Examining US Neocons’ Wider Black Sea Strategy
The Black Sea is key to the flow of resources and goods between the Balkans, Carpathians, the Caucasus, and the Urals. Transportation routes and pipelines branch outwards in all directions through Eurasia .
The Black Sea’s strategic location, along with the discoveries in recent years of its massive natural gas reserves, has Washington cooking up plans to try to sever energy and trade links between Russia and the region, but it is unlikely to find as much success as governments there aren’t quite as acquiescent as those in the EU.
In a statement that should make everyone in the region hoping for peace and prosperity very nervous, Secretary of State for European and Eurasian affairs James O’Brien recently told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Whatever path we take leads us to the Black Sea.”
O’Brien also explained to the committee that one of the main objectives of using Ukraine in an attempt to weaken Russia is to strengthen NATO’s presence in the Black Sea. Given that NATO is in the Black Sea through member states and partner countries, O’Brien described how the war is being used to increase NATO’s military presence across the Black Sea region under five pillars: more bilateral and multilateral engagement, regional security based upon a stronger NATO presence, economic cooperation, energy security, and “democratic resilience.”
But reading through O’Brien’s statements, as well as accompanying Senate bill, the Black Sea Security Act of 2023, and think tank pieces, the Blob’s strategy would be more accurately described by omitting the obligatory references to strengthening democracy, and it would read something like this: Keep Russia bogged down with Ukraine while attempting to push Moscow out of trade and energy developments in the wider Black Sea region.
On the first point, O’Brien echoed the more typical statements recently that have nothing to do with Ukraine “winning” but just keeping the war going. He argued that more money for Ukraine was necessary to provide “the ability to fight this fight over some time.” Former Indian diplomat M.K. Bhadrkumar wrote the following after Victoria Nuland’s hurried trip to Kiev:
The new war strategy — which was outlined in a recent article in the Washington Post — takes into account the possibility of Ukraine becoming a dysfunctional state. But so long as Ukraine remains a cauldron boiling with nationalism that lends itself as a base for hostile moves to destabilise Russia and lock it in permanently in a confrontation with the West, the purpose is served —from Washington’s viewpoint.
That’s the thing about neocons. Even when one scheme fails, there’s always another harebrained plot in the works. Arnold C. Dupoy at the Atlantic Council writes about Washington’s Black Sea designs that all countries of the region (minus Russia) will benefit from an increased US presence as the “honest broker.” The US must provide more support for the other two Black Sea NATO members (Romania and Bulgaria), as well as Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and even Azerbaijan. He stresses that all this will require “deep pockets” in order to fund and train regional military establishments, as well as offer support and incentives to US companies to move into the region.
These efforts aren’t exactly new (Washington has for years relentlessly pushed for increasing NATO’s presence in the region despite warnings that such moves would provoke Russia), but it appears to be taking on added importance with the impending US defeat in Ukraine.
The Black Sea Security Act of 2023 declares that the Blob should promote a plan for “greater freedom of navigation” in the Black Sea, as well as assess “the value of establishing a joint, multinational headquarters on the Black Sea, responsible for planning, readiness, exercises, and coordination of all Allied and partner military activity in the greater Black Sea region.”
The Heritage Foundation is already looking at post-Ukraine-loss strategies, writingthat “a more robust post-conflict maritime presence will be required for some time. Congress should require the Departments of Defense and State to provide an assessment of the costs and a timeline to establish an effective Black Sea Squadron.”
To demonstrate how unserious the US thinking on Black Sea policy is, Heritage declares that the US must not only dictate Türkiye and Central Asian states’ energy policies, but also Russia’s military presence, arguing for a reduction in post-conflict residual Russian Black Sea naval presence:
In any post-conflict negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, the United States should propose a reduction of Russian presence in the Black Sea below pre-conflict levels. The goal is to ensure that Russia cannot recapitalize its Black Sea navy to threaten Ukraine or any Black Sea state in the future.
So the plan is for Russia to reduce its forces (it’s currently doing the opposite) despite winning and possibly gaining even more Black Sea coastline? Meanwhile, NATO builds up its forces closer to Russia’s border in the region. Okay.
Türkiye’s Refusal to Play Along
Central to any US think tank pieces, proposed legislation, or official comments on “winning” the region is getting Türkiye to open the Black Sea gates to NATO warships. The US has been pushing for this since the war in Ukraine began to no avail, and it’s telling that every strategy still rests on it despite Türkiye’s repeated refusals.
Türkiye controls passage to and from the Black Sea through the Bosphorus Strait and the Dardanelles and can ban the passage of naval vessels from non-littoral countries under the Montreux Convention, which it has steadfastly done since Feb. 2022.
In January, Türkiye, Bulgaria and Romania signed a memorandum of understanding in İstanbul establishing the Mine Countermeasures Naval Group in the Black Sea, which will oversee demining operations.
There was hope from some in the West that this could be a way to sidestep Türkiye’s objections to NATO warships sailing into the Black Sea. The UK tried to send two minehunter ships to Ukraine, but Ankara said no.
Erdogan’s office said Türkiye “maintains its unwavering determination and principled stance throughout this war to prevent the escalation of tension in the Black Sea.”
Don’t expect the West to stop trying. Washington sees it in a different light, with the proposed Black Sea Security Act of 2023 declaring that “Türkiye’s behavior towards some regional allies and democratic states has been counterproductive and has contributed to increased tensions in the region, and Türkiye should avoid any actions to further escalate regional tensions.”
Turkstream as the New Nord Stream
A key NATO “ally” directly importing piped Russian gas? We know how that worked out for Germany. Moscow claims it has foiled numerous attempts to do the same to Turkstream.
The TurkStream pipeline, which brings natural gas from Russia to Türkiye across the Black Sea and then into southeastern Europe, was controversial in certain quarters of the West ever since it was conceived.
Now the flow of natural gas to Europe from Russia via Türkiye is reaching all-time highs. TurkStream has a capacity of 31.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas a year, roughly half of which stays in Türkiye, and the rest continues on to the Balkans and Central Europe. Serbia and Hungary are the primary European consumers. Washington tried to use Bulgaria to block the flow of gas from Turkiye onto Europe, but Hungary nixed that plan by threatening to veto Bulgaria’s entry into the Schengen area.
It’s worth remembering that TurkStream came about after the US and EU effectively killed the Russia-Bulgaria South Stream pipeline back in 2014. The project would have transported Russian gas under the Black Sea, making landfall in Bulgaria and then passing through Serbia and Hungary into Austria.
Instead Russia pivoted to Türkiye where Erdogan was less susceptible to US pressure and opened TurkStream at the beginning of 2020 despite US sanctions on companies involved in the construction of the pipeline.
That move was typical of US strategy towards Türkiye over recent years. And just like other efforts, it failed. Part of the US’ problem with Türkiye over many years is not for lack of trying; it’s that its efforts are composed almost exclusively of sticks. Erdogan is always up for bargaining as evidenced by the recently completed deal for Türkiye to approve Sweden’s NATO accession in exchange for 40 F-16s, but the agreement took nearly two years, and the State Department couldn’t help itself from simultaneously approving a deal with Greece for 40 F-35s. Maybe the most realistic hope for Washington is that Türkiye feels threatened by Russia’s increasing power in the region and wants to tip the scales back in the other direction, but Moscow is also aware of that dynamic and works to keep Erdogan/Türkiye assuaged.
Moscow has worked meticulously to increase its leverage over Türkiye –and it has also been aided by US missteps. Just to name a few:
After years of ignored requests for the US Patriot system with technology transfer, Türkiye purchased the arguably superior Russian system in 2017.
Moscow has helped Ankara prop up its foreign currency reserves with the purchase of Turkish bonds via a scheme involving the construction and development of Turkiye‘s Akkuyu nuclear power plant. Ankara and Moscow recently celebrated the loading of fuel into the first reactor at the Russia-built plant. It was a major milestone for Turkiye, which joined the ranks of countries with nuclear energy. Turkiye had been trying to get a nuclear power plant built for 50-plus years. Back in the 90s Ankara had bids from Westinghouse + Mitsubishi, AECL, and Framatome + Siemens but had to cancel because it was going to cost more than the Turkish government could afford at the time. Instead, Russia financed, built, and is delivering the fuel to Akkuyu under a build-own-operate model. Turkish nuclear engineers are also receiving training from the Russians.
Due to Western sanctions on Russia, Türkiye is now a go-between for goods into and out of Russia, which plays a large role in the recovering Turkish economy. Russian tourism also continues to be a major economic lifeline for Türkiye due to the increase in visitors after the West mostly slammed its doors shut.
The fiasco the US unleashed in Syria (with Türkiye onboard) has also backfired. Türkiye’s number one national security concern is a unified Kurdish region in Syria. Russia’s central role in determining the Syrian endgame means it is in Ankara’s interests to work with Russia to prevent that from happening. (Iran, Russia and Türkiye just jointly vowed to combat separatism in Syria following their 21st meeting as part of the Astana peace process.)
Looking ahead, it’s hard to see US-Türkiye relations improving. While Washington’s leverage declines, it remains reluctant to change course and instead doubles down on threats, which in turn only hardens the stance in Türkiye – especially its ascendant nationalists.
Redrawing the Energy Map
If O’Brien says “whatever path we take leads us to the Black Sea,” the same could also be said about the Turkstream pipeline for it is completely at odds for Washington’s plans for energy in the region.
The Atlantic Council does well to sum up Washington’s position: “Türkiye can become an energy hub—but not by going all-in on Russian gas.” The thinly-veiled threat concludes with the following:
Exploring phantom opportunities of energy cooperation with Russia at the expense of real risks of getting exposed to US and EU sanctions will not transform Türkiye into an energy hub. Quite the opposite, it would spell the end of this dream.
A 2020 RAND report, “Understanding Russian Black Sea Power Dynamics Through National Security Gaming”, as well as O’Brien’s report to the Senate and the Black Sea Security Act of 2023, make clear that one of the US’ top objectives (if not the top objective) is to get countries off of Turkstream and replace it with US-controlled energy.
O’Brien, in his testimony to the Senate, acknowledged that Washington aspires to create oil and gas pipelines that lead from Central Asia to Europe and mentioned possibilities through Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. It happens that US major energy companies, Chevron and ExxonMobil, with their operations in Kazakhstan, rely on a pipeline that ends at the Black Sea. Kazakhstan has also begun sending oil to Germany via Russia.
O’Briend added that Central Asia relies too much on China and Russia to export its energy resources (the US is also pressuring Black Sea countries to abandon the Beijing-led 14+1 Initiative). So the goal is to somehow link up Central Asia, the Black Sea, and Europe while excluding Russia.
Meanwhile:
Also at issue is the Black Sea’s massive natural gas reserves, which GIS Reports describes:
While the exact volume is still undetermined, the raw estimates paint a noteworthy picture. Türkiye announced in 2020 that its offshore exploration zone may hold over 400 billion cubic meters (bcm). Later it raised the estimate to 540 bcm and announced that further reserves are likely to be discovered in the remaining blocks. Ukraine estimated that the shelf it controlled prior to the war contained more than 2 trillion cubic meters. Romania’s reserves were conservatively estimated at around 200 bcm. Georgia’s offshore resources are thought to be of a similar scale, while Bulgaria’s reserves are believed to contain sufficient gas in just one of its fields to cover the country’s projected needs for more than 30 years.
The thinking goes that if Europe can acquire more natural gas and oil from Central Asia (and presumably from US companies operating there) and the Black Sea, then Russia could potentially be excluded from the European market altogether.
So far, one of the big winners in the geopolitical contest has been US energy companies, as their exports to Europe have increased as Russia’s have declined. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and Russians died or were wounded to make it happen, but there’s the possibility for even more suffering as the Black Sea Security Act of 2023 states, “there are mutually beneficial opportunities for increased investment and economic expansion” with the objective of “bolstering United States support for the region’s energy security and integration with Europe and reducing their dependence on Russia while supporting energy diversification.”
With any neocon plans, there’s usually just one question to ask, however: how is it going to backfire?For the people of the region, it could mean more conflict and suffering. But we know the neocons don’t care about that.
They only need to look back to 2014, however, when Russia annexed Crimea and with it a maritime zone more than three times its size with the rights to underwater resources potentially worth trillions of dollars. And now Russia might very well take all Ukraine’s Black Sea coastal regions all the way to the Danube.