A machine removes debris after an apparent Israeli attack killed
members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps in Damascus on 20 January
[photo credit: Anadolu Agency]
Other regional regimes have played a similar game. Gulf states that
were on the path of normalisation with Israel, and who maintained a
healthy distance from any step that could be construed as escalation,
have already received rewards, a prime example being the dropping by
Germany of its veto
on Eurofighter sales to Saudi Arabia and an intensification of German
and French diplomatic engagement with Riyadh on regional de-escalation
measures.
Those in the European foreign policy establishment who have been
pushing for increased engagement with Damascus now appear to be seizing
on this opportunity to reward Syria for its neutrality. Of course, Assad
is desperate for this: so much so that he has started announcing
cosmetic changes to his regime that could be used by advocates of
engagement to justify concessions in his direction. This includes an
aspirational goal of having an all-volunteer army; a potential merger of
some security branches and the closing of others such as the notorious
Palestine Branch; and the creation of a “secretariat-general for the
presidency” to replace the Ministry for Presidential Affairs. For the
gullible, the logic of reciprocal concessions between Damascus and the
West, advocated since 2019 by some think tanks and the UN Special Envoy,
is finally reaping results. The regime’s reform-oriented announcements,
coming at a time when Syria has stayed out of the Gaza fray, may be
rewarded with easing of sanctions, more trips to Damascus by European
diplomats, and more reconstruction-lite developmental assistance to a
level that was regarded until quite recently as an EU red line. To
placate the critics, Europeans may double down on their rhetoric on
accountability and UNSCR 2254. European diplomatic sources have
expressed concern that this year’s Brussels donor conference could be
the stage for such public posturing, effectively masking more engagement
with Assad.
Rewarding Assad in this way would be a win for those Europeans who
regard him as the actor best placed to preserve the Syrian state and
manage the refugee file. If tacit alliances with dictators are not a red
line in North Africa, why should they be in the eastern Mediterranean?
Additionally, some believe that keeping Assad in place maintains a
bulwark against Iranian escalation emanating from Syrian territory,
despite the deployment of tens of thousands of IRGC-affiliated
militiamen there. The neutrality rewards scenario aligns with a series
of other developments: appointment of regime-leaning personnel in
several European development ministries; UN aid chief Martin Griffiths’
proposal to establish a new UN fund for early recovery assistance
tailored to regime and GCC specifications; repeated visits by Syria’s
State Security chief Husam Luka to Riyadh; and recent armed incursions
into Jordan orchestrated by Maher Assad who is reportedly unhappy that
discussions between Damascus and Riyadh included the fate of his 4th
Division.
Whether and to what extent “rewards for neutrality” materialises
depends on the assertiveness of seasoned and more principled forces in
the European foreign policy establishment. It also hinges on whether
more credible ideas emerge to address the European dilemma of how to
help civilians in need without bolstering a regime that is the root
cause of civilian suffering. Presently, the discussion about
badly-needed early recovery assistance is between the West and Damascus.
What is needed is a shift to a whole-of-Syria approach that regards all
areas of control as equally deserving of humanitarian assistance and
the required engagement with authorities to implement it effectively.
After all, none of the de facto authorities are any less legitimate than the Assad regime – and support to some may even strengthen Europe’s hands rather than weaken it.