A Red Sea deal unsettles the Horn of Africa
Summary: the International Crisis Group assesses an agreement between Ethiopia and the breakaway state of Somaliland that could further destabilise the Red Sea region with MENA countries choosing sides and jockeying for position.
Further to Hossam El-Hamalawy’s 7 March newsletter “Egypt in decline” and following the latest and lethal Huthi attack we are reprinting two sections from a lengthy analysis by the International Crisis Group (ICG) on the preliminary agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland that would give the former access to the Red Sea and could further raise tensions in an already febrile region. You can find the full ICG analysis here.
International reactions
International reactions have largely favoured Somalia’s argument that the deal runs counter to principles of preserving territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. In the immediate vicinity, (Ethiopian President) Abiy’s push for sea access has unsettled neighbours Djibouti and Eritrea, which both seem to have sided with Mogadishu. Although Eritrea’s government has been quiet about the deal, President Isaias Afwerki invited Somalia’s President Mohamud to Asmara. Mohamud’s press office said “profound talks” were held “while refraining from a reactive posture to various provocative agendas”. Djibouti, which is friendly with Somaliland despite competing with it commercially, has come out strongly against the January memorandum. Djibouti has taken on significant Chinese debt to improve a road connecting its port to Ethiopia, assuming that a large volume of trade would continue to transit, and stands to lose significant revenue from port fees if the deal holds up. Additionally, (Somaliland President) Bihi signed the memorandum shortly after Djibouti President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh tried to mediate between Somaliland and Somalia, which likely came as an insult.
Farther afield, Egypt has perhaps been most active in capitalising on the dispute, doubtless due to Cairo’s longstanding rivalry with Addis Ababa. On 20 January, Egyptian President Abdelfattah al-Sisi invited President Mohamud to Cairo, pledging to defend Somalia if asked. Traditional partners like the European Union and the U.S. have expressed strong support for Somalia. Other powers closer to the Horn of Africa, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and the UAE, have publicly backed Mogadishu but likely seek to balance their relations in the region. The UAE appears to be in a particularly awkward position, given its majority stake in Berbera port, its strong security partnership with Mogadishu and its warm relations with Addis Ababa. Somali officials complain quietly that they see the Emirates playing a role in the deal, given Emirati leaders’ proximity to Abiy, although foreign diplomats are less certain.
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A surprise memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland has aggravated tensions in the Horn of Africa partly because of Somaliland's strategic Berbera port.
What are the dangers of further escalation?
The agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland could spell further friction in an already troubled Horn of Africa. Even if the deal collapses, the question of sea access for Ethiopia will remain a divisive issue that is likely to resurface soon. Abiy is bent on restoring it, and he has a penchant for unilateral action. Although the prospect of more armed conflict as a result of the January memorandum seems low, given that both Ethiopia and Somalia seem to be keeping their differences in the diplomatic and political arena, that could change if Addis Ababa and Hargeisa move quickly to the deal’s next stage.
Another major concern is that the feud could become the latest front for proxy shadowboxing in the Horn of Africa, echoing previous bouts of competition among Gulf powers in the region. The deal could drive a wedge between two emerging blocs – on one hand, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and their allies, including Eritrea and Djibouti, all of which are situated on the Red Sea; and the UAE, Ethiopia and their allies, on the other. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Eritrea share a desire to prevent other powers from encroaching on the Red Sea, while Djibouti has drifted closer to Saudi Arabia since it fell out with the UAE and seized control of a container terminal operated and jointly owned by DP World. These blocs are already at odds over the Sudan war, with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Eritrea favouring the Sudanese army on one side and the UAE backing the rival paramilitary Rapid Support Forces on the other. Recent developments – Egypt’s vocal support for Somalia, the pomp attending the announcement of a surge of Saudi aid to Somalia, and a series of meetings between Djibouti and Saudi Arabia – suggest that the parties are indeed positioning themselves along these lines.
Emphasis added.