty over any territory over which it has asserted sovereignty. The State of Palestine asserts sovereignty only over those Palestinian lands conquered and occupied in 1967. Of those lands, the State of Israel asserts sovereignty only over expanded East Jerusalem. Under a "condominium" solution, in the only place where current sovereignty claims overlap, sovereignty would overlap and be shared. To repeat, neither Israel nor Palestine would have to renounce sovereignty over any territory over which it has asserted sovereignty. Potentially intractable negotiations over where to draw international borders through and even within Jerusalem would be completely avoided, since the city would not be divided but shared.
Israelis should ask themselves what (if anything) they would actually be giving up in accepting joint undivided sovereignty over Jerusalem. Approximately 70 percent of the city's residents are now Israelis, and Palestinian residents already have the right to vote in municipal elections. That would not change. Put most simply, all Israel would have to do is say this: "United Jerusalem, within the expanded boundaries which we have unilaterally established, is the eternal capital of Israel ... but, in order to make peace possible, we accept that it is also the capital of Palestine." That's all. While, today, only Costa Rica and El Salvador even recognize West Jerusalem as Israel's capital, and no country recognizes Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem, if Israel adopted such a position and implemented it with Palestinian consent, virtually all countries would promptly recognize united Jerusalem as Israel's capital. Embassies would move there. Is this really so awful and unthinkable for Israelis? Is this really impossible?
There is a widespread misconception among Israelis that, under the status quo, Israel possesses sovereignty over expanded East Jerusalem. It does not. It possesses administrative control. A country can acquire administrative control by force of arms. It can acquire sovereignty only with the consent of the international community.
When Iraq conquered Kuwait, it asserted sovereignty over it. No other country recognized that claim. For the next seven months, Iraq's position in Kuwait - effective administrative control coupled with an unrecognized claim to sovereignty - was, as a matter of international law, effectively indistinguishable from Israel's position in expanded East Jerusalem today. (Indonesia's position in East Timor was, until recently, similar, and Morocco's position in Western Sahara remains similar.) Israel has possessed and exercised administrative control over expanded East Jerusalem for more than three decades. To this day, not one of the world's other 192 sovereign states has recognized its claim to sovereignty.
Israel could retain administrative control over expanded East Jerusalem indefinitely. That is a question of military strength and political will. However, it is most unlikely that it will ever acquire sovereignty over expanded East Jerusalem unless it agrees to a permanent solution to the status of Jerusalem based on joint undivided sovereignty over the entire city. That is a question of law. Indeed, since the right of a country to declare any part of its sovereign territory to be its capital is not contested, the refusal of virtually all countries to recognize West Jerusalem as Israel's capital and the maintenance of virtually all embassies (even including the American embassy) in Tel Aviv is striking evidence of the refusal of the international community, pending an agreed permanent solution to the status of Jerusalem, to concede that any part of the city is Israel's sovereign territory.
A vivid example of the firm and unequivocal position of the international community is provided by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 53/37, adopted on December 2, 1998 by a vote of 149-1 (with the United States abstaining), in which ““The General Assembly ... Determines that the decision of Israel to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the Holy City of Jerusalem is illegal and therefore null and void and has no validity whatsoever.”” In May 1996, the world’’s view of the legal status of Jerusalem was concisely summarized by then British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind: “Britain made clear many years ago, as did the international community, that it considered Israel to be in military occupation of East Jerusalem and to have only de facto authority over West Jerusalem.””
A clearer understanding of what the legal status quo regarding Jerusalem really is could make Israeli public opinion less reflexively resistant to contemplating any modification of that status quo, even in return for peace.
It is clear that joint undivided sovereignty is not the first choice of either Israelis or Palestinians. Exclusive Israeli sovereignty over the whole city would clearly be the first choice of most Israelis, but this is equally clearly unacceptable not only to Palestinians but also to the Arab and Muslim countries with which Israel wishes to have normal diplomatic and economic relations and which would accept any permanent status terms which the Palestinians might accept except that one, as well as to significant segments of the international community beyond the Arab and Muslim worlds. The Basic Agreement signed at the Vatican on February 15 between the Holy See and the Palestine Liberation Organization is noteworthy in this regard. It declares “that “an equitable solution for the issue of Jerusalem, based on international resolutions, is fundamental for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and that unilateral decisions and actions altering the specific character and status of Jerusalem are morally and legally unacceptable”” and calls “for “a special statute for Jerusalem, internationally guaranteed, which should safeguard”, among other things, “the equality before the law of the three monotheistic religions and their institutions and followers in the City”.”
A division of sovereignty and a redivision of administrative control strictly in accordance with the pre-1967 border (and hence with international law and U.N. Security Council Resolution 242) would clearly be the first choice of most Palestinians, but, particularly in light of the presence of the Western Wall, enormous Jewish settlements and even a slight Israeli population majority in expanded East Jerusalem, this is equally clearly inconceivable from the Israeli standpoint. (While expanded East Jerusalem is effectively indistinguishable from the other occupied territories as a matter of international law, it is most certainly distinguishable and distinguished as a matter of Israeli domestic law and, most importantly, in Israeli public perception.)
These irreconcilable "first choice options" must, logically, be discarded by all who truly wish to achieve peace. Such people should be searching now for a mutually acceptable "best second choice". If one accepts the two premises that no Israeli government could ever accept a redivision of Jerusalem and that no Palestinian leadership (and certainly not the Arab and Muslim worlds) could ever accept a permanent status solution which gave the Palestinian State no share of sovereignty in Jerusalem, then, as a matter of pure logic, joint undivided sovereignty is the only possible second choice if peace is ever to be achieved. However, even if the first premise were untrue (there being no reason to believe that the second premise might be untrue) and a division of sovereignty in Jerusalem could be agreed upon, joint undivided sovereignty might still be the best possible second choice for both Israelis and Palestinians.
Any solution to the status of Jerusalem, like any solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a whole, must have two characteristics if it is to produce a durable peace. It must be workable, and it must, at least in some measure, be inspirational. If a potential solution is technically workable but fails to inspire hearts and minds, it is unlikely to succeed. If a potential solution inspires hearts and minds but is unworkable on the ground, it too is unlikely to succeed. In thinking both about Jerusalem and about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a whole, all who truly wish to achieve peace should be searching for solutions which are both workable and inspirational.
The most obvious question regarding joint undivided sovereignty is "What law would apply?". The question tends to be posed on the assumption that it is unanswerable and that the "condominium" solution for Jerusalem, notwithstanding its inspirational aspects, would be unworkable in practice. In fact, there is not just one potentially workable answer to this question but several.
One approach would be for Jerusalem to have its own distinct body of laws, neither wholly Israeli nor wholly Palestinian and applicable within its boundaries to all who are present there. There is an appealing surface simplicity to this approach, which would have been virtually unavoidable had the city been "internationalized" pursuant to the United Nations' 1947 partition formula. However, as a practical matter, such a body of laws could only be based on those currently in force in the city as subsequently modified by the umbrella municipal council or, perhaps, by agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian states. Consequently, Jerusalem's laws would, for the foreseeable future, be virtually indistinguishable from Israel's laws (draining joint undivided sovereignty of most of its content in Palestinian eyes), while the umbrella municipal council, best kept technocratic, could become highly politicized. While the "Jerusalem law" approach could be workable, there are better approaches.
A second approach would be to apply Israeli law in every Israeli-majority district as fully as though that district were an integral part of Israel alone and to apply Palestinian law in every Palestinian-majority district as fully as though that district were an integral part of Palestine alone. This is the approach called for in the "scattered sovereignty" model developed in recent years by the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI) in Jerusalem, which would draw international borders around every currently existing village, neighborhood or settlement in expanded East Jerusalem and put each of them under the exclusive sovereignty of one of the two states (thereby requiring both Israel and Palestine to renounce sovereignty over territory over which they have asserted sovereignty). This approach would be entirely appropriate if a "scattered sovereignty" model were implemented and would even be potentially workable if a "condominium" solution were implemented. However, it is conceptually inconsistent with the uplifting vision of a single undivided city serving as the capital of both states, would produce practical results which both peoples would consider undesirable and would tend to lock in indefinitely the pervasive segregation of the city's existing neighborhoods.
A third approach, more supple and subtle, is the most promising one. Rather than seeking to establish a distinct body of laws for Jerusalem or providing a purely territorial basis for determining whether Israeli or Palestinian law applies, one can envision a more flexible system pursuant to which the law applicable in any specific instance would depend on the subject matter, the parties involved and the municipal district in which the issue or dispute arises.
Legal experts negotiating in good faith while keeping in mind three broad areas of law (civil, criminal and personal) and two potential bases for jurisdiction (personal and territorial) should be fully capable of agreeing upon appropriate choices of applicable law and jurisdiction based on objective, non-discriminatory and results-oriented criteria. Their task would be to agree upon those situations in which the personal/national element would control, those in which the territorial element would control, those in which an agreed "tiebreaker" would decide and those (if any) in which resort to a "mixed court" would be necessary.
A few examples should help to clarify how such a flexible legal system would work. Both sides might well agree that the personal/national element should control in all personal law matters (most notably marriage, divorce and inheritance), with Israeli law applicable to Israelis and Palestinian law applicable to Palestinians regardless of the municipal district in which they live. They might also agree that the territorial element should control in matters relating to property, with the prevailing law of the municipal district where the property is located being applicable, regardless of the citizenships of the parties involved.
In the area of contractual disputes, it might be agreed that Israeli law should apply to disputes between Israelis and Palestinian law to disputes between Palestinians, with the territorial element serving as a "tiebreaker" in any contractual dispute between an Israeli Jerusalemite and a Palestinian Jerusalemite where there was no explicit "choice of law" clause in a written contract. It might also be agreed that the territorial element should control in cases of theft, with the accused thief being deemed to have made his own effective "choice of law".
The most difficult and highly charged situation would probably involve a murder within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem. There would almost certainly be agreement that, if both victim and suspect were Israeli, Israeli law should apply even if the crime occurred in a Palestinian-majority district and that, if both victim and suspect were Palestinian, Palestinian law should apply even if the crime occurred in an Israeli-majority district. If victim and suspect were of different citizenships, a "tiebreaker" would be needed. It is not certain that a territorial "tiebreaker" would be acceptable to both sides or, indeed, to either side. It is possible that it could be agreed that the law of the suspect's citizenship or the law of the victim's citizenship should apply. It is also possible that no "tiebreaker" could be agreed upon for cases of murder and perhaps for some other difficult and highly charged situations as well.
The last resort would be a "mixed court", composed of one Israeli judge, one Palestinian judge and one international judge accepted in advance by both governments. There is a history of "mixed courts" operating in diverse places (including the New Hebrides Condominium) and in difficult circumstances during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and dispensing a reasonable degree of justice. Ideally, they would not be needed in Jerusalem. However, if, in one or more instances, no objective criteria could be agreed upon for determining whose law and jurisdiction would be applicable, then "mixed courts" would be the alternative to no solution at all.
The results-oriented balancing process necessary to agree upon such a legal structure for a Jerusalem equitably shared by both peoples and their states may seem complicated at first glance. However, the practical results in the lives of Jerusalem's residents would almost certainly be better than under a more rigid system, and the fluidity of such a legal system would itself emphasize the unique nature of Jerusalem as the undivided capital of two sovereign states. Agreeing upon the relevant practical criteria would be infinitely easier than rolling aside the symbolic and psychological boulder of the issue of sovereignty. The "condominium" solution is a workable solution.
The "condominium" solution has the advantage of being consistent with both the letter and the spirit of the formal American position on Jerusalem, which urges that the city should remain undivided and that its permanent status should be determined through negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. It is even consistent (at least up to a point) with the letter (if not the spirit) of the long-standing formal Israeli position, as restated by the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin during a joint press conference with President Bill Clinton in Jerusalem on October 27, 1994: "Jerusalem must remain united under the sovereignty of Israel." Whether a “united” or “undivided” Jerusalem could be shared under the sovereignty of Israel and Palestine has not yet been formally addressed, although the word “exclusive” has recently entered Israeli political discourse in apparent anticipation of such a possibility.
The "condominium" solution is further from the traditional Palestinian position with its steadfast reliance on "international legitimacy", international law and U.N. resolutions. With an exceptionally weak hand to play in terms of military strength and power politics, Palestinians have long drawn comfort from their certainty that international law is on their side, –and it is on their side, overwhelmingly so. (Indeed, the “maximalist” Palestinian negotiating position is nothing more nor less than full compliance with international law and relevant U.N. resolutions.) However, the decisions to enter into the 1993 Declaration of Principles and its various follow-up agreements reflect a mature acceptance of the brutal truth that a strong position under international law does not alone ensure even the slightest measure of justice. Agreeing not to insist on their strong position under international law with respect to expanded East Jerusalem and to share sovereignty in the only part of the former Palestine Mandate where current sovereignty claims overlap (as well as in West Jerusalem) may be the practical price which Palestinians must pay for successfully asserting Palestine's strong position under international law and Palestinian sovereignty with respect to all other Palestinian lands conquered and occupied in 1967.
Indeed, since mid-1995, President Yasser Arafat and other members of the Palestinian leadership have given increasingly clear indications that they are susceptible to the charms and practical merits of the "condominium" solution and favorably disposed toward it. Faisal Husseini, in charge of the "Jerusalem file" for the Palestinian leadership, has stated that, during permanent status negotiations, "we will insist that the negotiations cover all of Jerusalem (including West Jerusalem occupied by Israel in 1948) and not only East Jerusalem." In a speech at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government in October 1995, President Arafat asked, "Why not Jerusalem as the capital of two states, with no Berlin wall? United, open, coexistence, living together." The audience rose for a standing ovation.
Realistically, there are only three alternative endings to the search for Israeli-Palestinian peace: (1) Israel and Palestine agree on a basis for dividing Jerusalem, and peace is achieved on that basis; (2) Israel and Palestine agree to share an undivided Jerusalem, and peace is achieved on that basis; or (3) Israel and Palestine fail to agree on Jerusalem’’s status, and there is no peace. All the major Israeli political parties, as well as Prime Minister Ehud Barak personally, have ruled out dividing Jerusalem in the most categorical conceivable terms. In November 1997, even the ruling council of the Meretz Party, ostensibly the most left-wing and peace-oriented of the predominantly Jewish parties in the Knesset, decisively rejected a motion in favor of divided sovereignty in a physically undivided Jerusalem.
That leaves only the second and third alternatives - sharing and no peace - a sobering reality which should, logically, stimulate interest among peace-seekers in exploring the potential of the “condominium” solution and in trying to convince Israeli public opinion that the Holy City (as well as the Holy Land) can be shared, that a winner-take-all approach produces only losers, that both Israelis and Palestinians must be winners or both will continue to be losers and that there is a common destination at which both peoples would be satisfied to arrive and to live together in peace.
A century after the First Zionist Congress was held in 1897 and half a century after Israel was established in 1948, Israelis concerned about their future might well look back at the vision for Jerusalem of Theodor Herzl, the founding father of Zionism: ““We’ll simply extraterritorialize Jerusalem, which will then belong to nobody and yet to everybody, the holy place common to the adherents of all faiths, the great condominium of culture and morality.”” Herzl’’s dream of a Jewish State was wildly impractical at the time, but it existed half a century later. Whether its people ever enjoy peace and security may well depend on whether they can grasp the visionary practicality of Herzl’’s own recognition that what neither people of the Holy Land could ever relinquish or renounce must therefore be shared.
If Israelis and Palestinians can agree - and soon - that a mutually acceptable solution for the status of Jerusalem does exist, all the other pieces in the delicate peace puzzle could still fall into place and the actual achievement of a durable Middle East peace would at once become possible. Without a mutually acceptable solution for the status of Jerusalem, everything will fall apart. That cannot be permitted to happen.
The road to "interim self-rule" may have started in Gaza and Jericho and been extended to other West Bank cities, but any road to peace must start in Jerusalem.
John V. Whitbeck is an international lawyer who writes frequently on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. His "Two States, One Holy Land" framework for peace was the subject of a three-day conference of 24 Israelis and Palestinians held in Cairo in 1993.