[Salon] War in 2024



War in 2024

Summary: the oil market suggests that investors have, overall, learned to live with the current crisis in the Middle East, as well as the Russia/Ukraine war and China/Taiwan tensions. However, they still need to beware of less high profile war risk, consistent with the turbulent times in which we live. 

We thank our regular contributor Alastair Newton for today's newsletter. Alastair worked as a professional political analyst in the City of London from 2005 to 2015. Before that he spent 20 years as a career diplomat with the British Diplomatic Service. In 2015 he co-founded and is a director of Alavan Business Advisory Ltd. You can find Alastair’s latest AD podcast, Oil: the long good-bye here.

“The number of state-based conflicts, at over 50, is near its highest level since 1946, according to the Peace Research Institute Oslo.”

The Economist, 22 January 2024

I have read several forecasts for this year which have extrapolated from the start of the Russia/Ukraine war in 2022 and the Israel/Hamas conflict in 2023 to award a non-negligible probability to another major war breaking out in 2024, e.g. and notably a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Not only does this overstate this particular probability, it also risks blind-siding us relative to a growing number of smaller scale, but still worrisome, violent conflicts.

This wider pattern is what history tells us we should expect at the end of a hegemony, what The Economist described as “chaotic global circumstances”. As the article went on to argue, although the Biden Administration has reversed some of the damage done to US influence and alliances by its predecessor, if Donald Trump is back in the Oval Office next year, this will prove short-lived. Furthermore: “…as the clock ticks down on a tight election the effectiveness of the Biden doctrine may [already] be in decline.”

Acknowledging that Iran’s overarching ‘axis of resistance’ has much to answer for, the complicated dynamics of the Middle East include several such cases capable of catching unawares all but the real experts, as this article by the BBC’s Raffi Berg makes clear. For example, although Turkish strikes on Kurdish militia in Iraq and Syria should have come as no surprise, who expected Jordan to launch strikes against Iran-backed militia in Syria? Or, for that matter, for Iran and Pakistan to exchange tit-for-tat missile strikes against Baloch separatists, causing the BBC’s Lyse Doucet to write (in a 20 January article): “This past week has been a reminder, if one was needed, of the unpredictability and peril in this moment of a widening and worsening Israel-Gaza war?”


US Air Force A-10C+ Thunderbolt IIs from Al-Dhafra Air Base in the UAE participated in the strikes in Iraq and Syria [photo credit: USAF]

This is not to argue that concerns about a possible Iran/US head-to-head are not justified — and especially not after the US suffered its second fatalities of the conflict on 28 January. The nonsense being peddled by Washington to the effect that Tehran is “the prime instigator” behind the Huthis attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, and that these have nothing to do with Gaza, helps create an atmosphere increasingly ripe for a mis-step of some sort, especially if policymakers in DC believe these claims. As a number of recent Newsletters have pointed out, although Tehran certainly supplies weapons to the fiercely independent, bellicose and deeply anti-semitic Huthi, its influence over them is limited. And, as the 15 January Newsletter argued: “[The Huthis’] is a very clear message to Western powers: use your clout and influence to force the Israelis into a ceasefire, otherwise we will not stop our attacks on Red Sea shipping”.

 Where the Huthis are making their mistake is in overestimating Washington’s influence over Israel which - short of actions which would likely doom completely Joe Biden’s chances of re-election (see my comment in the 16 January Newsletter) - is severely limited (as would still be so if Donald Trump were in the White House). The same can be said for the ICJ’s interim ruling on the genocide case brought against Israel by South Africa. Indeed, despite some international progress towards a temporary truce, forces within Israel itself have the best chance of bringing about a full cessation of hostilities as pressure to put securing the release of hostages over and above ‘destroying’ Hamas mounts, including within the war cabinet. However, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has yet to show any preparedness whatsoever to go down this track even though he approved January’s strategic shift to a more targeted campaign, leading to a reduction in the still high number of civilian deaths.

How long this shift lasts remains to be seen for it is very uncertain that Israeli forces would be able to clear Hamas out of its southern and central strongholds, especially in densely populated Khan Younis and Deir al Balah, without civilian casualty numbers spiralling upwards again. Yet, failure to root out Hamas completely would amount to a “strategic defeat” for Israel, as The Wall Street Journal argued on 16 January. Acknowledging that many believe that Mr Netanyahu is being driven primarily by personal interest, accepting such a failure would be hard to countenance in any circumstances, suggesting that there is still some considerable way to go before some semblance of peace is achieved.

What does all this mean for oil? Although the FT’s Stuart Kirk did not get drawn into the oil market, his 19 January op-ed headlined ‘Should investors care about geopolitics?’ set out some usefully indicative analysis. Reflecting on the investor ‘bugbear’ of uncertainty, he showed how the outbreak of war triggers an initial dip in equity markets followed by a recovery and subsequent solid performance through the course of the conflict. However, I believe that, in so doing, he misunderstood the nature of 'uncertainty' in such circumstances. A state of uncertainty surely prevails in the run-up to a war (will there be war or not?); but once a state of war exists as with Israel/Hama there is often far less uncertainty with which markets have to grapple. Of course, war still brings with it a whole herd of 'grey rhinos'; but, in general, markets are adept at ignoring these (for want of being able to price them in, if nothing else) unless or until one or other of them hits us.

Thus, I continue to believe that oil markets have got it about right, as set out in the 4 January Newsletter, albeit with overall risk currently skewed a little more to the upside thanks to multiplying tensions. My forecast for Brent crude on 31 December therefore remains US$70 per barrel, albeit with continuing (fairly modest) volatility on the way.


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