Left: Kata'ib Hezbollah “missile force” chief Abu Baqer al-Saidi,
assassinated by a U.S. hellfire missile in Baghdad, Feb 7, 2024. Right:
Abu Mahdi al-Muhandes, assassinated by a U.S. hellfire missile in
Baghdad on Jan 3, 2020.
Geopolitically, the biggest question is whether US and Coalition
troops will remain in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. The KDP — along
with their intra-Kurdish rivals, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) —
are strong backers of a robust international military presence.
However, some parties within Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s
central government are publicly pushing for the withdrawal of US troops
sooner rather than later. As a semi-autonomous area, the Kurdistan
Region does not exercise sovereignty on this issue but the stances of
its major political parties matter.
Reminding the Kurdistan Region of its vulnerabilities in this context
yields a complex reaction. On the one hand, the withdrawal of US and
Coalition troops from the Kurdistan Region leaves it even more exposed
but on the other it theoretically removes a cause for the attacks in the
first place and encourages the Kurdish parties to seek accommodation
and security with Baghdad. However, history repeatedly shows that Kurds
remain vulnerable to attack regardless of the security regime in place.
The Kurdish preference for a continued US military presence is clear,
but it is far from guaranteed that this will give them the security they
seek or whether it will be in place for much longer.
Following the January 15 attack, Washington and Baghdad began talks
about the future of US troops in Iraq. This came at the same time as
several prominent articles
in American media outlets about whether US forces would also remain in
northeastern Syria, a mission that is dependent on having access to
bases in Iraq. While US officials downplayed whether the negotiations
would lead to a withdrawal, Iraqi voices were much more forceful that
this is Baghdad’s ultimate goal. Such a major shift takes time and there
is little appetite,
even among Iraqi politicians with close ties to Iran, to see a
precipitous exit by Washington. With a presidential election looming in
November and memories of the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan still
fresh, the Biden administration also probably wants to take its time.
This was made much more difficult on January 28, when three US soldiers were killed
at the Tower 22 outpost in Jordan located near the tripartite
Syria-Iraq-Jordan border. Iran-backed armed groups claimed
responsibility. The death of US soldiers was widely viewed as being a
major escalatory event and the rhetoric coming out of some parts of Washington urged Biden to strike at Iran directly.
The US has now conducted two rounds of retaliatory strikes. The first, on February 2, hit several bases in Iraq and Syria but was expected and seemed of a limited nature. The second, on February 7, killed
an important Kata’ib Hezbollah commander traveling in a vehicle in
Baghdad. This precision strike was far more consequential. There have
been far fewer attacks
on sites associated with the Coalition since the attack on Tower 22 and
most of those have occurred in Syria but escalation still seems to be
taking place. The US strikes will encourage some parties in Iraq to
increase their pressure on Sudani to force a quicker withdrawal.
It is far from certain what will now happen, particularly given the
volatility in the broader Middle East and Gaza in particular. Should
Iran or Iran-backed groups in Iraq resume their attacks on the Kurdistan
Region or kill more American soldiers, the US will step up its response
adding to an already dangerous escalatory situation.
Erbil, Baghdad, Tehran and Washington all have decisions to make but
events seem to be reducing the time in which they had hoped to make
them.