[Salon] Why Israel's New Nationalistic Judaism Doesn't Care About the Hostages in Gaza - Opinion - Haaretz.com



Title: Why Israel's New Nationalistic Judaism Doesn't Care About the Hostages in Gaza - Opinion - Haaretz.com
They’re talking the Republican Party here; its Likud wing, jointly headed by Netanyahu and Donald Trump. With its major state subsidiary Florida, under the extreme ZioCon/NatCon, Ron DeSantis. But no mention of their “Godhead,” NatCon Yoram Hazony!

They would say they’re in “good company,” I would say they’re in the company of fascists: "Mafdal, the first party representing religious Zionists in Israel was centrist. Yet it gradually lost support and was eventually replaced by the extremely nationalistic "Religious Zionist Party" of Betzalel Smotrich, which has allied itself with Meir Kahana's successors.

Libertarians I know will giddily say; who cares?

Here is who the US right-wing is allied with, which is why they appeal so much to all sectors of “Conservatism,” Traditional Conservative, Neo-Conservative, and National Conservative, all linked together with Yoram Hazony, and his antecedent “political theorist,” Willmoore Kendall, through his political theory writings. And through him, to Leo Strauss, and Carl Schmitt. All like-minded authoritarian political theorists. And all like minded with this sentiment: “honor and unity.” With no dissent allowed!

"Several right-wing speakers presented the war as a rare opportunity to recover a sense of honor and unity. Yinon Magal, a prominent right-wing journalist described in an interview this period as a "great era that does good for Israel"




Why Israel's New Nationalistic Judaism Doesn't Care About the Hostages in Gaza - Opinion - Haaretz.com

Why is the Israeli right absent, by and large, from demonstrations for the hostages? What could be more sacred and urgent than saving the lives of fellow Israelis? The answer seems deceptively simple: these activities are conceived as a continuation of the protests against Netanyahu's government and its attempt to overhaul the judiciary, from before October 7.

Another oft-cited reason is that the hostages mostly come from kibbutzim, which are considered left-wing and therefore at odds with the Israeli right. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's unilateral pullout from Gaza in 2005 has also come up in this context. Indeed, a hostage family member was recently told by a Likud Knesset member: "If the disengagement had not happened, you would not be sitting here right now."

But these explanations, based on political agendas and identity-politics do not go deep enough.

A fundamental ideology is at work here, according to which the war in Gaza is the ultimate national drama, a rare opportunity to recover national pride and a sense of invincibility. In this narrative, the hostages are a source of collective weakness. Supporting their cause means elevating the cause of the individual above that of the state.

This is not just a matter of immediate priorities but of a whole value system. Several right-wing speakers presented the war as a rare opportunity to recover a sense of honor and unity. Yinon Magal, a prominent right-wing journalist described in an interview this period as a "great era that does good for Israel"

Then there is religion. According to a recent poll, 73 percent of the secular Jewish population supports a deal with Hamas to release the hostages, in comparison to 52 percent of those who define themselves as "masorati," 41 percent of those identified as religious, and only 24 percent of the Haredi community.

Right-protesters demonstrate against a cease-fire deal to end the Israel-Hamas war in Tel Aviv in November. Their signs read, "We don't stop until we win".

Right-protesters demonstrate against a cease-fire deal to end the Israel-Hamas war in Tel Aviv in November. Their signs read, "We don't stop until we win".Credit: Tomer Appelbaum

An unequivocal correlation thus exists between the level of religiosity and hostility toward negotiations with Hamas. This correlation cannot be explained by religious sensibilities per se, since halakhic tradition by and large espouses a deep commitment to and compassion for hostages.

Jewish communities throughout history went to great lengths and paid vast sums of money to ransom hostages from all around the world. While the Mishnah rules that "The captives are not to be ransomed for more than their value" halakhists (experts in Jewish law) of all generations took pains to bypass this restriction, from the Tosafists in the twelve century (see the Tosafot on Bavli Gittin 45a; 58a) to Rabbi Ovadia Yosef who ruled in 1976, when an Air France airplane was kidnapped to Uganda, that it is justified to release terrorists for captives, even for an extremely high price (Yabia Omer part 10).

Thus it is not tradition that is at play here, but rather a new type of nationalistic religiosity. The correlation between religious identity and right-wing politics is stronger than ever, and the question of national pride versus perceived weakness plays a crucial role in this atmosphere.

Mafdal, the first party representing religious Zionists in Israel was centrist. Yet it gradually lost support and was eventually replaced by the extremely nationalistic "Religious Zionist Party" of Betzalel Smotrich, which has allied itself with Meir Kahana's successors.

Demonstrators take part in a rally calling for the release of hostages kidnapped in the deadly October 7 attack on Israel by Hamas from Gaza and for support from the United States, outside the Embassy of United States, in Tel Aviv, Israel in March.

Demonstrators take part in a rally calling for the release of hostages kidnapped in the deadly October 7 attack on Israel by Hamas from Gaza and for support from the United States, outside the Embassy of United States, in Tel Aviv, Israel in March.Credit: Carlos Garcia Rawlins/ REUTERS

This dramatic shift has been a long time in the making. It began after the 1967 war and was bolstered in the 1980s and 1990s with the formation of an independent school system for the National Religious camp (with its own textbooks of history, literature and political science) and the creation of homogenous neighborhoods (and settlements) which gradually grew into echo chambers monopolized by a single, ethno-nationalist narrative.

In the ultra-orthodox community too, a rapid process of nationalization is taking place. A community whose leaders once supported political and territorial compromises is now situated unequivocally in the far right (the support of many young voters at the fringes of the Haredi communities for the Kahanist party of Itamar Ben-Gvir is an open secret that keeps some Haredi politicians up at night). The fact that Haredi nationalism is unchecked by modern liberal values makes it especially dangerous. It is hardly surprising that some of the most extreme views concerning the war can be found there.

Bezalel Smotrich, Israel's far-right finance minister and head of the Religious Zionist Party, addressing the parliament in Jerusalem last year.

Bezalel Smotrich, Israel's far-right finance minister and head of the Religious Zionist Party, addressing the parliament in Jerusalem last year.Credit: Maya Alerruzzo,AP

What more, some in the far right Religious Zionist Party have also cultivated a visceral antagonism towards the very idea of Jewish vulnerability. In this telling, Jewish Israelis should at all times project an image of power and dominance.

This is not just a reincarnation of the old "Sabra" image from early statehood, but an entirely new ideology.

Too much consideration and attention to human weakness is an _expression_, they think, of corrupt, emasculating "Western" values. One member of the party argued a few years ago that a youth movement for disabled children is diminishing society by sending "anti-national and anti-manly" messages. This may be an exceptionally extreme position, but it conveys a much wider sentiment. Too much morality is a sign of weakness, not only in the context of concern for Palestinian people but even when it comes to vulnerable Jews.

Though these groups claim to be the guardians of Jewish history, this brand of Judaism that we are encountering today in Israel, often considered in public discourse as the only possible Judaism, is in fact a recent development.

It is a melding of jingoistic tendencies that have always existed in Judaism together with novel nationalistic voices along with a vigorous dose of messianic expectations. This is not an authentic _expression_ of Jewish tradition, but rather a new type of Judaism, one that glorifies power and scorns the weak and needy. It is a reversal of the Jewish tradition I have dedicated my life to learning and teaching.

This nascent version of Judaism, now holding the reins of power in the Israeli government explains, in part, why 134 Israelis, including women and babies, are still in Gaza over five months since they were stolen away.

Ishay Rosen-Zvi is the chair of the Department for Jewish Philosophy and Talmud at Tel-Aviv University and a research fellow at the Shalom Hartman Institute. On Twitter: @irosenzvi



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