[Salon] Cairo’s dwindling influence



Cairo’s dwindling influence

Summary: the more regional turmoil brews, the more Egypt is exposed as a regional hegemon in decline with little or no power to project even in its traditional spheres of influence.

We thank Hossam el-Hamalawy for today’s newsletter, an edited version of an article selected from his 3Arabawy Egypt Security Sector Report. Hossam is a journalist and scholar-activist, currently based in Germany. He was involved in the Egyptian labour movement and was one of the organisers of the 2011 revolution. Follow his writings on Substack and Twitter.

Egypt’s decline is particularly visible in the ongoing war in Gaza, where President Sisi operates the Rafah crossing, essentially an Egyptian-Palestinian border controlled by Israel, which decides who gets in and out and the amount of aid allowed in. Despite talks ongoing in Cairo, Egypt’s traditional role as the key mediator between the Palestinian factions and Israel is now being eclipsed by Qatar.

To the south, Cairo’s political influence is also declining. Relations with the Nile Basin countries have always been a strategic file overseen by the Egyptian General Intelligence Service (GIS). Cairo enjoyed strong political influence across the continent in the 1950s and 1960s, mainly due to President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s support for anti-colonial struggles. Africa was also one of the arenas for spy wars between the Israeli Mossad and the GIS, whose exploits were lionised in Egyptian popular culture.

That influence went into a steady decline under Nasser’s successors, who were only interested in garnering US and European support for their regimes. The decline accelerated exponentially after Sisi’s 2013 military coup which saw the regime become completely dependent on the financial and political backing of foreign powers seeking a swift end to the threat posed by the Egyptian revolution.

In Sudan, Egypt failed to exert any influence on the outcome of the 2019 uprising that toppled Omar Bashir. This was dramatic from Cairo’s point of view, as the Egyptian authorities feared that civilian protests would spill over into their country. Instead, it was Ethiopia that brokered a political settlement between the Sudanese opposition and the military.

Cairo backed the 2021 coup against the civilian government by the Sudanese military (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which subsequently failed to stabilise the country. By April 2023, Sudan was engulfed in a civil war that pitted the army against the RSF. Cairo backed the Sudanese army, which faced catastrophic defeats in one city after the other. Moreover, the ongoing diplomatic efforts to settle the conflict are hosted in countries like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Djibouti, not Egypt, which has zero influence on the process.

To add insult to injury, videos emerged at the start of the civil war of RSF soldiers capturing Egyptian jets and humiliating Egyptian soldiers stationed in Merowe airbase. The Egyptian military spokesman announced those soldiers were in Sudan for “joint training” with their Sudanese counterparts. However it was no secret that Egypt wanted to have an advanced position from where its jets could threaten Ethiopia. This position has now been lost.


Egyptian soldiers who surrendered to the Sudanese Rapid Support Force at the Merowe military base, April 19 2023 [photo credit: @RenaissanceDam]

Red Sea Blues

Since Yemen’s Huthi forces began attacking cargo liners in the Red Sea in retaliation for Israel’s war in Gaza most shipping giants have decided to suspend their operations and reroute their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. As a result Suez Canal revenues declined by 44 percent in January compared to the same month last year.

The Suez Canal connects the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, a vital route responsible for 12 percent of global trade. It is also one of the main sources of the hard currency that Cairo so desperately needs, along with worker remittances and tourism. Although the tourist sector has witnessed a steady recovery since the pandemic, its future remains uncertain should regional instability persist. Further underlining the damage to the economy of lost Suez revenues, remittances sent home by Egyptian expats have also declined by 29.9 percent according to the Central Bank’s report in the first quarter of the fiscal year

Successive Egyptian regimes have treated the Red Sea like a strategic backyard, where maritime traffic flow is a matter of life or death for the state’s income and regional influence. Egypt fought Britain, France, and Israel in 1956 to gain control of the canal. During the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Egyptian navy closed Bab el-Mandab strait to impose a blockade against Israel.

Cairo is thus unsurprisingly extremely concerned by the Huthi intervention in the regional turmoil that has seen attacks launched against ships destined to or affiliated with Israel, before the campaign expanded to target other ships affiliated with the countries conducting air and naval strikes in “self-defence”, i.e. the US and Britain.  Despite the importance of international shipping to the Suez Canal, Egypt has been powerless to halt the Huthi attacks; its regional decline is now on full display, with little recourse to change it.

Growing tensions with Ethiopia

Although Egypt and Ethiopia have official diplomatic relations, the two have developed a rivalry over the past decade, which has morphed into outright hostility at least in diplomacy and public rhetoric with the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) the major irritant.

The Nile River is the primary source of water for Egyptians. Over the past decade, Egypt has tried and failed to stop Ethiopia from building the dam which Egyptians perceive as a strategic threat to their water resources. Ethiopia, for its part, sees GERD as essential for its development efforts and denounces Egypt’s share quota of Nile water as an unjust relic of the colonial era.

After several rounds of prolonged negotiations, the Egyptian government announced last December that talks over the dam had failed, asserting that “Egypt reserves its right, under international charters and accords, to defend its water and national security in case of any harm.” Given the critical importance of the Nile waters to the well-being of Egypt it was an assertion more mild than menacing.

A controversial agreement

On the first day of 2024, in the latest evidence of Egypt’s declining influence, a pact was declared and signed by Addis Ababa and the breakaway statelet of Somaliland, whereby the latter would grant landlocked Ethiopia access to the Red Sea.. This was followed by talks to strengthen military cooperation between the two. The exact details of the agreement have not been publicly disclosed, but the declaration was enough to arouse the anxieties of the Egyptian regime.

Egypt immediately sent a senior diplomatic delegation to discuss the matter with Somalia’s president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry was also dispatched to Eritrea. Cairo is trying to mobilise its (rather depleted) diplomatic arsenal in support of Somalia, inviting President Mohamud to Cairo for a two-day visit, during which Sisi declared “Egypt will not allow any threat to Somalia or its security.” The following month, Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki was also invited to Cairo for talks.

Cairo is also behind the Arab League’s denunciation of the pact, a largely hollow move since the league has zero impact on policymaking in any of its member states. One explicit example is the United Arab Emirates. While the league does not recognise Somaliland, the statelet enjoys close military, diplomatic, and economic relations with the Emiratis. Dubai Ports World operates in Somaliland, part of the UAE’s quest for maritime hegemony.

There was a time under Nasser when Egypt was a regional hegemon challenging the world order. Under his successors Sadat and Mubarak, it was a regional hegemon serving the world order. Today under Sisi Egypt is still largely relevant to the world order but only because it remains a country “too big to fail” –  nothing less, and nothing more.


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