It’s common knowledge that the possibility of a return to the White House by former U.S. President Donald Trump is sending shivers up the spines of Washington’s NATO allies. But the prospect of a second Trump presidency is also heightening anxieties among U.S. allies in Asia, which have also relied on U.S. security assurances for decades and are now wondering if they will be able to trust those promises in the years to come.
Nowhere are those concerns more urgent than in Taiwan, where officials are keeping a close eye on the war in Ukraine as a barometer of the political pressures in Washington—and a possible prelude to how the U.S. might react if China carries out its frequently threatened military move to seize the independent island it claims as its own.
Trump is not in office, but his Republican allies in Congress have already blocked a $95 billion package that contains funding for key U.S. foreign policy priorities, most of it to replenish Ukraine’s depleted weapons and ammunitions stocks. As much as the Taiwanese would also like to see the $1.9 billion tagged for their own arsenal freed up, it is the $60 billion for Ukraine that could prove more consequential in Asia’s calculations.
The fate of the package and U.S. support for Kyiv, as well as the ultimate outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine, will send messages about Washington’s reliability and effectiveness as an ally elsewhere. The fact that Trump’s supporters are already having such a measurable impact on the United States’ ability to meet its commitments only highlights the risks of another Trump presidency, which would likely intensify those patterns.
The shift would be dramatic, because President Joe Biden has been remarkably outspoken about the U.S. determination to support Taiwan if it is attacked by China. And Biden has followed through where it counts, bolstering U.S. military aid to Taipei since taking office.
When a U.S. congressional delegation recently traveled to the island, the topic of Ukraine reportedly took center stage. Taiwanese officials repeatedly questioned the legislators about the fate of aid for Kyiv. “Taiwan is extremely interested in Ukraine, and extremely worried that we might walk away from Ukraine,” said Rep. Mike Gallagher, a Republican who chairs the House Select Committee on China.
Trying to sound reassuring, Gallagher declared, “The people of Taiwan should be confident that regardless of how fractious our election gets, America will stand firmly with Taiwan.”
But one could forgive the Taiwanese if they are skeptical—as is Beijing. In an interview with Fox News, the spokesperson for China’s office in charge of Taiwan affairs said that if Trump becomes president again, the U.S. “will pursue America first, and Taiwan can change from a chess piece to a discarded chess piece at any time.”
Trump has done little to dispel that notion. When he was asked if he would defend Taiwan if China attacks, he said he wouldn’t answer, but nevertheless added, “Taiwan did take all of our chip business.” His response turned a geopolitical security question of the highest order into a mercantilist consideration more suitable for 17th-century strategists.
Anxiety is also rising in South Korea, a key U.S. ally in the Pacific.
Trump has long been skeptical of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, and he purportedly planned to blow up the alliance if he won the 2020 election. “We’ll do it in the second term,” he reportedly said about withdrawing the U.S. from NATO and ending the alliance with South Korea.
A recent article in Politico claimed that Trump also has a plan to accept North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapons state if it agrees to stop building new warheads. Trump appeared to deny the story, but the report only added to growing calls within South Korea for Seoul to develop its own nuclear arsenal. That position, which once had been held only by fringe figures, is now supported by the majority of the South Korean population.
Washington has counterbalanced Beijing in the region. But if U.S. support for Taiwan, in particular, and for its two Asian allies weakens, China could become more of a threat.
In fact, even if Trump does not win the 2024 contest, the damage may have already been done. One of the leading advocates of a nuclear South Korea, the academic Cheong Seoung-Chang, told Voice of America that the U.S. could return to an isolationist stance under another president in the future, saying that Seoul should be prepared.
Japan, whose U.S.-written postwar constitution all but created its security dependence on Washington, is watching all this with great concern.
Trump once suggested that Japan and South Korea should both acquire nuclear weapons. The Japanese, who endured U.S. nuclear attacks in Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II, are unlikely to move forward on that idea anytime soon. But they are deeply worried about their longtime rival, China, emerging as the unquestioned dominant power in Asia if Trump becomes president.
Washington has counterbalanced Beijing in the region, even as China’s economy turned it into a global power. But if U.S. support for Taiwan, in particular, and for its two Asian allies weakens, China, which already bullies its neighbors in the South China Sea, could become more of a threat.
Japan is also worried about the economic consequences of a protectionist, isolationist, transactional second Trump administration.
In particular, Tokyo fears a possible deal between the U.S. and China under Trump that could weaken joint efforts by G-7 countries to counter Beijing, as well as the reimposition of U.S. trade tariffs—especially on steel—that could deal a blow to the Japanese economy and unleash a global wave of protectionism.
Already Trump has taken a stance against Biden’s landmark Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, a 14-member agreement aimed at tackling strategic supply-chain emergencies. It’s the first-ever such agreement, with potentially enormous benefits for its members, including Japan. But Trump is not a fan of multilateralism.
Japan has already launched a sub rosa diplomatic effort aimed at building ties with a possible Trump administration. Tokyo worries that the more traditional conservative pro-Japan hands from Trump’s first term—people like former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, former Vice President Mike Pence and former Defense Secretary James Mattis—won’t be there to moderate his actions in a second term.
For now, the most urgent sign of Washington’s reliability as an ally will play out in Ukraine. Anxious allies in Asia will be keeping their eyes on what happens on the battlefield there, but also in Congress, as a portent of the future of their relationship with the United States.
Frida Ghitis is a world affairs columnist and a regular contributor to CNN and The Washington Post. Her WPR column appears every Thursday. You can follow her on Twitter at @fridaghitis.