Smoke rises over the Gaza Strip after Israeli forces' attacks as seen from Sderot, Israel [photo credit: Mostafa Alkharouf]
I'd like to begin by looking at security, insecurity, escalation,
de-escalation, as the Gaza war grinds on and I want to do it through the
lens of some of the big regional players. Let's begin with Türkiye
. How is President Erdogan's view of the war shifting? And can Türkiye
play any meaningful role in de-escalation?
I think that it's important to remember that the week before October 7
Erdogan, for the first time, shook hands with Netanyahu. And there was
this push from Türkiye to establish a gas pipeline in the Mediterranean
to work with the Israelis to ease tensions in order to find some
agreement with regards to access to resources. There was also concern in
Türkiye that Israel might actually go along with Saudi Arabia and the
UAE in developing the Middle East corridor announced at the G20 Summit
in India only a few months ago. And Türkiye was lobbying the Israelis to
tell them ‘listen, don't go through UAE and Saudi Arabia, we’re a
better country for you to go through, let's work together. Let's work
with economic ties, let's expand those economic ties.’ And when October 7
took place, I think that the reaction of Türkiye was one in which it
very much tried to hold the stick in the middle, it was trying to ensure
that it would seem to be close with the Palestinians without
necessarily offending the Israelis. The point that I'm saying is that
when it comes to Türkiye's position, there's this hope that all of this
will just go away, so that Türkiye can resume its bid to improve
relations with the Israelis in order to pursue economic ties.
If you notice Erdogan’s rhetoric, you will notice that particularly
in the beginning, he was very keen to be neutral. And then when he found
the Turkish population turning against him and very angry at his
position, which was seen to be very soft, he began to become harder in
his rhetoric. But if you listen carefully to his speeches, he says a lot
about not being able to work with Netanyahu, not been able to talk to
Netanyahu, not wanting to co-operate with Netanyahu. The idea being he
believes Biden wants Netanyahu out and wants to replace him with Benny
Gantz or the like. Erdogan’s rhetoric now is aligning with ‘we're
willing to work with the Israelis, but can we please get Netanyahu out
of the picture’ and he believes that then with some sort of
justification he can work with the Israelis.
Let's look at the Saudis now. They find themselves, not just
chased off the Abraham Accords, but facing renewed challenges in Yemen
and also facing the potential that the Red Sea could become a second
front unless there is de-escalation.
I think the Saudi Crown Prince’s position has been much closer to
Israel than it has to the Palestinians, even during this genocide and
this ethnic cleansing that has taken place. I'll explain what I mean. If
you remember, when Blinken went to Tel Aviv, he met with Netanyahu and
declared that the US would provide unfettered support. Blinken, instead
of going back to Washington went to visit the regional powers. And among
those regional powers, he went to Saudi Arabia. When he left Saudi
Arabia, there was a sudden shift in the rhetoric of the imams in the
mosques, in which they would come out and say you should make prayers
for Gaza but you shouldn't talk about it. Because if you talk about
Gaza, it will lead you to turn against your ruler and you should trust
that your ruler has better information than you do, that he is wiser
than you are and therefore you shouldn't analyse too much what's
happening in Gaza.
And it's very noteworthy that there were reports that Brett McGurk,
Biden's advisor, went to the Saudis to suggest that they could normalise
in exchange for an end of the genocide. And instead, the reports were
bin Salman said ‘No, my demands remain the same. I will normalise in
exchange for a NATO style security agreement against the Iranians,
nuclear technology and support for Vision 2030’ suggesting that for the
Saudis the genocide in Gaza has not actually made any difference with
regards to their interests or their priorities. They believe that
normalisation is still a tool through which to achieve their goals.
The Emiratis and the Saudis have made prodigious efforts to warm
their relations with Iran. Are those warming relations damaged by how
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have responded to the Gaza war?
I think that when it comes to Saudi-UAE relations with Iran,
certainly, there's this sense of ‘we started this process on the basis
that the Americans would no longer protect us from Iranian proxies.’
They saw Iran was entrenching itself in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen
and they were losing to Iran in each of these domains. And given in
2019, when the (Aramco) oil facilities were hit, when Abu Dhabi airport
was hit, America showed no inclination to come to their rescue, to
provide security or to go to war on their behalf and given that the
language of the US presidential candidates is about detachment from
those issues that are in the Middle East, the UAE and Saudi came
together and said what are our options? And they realised they can't
really go head to head with Iran. They tried for eight or nine years in
Yemen and the Huthis ended up only becoming stronger. They tried to buy
off Iran's allies in Iraq. And they found that for all the millions they
gave to Moqtada al Sadr’s militia and other militias, those militias
remained very loyal to Iran. They tried to buy off Bashar al-Assad, but
al-Assad only seems to be giving more and more territory to the
Iranians. They tried to buy the Lebanese factions and form a coherent
block against Hezbollah and failed miserably. So the Saudi Crown Prince
sat in his office and he said ‘you know what, I've been in power since
2017. And now its 2024, Vision 2030 is not moving in the way that I
expected, it is not moving forward. I need time, I need a truce. I'm
tired. I'm spending way too much money on these things.’ It's in this
context that he reached out to the Iranians and said let's talk. And
there was even a gesture of thanks where they sent Ronaldo to go and
play in Teheran. They gave the Iranians a good PR opportunity.
All of this is driven by American apathy. If the Saudis feel that the
Americans are genuine in deploying their forces to push back Iran,
Saudi will throw out the Iranian rapprochement. If the Saudis and the
UAE believe that the US is absolutely committed to their security, they
will go back to antagonism with Iran. Now their whole talk with Iran is
out of fear that the US doesn’t have their back. And I think that’s the
reason why they won't ruin relations with Iran at this moment and why
Saudi is playing this very strange mediating role with the Iranians. It
is because the Saudis don't trust Biden, the Saudis believe that
although Biden is taking an interest now, Biden is not doing it because
he cares about the Saudis and their allies, Biden is doing it because of
the Israelis. And also Biden has yet to give the Saudis their
conditions for normalisation. And therefore, the Saudis are also holding
the stick in the middle in that they are giving enough to the Israelis
to suggest they are ready to normalise. Meanwhile Biden is not
reciprocating in a way that has convinced bin Salman that America is
committed. So to answer your question, I think they're maintaining ties
while still hoping the Americans are now going to push back against
Iran. They're not convinced the US is entirely committed. So they are
telling the Iranians let's talk. Granted, that talking process is
slowing down. It's no longer as quick as it was before. If you remember,
they were talking about exchanging ambassadors and visiting the
capitals and whatever, that process is slowing down, while bin Salman
and bin Zayed give a chance to Biden to prove his commitment against the
Iranians because they've been scarred before by the Americans.
Let me ask you about another Gulf state, Qatar. It is in an
interesting space, hosting Hamas as it has done for a number of years
and prior to the war paying public service salaries in Gaza with the
approval and support of the Israelis. The Qataris have already achieved
some success on the hostage front. There is talk ongoing that there may
be more hostages released. We'll have to wait and see how that plays
out. But do you see that Qatar can play an expanding role in
de-escalation and really, for this tiny state, boost themselves back up
into the big leagues of a foreign diplomacy?
It has to be said Qatar’s role in all this has been absolutely
phenomenal. It's been extraordinary in every sense of the word: in the
way that its media has provided relentless coverage of what's been
happening in Gaza in reporting the genocide and ethnic cleansing, really
keeping up the pressure on the Israelis, keeping up the pressure on the
Americans and other Western states. And also refusing to buckle under
pressure. Blinken has gone three times to Doha to ask them to stop
covering the issue in Gaza and Palestine. And the Qataris have refused
all three times, continuing their coverage, sending Wael Al-Dahdouh and
all these other journalists into the middle of Gaza.
Their shuttle diplomacy has been phenomenal in the way it's been
going to Egypt, to Jordan, to Washington, to Paris to London, all of
this lobbying on behalf of those in Gaza, trying to ensure there's a way
through which to end this genocide and also mediating a number of
truces, particularly with regards to the hostage truce that took place
when we saw an exchange that could have been extended. But Netanyahu
panicked and realised that his government was about to collapse because
(National Security Minister) Ben Gvir held a unilateral press conference
where he warned Netanyahu ‘if you extend this truce we will bring down
your government.’
So I think Qatar’s role has been immense in really amplifying public
opinion which has been essential in shifting the stance of foreign
policy actors. Particularly if you consider that Blinken went from
banning the word ceasefire and banning the word pause in his own State
Department to going to Netanyahu and telling him please, let's do a
humanitarian pause - because the Democrats are now behind in six swing
states in the US - to forcing Netanyahu into a hostage truce and now
talking about a sustainable ceasefire or talking about low intensity
warfare. The point being that Blinken is buckling under a pressure that
is being exacerbated and amplified by the Qataris who are deploying
their media to maintain public opinion while simultaneously offering a
channel of communication through mediation to allow for dialogue that
will hopefully lead to a truce or a pause in the fighting or an extended
pause in the fighting and then to an ultimate ceasefire.
The Qataris are aware - and this message does resonate a lot in a
number of capitals - that if Israel continues as it is then it will
cause such an escalation in the region that these powers will be brought
into a conflict they will not be able to get out of. So I think Qatar’s
role has been fundamental. I think the Saudis are slightly jealous. Bin
Salman was hoping he could present himself as some sort of mediator to
compensate for the point of view in public opinion that the Saudis have
betrayed the Palestinians and that they're standing more closely with
the Zionists than they are with the Palestinians. And certainly Qatar
has now come under significant pressure with the Israelis targeting the
Qataris and accusing them of supporting Hamas because they don't like
the fact that Qatar’s mediation efforts and their media coverage is
humiliating them. The ICJ ruling will only make it worse for the
Israelis. I don't think they ever envisaged that they would be put on
trial for genocide. Qatari diplomacy, Qatari media - alongside social
media and what ordinary people are doing - has amplified and shifted
public opinion in a way that has been nothing short of phenomenal.