Postscript to Overview of Vladimir Putin’s State of the Nation address
1 March 2024
Putin’s two hour and five minute address was very rich in ideas and my overview of yesterday was incomplete. In what follows below, I propose to direct attention to several further elements of the speech that merit discussion.
It bears mention that during the speech Vladimir Putin explained more than once that many of the new initiatives he was promoting for implementation in his next term in office should he be elected came from his meetings these past several months with ordinary citizens, with businessmen and with civic groups as he traveled across country. The shift from neo-Liberal concepts of economic management that were so dominant before the Kremlin put the economy on a war footing to a more dirigiste approach focused on raising the quality of life for the vast majority of the population today reflects this ‘ear to the ground’ approach.
In the West, it is assumed that only representative democracy can ensure furtherance of the interests of the general population, but that is a myth. We all know how little the views of the electorate influence the setting of foreign policy in the EU, to take just one example, and in these days of self-defeating sanctions on Russia nothing could be more immediately connected with the state of the economy and welfare of the population in the EU than its foreign policy.
Russia’s ‘managed democracy’ under Vladimir Putin benefits from the way The Boss insists on breaking out of his narrow circle of advisors and meeting personally with people in all walks of life to perform his own reality check. For those who doubt my words, I refer you to Jacques Baud, author of The Russian Art of War. Baud tells us that the Russian General Staff is in direct communication with soldiers and officers in the trenches and regularly receives from them tips on how to improve tactics and strategy. Why then should Russia’s civilian leadership be less branché.
As I said yesterday, Putin’s development plans for Russia’s future over the coming six years have many social welfare components. It is important to note that they are not spoken about as ‘expenses.’ No, they are viewed as investments in the country’s future that will pay back handsomely in rubles and kopeks from a citizenry that is healthier, better educated and earning more taxable income. The difference in approach is not seen in the headings of the Treasury ledger, but is now and henceforth will be on the minds of legislators as they weigh appropriations.
On the subject of taxes, yesterday I failed to mention a remarkable proposal from the President that came in the final minutes of the speech, that the flat 15% income tax regime that Putin introduced at the very start of his first term in office be replaced by a progressive tax that takes more from the wealthy few and less from the poorer strata of the population. The objective is to level up, to reduce the enormous disparities in income among the Russian population. This proposal was not fleshed out. I would say it was a trial balloon for what will be a tough debate on taxation principles in the months ahead.
Finally, I turn attention to Vladimir Putin’s plans to create new ‘elites’ in Russian society by promoting Special Military Operation veterans who were distinguished for heroism to leadership positions in government and business. Without saying so explicitly, the idea is to replace the thieves and cunning operators who made their fortunes and consolidated their privileged position in society during the wild 1990s by people who are genuinely patriotic and brave, by people who proved themselves on the field of battle. In particular, these heroes will be offered entrance to the nation’s best institutions of higher learning to prepare them for their future roles in civilian life or in the military, if they wish to continue their careers there.
This idea did not come from nowhere. A similar policy of social mobility was practiced in the USSR in the years following WWII. It also reminds me of the ‘GI Bill’ that entitled U.S. veterans of WWII and the Korean War to get a free higher education, cheap home mortgages and the like. When I entered the world of U.S. multinationals in the 1980s, many of the top executives were precisely former senior military officers.
This very idea of admitting bearers of medals for bravery on the field of battle to top universities without obliging them to pass the usual entry exams has been a subject of discussion on Russian talk shows for the past several months. It stirred up controversy, with special objections raised on the very eve of Putin’s speech when put forward by Vladimir Solovyov. The naysayer was the dean of an international affairs department from Moscow State University who could not accept that persons without the appropriate knowledge base would be admitted to classes. However, it may well be that other, namely political objections underlay this opposition. It would not be an exaggeration to say that university faculty in Russia tend to be more liberal than the general population, and the thought of having to face down patriotic war heroes in class might be intimidating to faculty.
For exactly the same reason the idea enjoys the support of Russia’s more conservative minded legislators who also appear on the Solovyov show. If it is not possible to weed out the less than enthusiastic Putin supporters on faculty, then bringing heroes into the classroom might find liberal faculty biting their tongues.
©Gilbert Doctorow, 2024