January 30, 2024
There are a few new reports and news bites from Ukraine which are of interest.
Stephen Biddle, a professor who was written on strategy and military power from a realist standpoint, looks at the state of the war In Ukraine.
How Russia Stopped Ukraine’s Momentum - Foreign Affairs, January 29, 2024
Deep Defense Is Hard to Beat
The essence:
By late spring, the Russians had adopted the kind of deep, prepared defenses that have been very difficult for attackers to break through for more than the last century of combat experience. Breakthrough has been—and still is—possible in land warfare. But this has long required permissive conditions that are now absent in Ukraine: a defender, in this case Russia, whose dispositions are shallow, forward, ill prepared, or logistically unsupported or whose troops are unmotivated and unwilling to defend their positions. That was true of Russian forces in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson in 2022. It is no longer the case.The implications of this for Ukraine are grim. Without an offensive breakthrough, success in land warfare becomes an attrition struggle. A favorable outcome for Ukraine in a war of attrition is not impossible, but it will require its forces to outlast a numerically superior foe in what could become a very long war.
Biddle does not expand from there.
But we know that the current Russian disposition of waging an 'active defense' is delivering day by day some small progress along the whole front.
Ukraine's artillery losses have become smaller because it simply lacks the munitions to fire. A cannon that can not fire stops to be a priority target.
First Person View (FBV) drones have became a major cause of all losses. Ukraine was first to use those but Russia has since rapidly ramped up their production. Meanwhile Ukraine is still lagging. Each day hundreds of these drones clear Ukrainian positions without causing significant losses for the attacking Russian side.
In the New Yorker Masha Gesses takes a look at the political scene in Kiev:
Ukraine’s Democracy in Darkness - (archived) - The New Yorker
With elections postponed and no end to the war with Russia in sight, Volodymyr Zelensky and his political allies are becoming like the officials they once promised to root out: entrenched.
Gessen finds that democracy in Ukraine, if it still exists, is in a sorry state:
Such was the state of Ukraine as it entered its third consecutive winter at war: still battling the demon of corruption, still defiant, yet visibly reduced, palpably tired. ... In the meantime, in Ukraine, democracy is largely suspended. According to the regular order of things, Ukraine should have a Presidential election in March. Up until the end of November—a few weeks before the deadline for scheduling the election—Zelensky’s office seemed open to having one, but ultimately decided against it. “We shouldn’t have elections, because elections always create disunity,” Andriy Zagorodnyuk, a former defense minister who now advises the government, told me. “We need to be unified.”An estimated four to six million Ukrainians are living under Russian occupation. At least four million are living in E.U. countries, a million more are living in Russia, and at least half a million are living elsewhere outside of Ukraine. Another four million have been internally displaced. These figures include a significant number of people who became adults after the war began and aren’t registered to vote. “Elections are a public discussion,” Oleksandra Romantsova, the executive director of Ukraine’s Center for Civil Liberties, which shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 2022, told me. “But a third of the population is connected with the military. Another third is displaced.” With so many people excluded from the public discussion, what would an election even mean? ..."
All power in Ukraine has been concentrated in the President's office:
At the start of the war, when Russia was bombing Kyiv daily, the parliament had to consider the risks of continuing to hold meetings in its building, which has a glass roof. It decided to do so, but to vote only on bills that a majority wanted to bring to the floor, and to limit discussion of amendments. This effectively shifted the center of legislative work to the President’s office. Among other bills, the parliament approved the declaration of martial law, introduced by Zelensky on the first day of the war, and has regularly renewed it. Martial law enables the cabinet of ministers to control who can enter and leave the country—since the start of the war, men under the age of sixty have been forbidden to leave—and to regulate the work of all media outlets, printing presses, and distribution companies.Zelensky’s office created the United News TV Marathon, a round-the-clock program of war-related news and talk shows, supplanting what had been a vibrant and varied television news market. The segments appear on six of Ukraine’s major channels and, at any given time, all of them are showing the same thing. Despite its name, United Marathon was clearly designed to be a sprint. In the early months of the war, the programming had a sense of urgency, of novelty and shock. Now even the worst days—when Russia fires a barrage of rockets that kill civilians across the country—are like all the other terrible days, when people are killed in the same way, in more or less the same places. There is little to analyze anymore. “The one thing all Ukrainians agree on is that we need an end to the Marathon,” Romantsova told me.
Other government-controlled media target an international audience.
An example of the power struggle around the presidential office could be witnessed yesterday.
Around noon several reliable political sources in Ukraine reported that President Zelensky had signed a decree to fire the Commander in Chief General Zaluzny. Hours later the Ministry of Defense denied that Zaluzny was fired.
From information gained since we can somewhat reconstruct what had happened.
Zaluzny had been ordered into the President's office. He was asked to write his resignation. As consolation gift he would receive an ambassadorship in some western European country.
Zaluzny rejected the request and insisted of getting fired or being allowed to stay in place.
Zelenski had planned to promote the Chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence in Ukraine Kyrylo Budanov as the new Commander in Chief.
Here is where I believe that other high officers, and likely also the U.S. military, stepped in.
Budanov has been in special forces intelligence from the very beginning of his career. He has never commanded anything larger than a group. Not a platoon, not a company, not a battalion, not a brigade, not a division and not a corp. How can someone who has zero experience in leading actual force formations supposed to be the commander of all Ukrainian forces including the army, air-force and navy?
It is impossible.
Budanov seems to be somewhat loyal to Zelenski (though I bet he really isn't). He is handsome and looks good on camera. He is a smooth talker. He is also a creative and talented terrorist. His actual military operations though, like the ground raids into Belgograd, have mostly been mediocre failures.
I am pretty sure that the Pentagon and even the White House may have called Kiev and stopped Zelenski from implementing such nonsense.
Zaluzny will, for now, stay in his position.
But the whole affair will have diminished the military's view of Zelenski and his consorts. In just one day a military coup In Kiev has suddenly become much more possible. As further the military situation deteriorates the higher are the chances that it will eventually happen.