Trump Presidency II: Things could get messier on foreign and trade policies
LET’S face it. Contrary to many of the nightmare scenarios drawn up by Donald Trump’s critics at home and abroad who are concerned over his proclaimed isolationist and protectionist agendas, none of them occurred during his first term.
No, the United States did not withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) nor abrogated its defence treaties with Japan and South Korea. In a way, his threats to do that placed pressure on these countries to raise their defence budgets and make more contributions to the alliances.
Notwithstanding his threat to obliterate North Korea in a nuclear war, Trump, as president, ended up pursuing a diplomatic love affair with its leader Kim Jong Un, which actually brought more stability to the Korean peninsula
It’s true that Trump’s bromance with Russia’s dictator was disconcerting. But, against expectations, he provided more military assistance to Russia’s adversary, Ukraine, than his predecessor Barack Obama.
Moreover, it was Trump who proved in retrospect to be right from a strategic perspective when he put pressure on Germany to cease being dependent on gas imports from Russia, which it eventually did following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Trump’s decision to revoke the nuclear deal with Iran did not ignite a new war and US military interventions in the Middle East. Just the opposite.
The so-called Abraham Accords that he had promoted led to new peace agreements between Israel and several Arab-Sunni nations, and created the conditions for a diplomatic detente between the Jewish state and Saudi Arabia.
It’s true that on his first day in office, Trump signed an executive order removing the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and declared an end to the era of multinational trade agreements. But then, his presidential rival Hillary Clinton had promised to do the same during their 2016 presidential election campaign, reflecting the anti-free trade sentiments then among both Democrats and Republicans and across the country in general.
Candidate Trump did rally against the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) during the election campaign, but later replaced it with another accord, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).
There is general consensus that Cold War II between Washington and Beijing may have commenced under Trump, starting with a series of trade battles with the Chinese, including the imposition of major tariffs on Chinese imports.
But, in retrospect, it could be argued that the policy of “engagement” between China and the US would have been reassessed and come to an end under any American president in response to public and congressional pressures.
In fact, his successor in office, Democratic President Joe Biden, a self-proclaimed internationalist, has adopted a tougher approach to Beijing than his nationalist predecessor.
Yet, there is no doubt that when it comes to the former president’s core “Make America Great Again” beliefs, his commitment to protectionist trade policies and a unilateralist approach to the world marked a major change in the direction of the American global strategy that has been pursued by Republican and Democratic presidents since World War II.
To put it differently, unlike earlier presidents, Trump believes that the pursuit of multilateralist free trade policies has harmed US global interests and does not place its set of security alliances at the centre of America’s national strategy.
Trump’s political backers insist that he is a proponent of a realpolitik approach that assumes that the US needs to pursue its core national interests and not be constrained by multilateral accords, pressure from allies, or considerations of human rights.
The assumption is that when push comes to shove, others will eventually follow the US lead, which in a way has happened under President Biden in response to the Russian attack on Ukraine.
The Trump Doctrine, if it can be so labelled, sees as central to US national security the competition with great powers led by China and Russia. Democratic liberal internationalists and Republican neoconservatives believe that those governments’ authoritarian regimes and expansionist policies pose a direct threat to US interests and require an assertive response. Trump believes that he can negotiate and make deals with them.
Hence, one of the major changes that is expected to take place under a second Trump administration in the foreign policy arena would be a renewed effort on Trump’s part to improve the US relationship with Russia and with his long-time pal, President Vladimir Putin – an approach that would mean gradually terminating US military and economic support for Ukraine.
Indeed, Trump is likely to put pressure on Kyiv to reach an agreement with Russia to end the war.
He would probably even portray himself as a peacemaker by offering his services as a mediator between the two governments.
That kind of approach is bound to raise concerns among Nato’s members in Europe who believe that a more aggressive Russia under Putin could pose a long-term threat to their security and that they may not be able to count on the US to protect them.
Trump’s expected response would be to demand that these European allies increase their defence spending, build their militaries and start taking care of their security interests. That kind of approach is likely to threaten US ties with those governments, which could mean that while Nato survived Trump’s first term in office, it might not outlast his second, if there’ll be a second.
But then, Trump’s main emphasis would be placed not on US interests across the Atlantic, where he expects the Western nations to take care of themselves, but in East Asia where he sees China as America’s leading geoeconomic and geostrategic adversary.
Trump is likely to embrace a more aggressive approach on trade with China, including the possibility of revoking normal trade ties with Beijing – a move that would automatically raise tariffs on Chinese imports that could exceed 60 per cent.
But, there could be some good news for China. Contrary to the hawks in the Republican Party, Trump does not believe that the US has an obligation to come to Taiwan’s defence, and he certainly places China’s human rights conduct and its policies in Hong Kong at the bottom of his China agenda.
In a way, like in the case of Russia, Trump assumes that relations between states and, in particular, between great powers are transactional, and, that as long as Beijing or Russia do not threaten direct US military and economic interests, Washington could make deals with them. Why bother about Ukraine or Taiwan? Let them take care of themselves.
Similarly, if countries such as China – or, for that matter, India – impose higher tariffs on US products, the US would be open to making deals with them by persuading them to lower their tariffs or face higher American tariffs which would benefit the US economy by raising more revenues that would supposedly help reduce US trade deficits.
Critics would argue that imposing tariffs and launching trade battles against China or other countries, by threatening the current international trade regime, run against US economic interests and would hurt American consumers and businesses.
But, that is not the way an economic nationalist like Trump sees the international trade system and the world in general – one driven, in his book, by a zero-sum game that America is bound to win.