U.S. President Joe Biden gave the annual State of the Union address to Congress last Thursday night. Intended to outline current U.S. domestic and foreign policy, the address turned into a fiery campaign speech. Biden repeatedly attacked his “predecessor” and rival in the November election, former President Donald Trump, without mentioning him by name, while contrasting his policies with those of Trump and the Republican Party. To the extent that Latin America and the Caribbean were discussed at all, it was in the context of the migration challenges at the U.S. southern border and the concerns about illegal immigration among U.S. voters. But Biden similarly uttered the word “border” 10 times without ever mentioning Mexico, the country on the other side.
Earlier that day, however, Assistant Secretary of State Brian Nichols provided a deeper and more nuanced articulation of the Biden administration’s policies and record in Latin America and the Caribbean. Speaking at the Council of the Americas, Nichols highlighted the same big-picture values for Latin America that Biden has endorsed in his speeches and public comments for a decade, since his time as vice president: a hemisphere that is democratic, secure and middle class. Nichols provided a laundry list of U.S. programs that are almost unknown to people who don’t spend a lot of time deep in the weeds of regional policy but which, taken together, comprise the basic toolbox for the U.S. government’s efforts across the hemisphere. He also, correctly, highlighted the Biden administration’s success stories, including supporting the democratic transfers of power in Guatemala and Brazil, both of which were in doubt and required international pressure to ensure.
As the top diplomat for issues in the hemisphere, Nichols has done a great job in a tough position, and everything about his speech was factually correct. And yet, it didn’t address or dispel the general sense that something is off about U.S. policy in the region. More than three years into Biden’s term, the administration’s values are on target. Its tactics and tools are good, though underfunded, and it has notched a few victories to be proud of. Despite that, pretty much nobody in the U.S. or in the hemisphere is happy.
This paradox applies to more than just Biden’s Latin America policy. The U.S. economy is growing. Jobs and wages are increasing. Inflation has dropped. And yet, a majority of U.S. voters are dissatisfied with the economy and Biden’s handling of it. However, unlike the economy, popular dissatisfaction over the Biden administration’s approach to Latin America and the Caribbean is about to get worse. For all the success his team has had—and I do think they deserve credit for what they’ve done—a small number of big challenges have stubbornly dominated the Biden administration’s agenda for the past few years, without any progress to show for it. They are fueling the perception of a broader failure that will persist and possibly even worsen in the coming months.
The first and most pressing problem is the border. Conservatives are angry that so many migrants are able to cross into the U.S. and allowed to remain in the country while awaiting the processing of their asylum claims. Leftists dislike the fact that the asylum-processing system is slow, that migrants are treated poorly and at times inhumanely at the border, and that the Biden administration constantly caves to the right’s ridiculous rhetoric portraying the border situation as a national security threat. Moderates and technocrats simply wonder why the images of border chaos continue to proliferate, and what’s keeping an administration that promised to bring professionalism back to government from managing the entire issue more efficiently.
The Biden administration can correctly point to immigration regulations that it has improved since taking over from the previous administration. Moreover, part of the fault certainly lies with the lack of congressional action and funding on a wide variety of immigration issues. And Biden’s policy of trying to address the root causes of migration in Latin America is likely correct, though it’s not clear that it has the necessary levels of funding or attention to make an impact. And yet, no excuses make up for the fact that the border situation is problematic. And in U.S. politics, the buck stops with the president.
A few big challenges have dominated Biden’s Latin America agenda for the past few years, without any progress to show for it. They are fueling the perception of a broader failure that will possibly worsen in the coming months.
In addition to the persistent crisis at the border, at least two other crises are about to hit the Biden administration head on this election year. First, the authoritarian regime of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has announced that a long-anticipated presidential election will be held on July 28. The accelerated timeline abides by the letter of the Barbados Agreement signed by the Maduro regime and its political opponents, whereby a fair election was to be held this year in which both sides would be free to choose their candidates. However, the Maduro regime’s continued ban on opposition nominee Maria Corina Machado doesn’t, and there is no reason to believe the conditions in which the election is held won’t either.
As with the border, Biden can blame his predecessor, having inherited Trump’s Venezuela policy of maximum pressure and minimal results, but nothing Biden has done since taking office has been enough to dislodge Maduro from power or halt the country’s decline. The odds of an ugly election result that keeps the dictatorship in power come July are quite high, and whether or not that is Biden’s fault or something his administration can possibly change, he will take the blame for the lack of progress on nudging Venezuela in the right direction.
Second, Haiti’s increasingly dire situation can no longer be ignored. Two weeks ago, the country’s unelected acting prime minister, Ariel Henry, promised new elections by mid-2025, a long-delayed timeline that would have kept him in power far too long. Then Henry found himself unable to reenter the country after a trip abroad due to gang violence and political manipulations. With Henry now stuck in Puerto Rico, everyone—including the Biden administration, which had been his only real base of support—wants him to allow a transitional governing council to take over. But Haiti’s various feuding political factions and politically powerful gang leaders are far from agreeing on who should comprise it. Meanwhile, gangs have conducted jailbreaks to free their imprisoned members and attacked critical infrastructure, and they are once again blocking food and fuel shipments. The Biden administration is now in a bind that is years in the making: send in forces on a mission with no clear objective and little chance of success in the coming months, or don’t send in forces and watch the situation in Haiti deteriorate further.
Making matters worse, the crises in Venezuela and Haiti are both already fueling migration to the U.S., meaning the border crisis will only worsen if conditions in those countries fail to improve in the months ahead.
The nuts and bolts of U.S. policy in the hemisphere may be better today than they were under Trump, but that’s too low of a bar for Biden to claim success. The border, Venezuela and Haiti are all crises that have festered because the Biden administration was too slow to act. Some critics have argued that these challenges are a sign that Washington’s regional influence is no longer enough to solve the hemisphere’s problems. However, accurate or not, that sort of logic doesn’t fit the Biden administration’s narrative or Biden’s rhetoric from the State of the Union, both of which trumpet the belief that America can do anything. His administration can’t have it both ways, claiming a big picture agenda of democracy, economic growth, human rights and security, and then trying to find excuses when things don’t work out.
This is the challenge Biden now faces. Three big issues hang over his approach to Latin America and the Caribbean in 2024: the border, Venezuela and Haiti. Make progress on any one of them, and the success may be perceived by analysts, regional leaders and U.S. voters. But fail to move the bar on any of them, and the perception of a floundering regional policy will be difficult to dispel.
James Bosworth is the founder of Hxagon, a firm that does political risk analysis and bespoke research in emerging and frontier markets. He has two decades of experience analyzing politics, economics and security in Latin America and the Caribbean.