An Israeli soldier interrogating a wounded Palestinian in West Gaza city [photo credit: IDF]
At the public level, the hostages’ relatives are wreaking havoc for
Netanyahu, blocking traffic outside his house in Jerusalem and in
December bursting into a committee meeting in Israel’s parliament.
On the governmental level, Israel’s war cabinet, which has overall responsibility for the Gaza campaign, is deeply split about strategy and how to bring the hostages home.
IDF Chief of Staff and war cabinet member Gadi Eisenkot has said it
was time to “say bravely that it is impossible to return the hostages
alive in the near future without an agreement [with Hamas]”, and that
Israel should consider halting the fighting for a “significant” period
of time as part of any such deal.
Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defence Minister Yoav Gallant on the
other hand have repeatedly argued that the only way to bring the
hostages home is to continue the war by maintaining intense military
pressure on Hamas.
Then there is the extreme right in the Netanyahu government, such as
the Ministers of Finance, National Security and Heritage. They endorse the rebuilding of settlements in Gaza, the “voluntary emigration” of Palestinians and even dropping a nuclear bomb.
These internal disputes over how to prosecute the war go to the heart
of Israel’s military strategy and are crippling national morale and the
war effort.
Furthermore, as Sami Hamdi explained in last Thursday’s podcast,
the longer the war goes on the greater the chance it will spread in the
region, potentially with very far-reaching consequences.
The biggest risk in terms of escalation remains the possibility of a
full-blown conflict with Iran. So many potential clash points exist
between the US and Iran throughout the region if the war does not stop
this seems almost inevitable sooner or later. Whether it happens in
days, weeks, months or years, nobody can say.
In Yemen, the US and its partners are steadily being sucked into a
quagmire of their own making by picking a fight with the Huthis which
they can never hope to win.
The US and UK may just about protect their own vessels but after 9
years of war with Saudi Arabia the resilience of the Huthis to withstand
external attacks is undiminished and protecting the 50 odd merchant
ships passing through
the Bab Al Mandeb each day is a losing proposition. In fact, since the
US began its strikes on the Huthis last month the rate of attacks has
actually increased.
If these strikes continue, the Huthis have already warned there will
be consequences. And it could be Saudi Arabia taking the first hits. A
limited strike like the one on the Abqaiq–Khurais crude oil
stabilisation plant in 2019 would be manageable, but if a bigger war
breaks out the Saudis could soon be in very serious trouble. Their
nightmare scenario: Huthis invade from the south, Iran-backed militia
from Iraq attack from the north, sleeper cells in the Eastern Province,
Kuwait and Bahrain strike from the east, thousands of missiles hit
targets throughout Saudi Arabia and the regime collapses.
In the West Bank, with Palestinian deaths closing in on 400 and
settler vigilantes rampaging unchecked, another powder keg could explode
at any time.
If the Palestinians there lose what little faith they have left in
the Palestinian Authority they can simply confiscate PA police weapons
and turn them on Occupation troops and settlers, opening a new front
against Israel.
Egypt and Jordan could also see significant escalations in 2024 if
the war continues, more remote possibilities to be sure but nothing can
be ruled out.
Egypt is in far worse shape economically than it was in January 2011
when the country erupted in popular revolution and Jordan has been
witnessing the largest wave of solidarity with Palestine in its history, including a general strike observed by millions.
So far the vast majority of Jordanians and Egyptians have stopped
short of directly accusing their leaders of betrayal and complicity in
Israel’s genocide but this could change at any time and if it does
history shows the situation can unravel fast.
Some in the US administration and thoughtful Israelis understand that
continuing the war poses more danger to Israel now than stopping it.
They can see that the longer it goes on, the more Israel delegitimises
itself, threatening the very existence of the state.
Preventing Israel’s demise requires an immediate end to the war but,
crucially, in a way in which Hamas cannot be seen to win. The obvious
way to achieve this would be through the peace talks now going on in Paris.
If Hamas can be persuaded to accept a temporary truce, which it
currently refuses without guarantees for a longer-term ceasefire, this
would serve both to save Israel’s face and at the same time relieve the
pressure on Joe Biden by showing the world he has done his utmost to end
the bloodshed. This could then be extended and extended until it became
permanent.
Ironically, Biden is actually keener to stop the war and save Israel
than Netanyahu, whose main priority is staying out of prison.
Unfortunately for Biden however, within his administration support for
Netanyahu, though dented, remains strong, with the Israeli PM even
claiming he has more support
than the president. Just as the UK has to have its Gaza policy dictated
by the US, so Biden has little choice but to go along with Netanyahu
because he cannot afford to be seen to be undermining him or letting
Israel down.
Biden’s desire to stop the war is not because he has any sympathy for
the Palestinians. Rather it is for political reasons due to the massive
shift in public sentiment both in America and internationally as the
world recoils from the genocidal tactics the IDF is deploying.
In America, thus far the shift has been restricted mainly to young
people, not Washington's powerful lobbies, but divisions are deepening
and splintering the Democratic caucus.
Internationally, the US is facing mounting accusations of double
standards and hypocrisy, especially, as Tharwa Boulifi observed in last Friday’s newsletter, after the bombshell International Court of Justice ruling.