The
two-state solution is
enshrined in
international law and is
the only viable path to
a long-lasting peace.
All other solutions—a
continuation of Israel’s
apartheid regime, one
bi-national state, or
one unitary state—would
guarantee a continuation
of war by one side or
the other or both. Yet
the two-state solution
seems irretrievably
blocked. It is not. Here
is a pathway.
The
Israeli government
strongly opposes a
two-state solution, as
does a significant
proportion of the
Israeli population, some
on religious grounds
(“God gave us the land”)
and some on security
grounds (“We can never
be safe with a State of
Palestine”). A
significant proportion
of Palestinians regard
Israel as an
illegitimate
settler-colonial entity,
and in any event
distrust any peace
process.
How then to proceed?
The usual recommendation
is the following
six-step sequence of
events: (1) ceasefire;
(2) release of hostages;
(3) humanitarian
assistance; (4)
reconstruction; (5)
peace conference for
negotiations between
Israel and Palestine;
and finally (6)
establishment of two
states on agreed
boundaries. This path is
impossible. There is a
perpetual deadlock on
steps 5 and 6, and this
sequence has failed for
57 years since the 1967
war.
The failure of Oslo is
the paradigmatic case in
point. There are
irreconcilable
differences, such as the
status of East
Jerusalem. Israeli
zealots would force from
power any Israeli
politician who dares to
give up East Jerusalem
to Palestinian
sovereignty and
Palestinian zealots
would do the same with
any Palestinian leader
who gave up sovereignty
over East Jerusalem. We
should relinquish the
continuing illusion that
Israel will ever reach
agreement, or that
Palestine would ever
have the negotiating
power to engage
meaningfully with
Israel, especially when
the Palestinian
Authority is highly
dependent on the US and
other funders.
The correct approach is
therefore the opposite,
starting with the
establishment of two
states on globally
agreed boundaries,
notably the boundaries
of June 4, 1967 as enshrined in
UN Security Council and
UN General Assembly
resolutions. The UN
member states will have
to impose the two-state
solution, instead of
waiting for yet another
Palestinian-Israeli
failed negotiation.
Thus, the settlement
should follow this
order: (1) establishment
of Palestine as 194th
member state within
two-state solution
framework on June 4,
1967 borders; (2)
immediate ceasefire; (3)
release of hostages; (4)
humanitarian assistance;
(5) peacekeepers,
disarmament and mutual
security; and (6)
negotiation on
modalities (settlements,
return of refugees,
mutually agreed
land-swaps, and others;
but not boundaries).
In 2011, the State of
Palestine (now
recognized by 138 UN
member states but not
yet as a UN member state
itself) applied
for full UN member
status. The
UN Security Council
Committee on New Members
(constituted by the UN
Security Council)
recognized the
legitimacy of
Palestine’s application,
but as is utterly
typical in the “peace
process,” the US
government prevailed on
the Palestinian
Authority to accept
“observer status,”
promising that full UN
membership would soon
follow. Of course, it
did not.
The Security Council,
backed by the UN General
Assembly, has the power
under the UN Charter to
impose the two-state
settlement. It can do so
as a matter of
international law,
following decades of
relevant resolutions. It
can then enforce the
solution through a
combination of carrots
(economic inducements,
reconstruction funding,
UNSC-backed
peacekeepers,
disarmament, border
security, etc.) and
sticks (sanctions for
violations by either
party).
The only conceivable
border for creating the
two-state solution is
that of June 4, 1967.
Starting from that
border, the two sides
might indeed negotiate a
mutually agreed swap of
land for mutual benefit,
but they would do so
knowing that the “best
alternative to a
negotiated agreement”
(BATNA) is the June 4,
1967 border.
It is quite possible,
indeed likely, that the
US would initially veto
the proposed pathway.
After all, the US has
already used its veto multiple
times to block
merely a ceasefire.
Yet, the process of
eliciting the US veto
and then securing a
large majority vote in
the UN General Assembly
will be salutary for
three reasons.
First, US politics is
shifting rapidly against
Israeli policies given
the US public’s growing
understanding of
Israel’s war crimes and
Israel’s political
extremism. This shift in
public opinion makes it
far more likely that the
US leaders will sooner
rather than later accept
the basic approach
outlined here because of
US domestic political
dynamics. Second, the
increasing US isolation
in the UN Security
Council and UN General
Assembly is also
weighing heavily on US
leaders, and forcing the
US leadership to
reconsider its policy
positions in view of
geopolitical
considerations. Third, a
strong vote in the UNSC
and UNGA for the
two-state solution on
June 4, 1967 borders
will help to strengthen
international law and
the terms of the
eventual settlement as
soon as the US veto is
lifted.
For these reasons, there
is a realistic prospect
that the UN will finally
exercise its
international legal and
political authority to
create the conditions
for peace.
Twenty-two years ago,
Arab and Islamic leaders
affirmed in the 2002
Arab Peace
Initiative that
that the only pathway to
peace is through the
two-state solution. On
February 7, 2024, the Saudi
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs reasserted
that a comprehensive
peace will only be
achieved by recognizing
an independent
Palestinian state on the
1967 borders and East
Jerusalem as the
capital. The Arab states
and the world community
generally shouldn’t buy
into another vague peace
process that is likely
doomed to fail,
especially given the
urgency caused by the
ongoing genocide in Gaza and
the bad-will accumulated
over the past 57 years
of a fruitless “Peace
Process.”
Peace can come through
the immediate
implementation of the
two-state solution,
making the admission of
Palestine to the UN the
starting point, not the
ending point. Two
sovereign states, on the
boundaries of June 4,
1967, protected
initially by UN-backed
peacekeepers and other
guarantees, will be the
starting point for a
comprehensive and just
peace not only between
Israel and Palestine—and
also a regional peace
that would secure
diplomatic relations
across the Middle East
and end this conflict
that has burdened the
inhabitants, the region,
and the world, for more
than a century.