| | |   The great sociologist and public intellectual Eric Klinenberg, author of books on subjects as diverse as the horrors wrought by media concentration, the increasing number of Americans happily living alone, and the importance of great public spaces, has a new one called 2020: One City, Seven People, and the Year Everything Changed,
 on the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic. It covers an 
extraordinarily rich range of issues and insights, some of them 
familiar, others utterly fresh. Interviewing him last week at Chicago’s 
Seminary Co-op Bookstore, I drilled down on the two I found most 
important. In the course of our conversation, we wended our way to a 
third, in developments that took shape after the book went to press. I 
found his insight one of the most striking expressions of America’s 
political brokenness that I’ve yet encountered. So in this essay, we 
will wend our way there, too.
 The
 book starts on the day the Earth stood still, four years ago this week.
 For Klinenberg, that came while on the road in Cleveland, Ohio, for a 
big speech marking a major civic occasion. The organizers decided to go 
forward with it, despite fear of this dread new disease; the theater 
ended up being only half full. Klinenberg returned home to a frightened 
family worried about his 13-year-old’s fever and wondering just what 
they should do: "Isolate our child in a room of his own or hug and hold 
him? Establish distance or deepen the connection? How were we to care 
for each other? Would our instinct to keep each other close make the 
situation worse?"
 
 From
 public-health experts and officials, the answer had already begun to 
arrive: "social distancing." To the sociologist, this was practically an
 emotional trigger.
 
 In Chicago, Klinenberg recalled how he immediately thought back to the book
 for which Chicagoans know him best: his classic "social autopsy" of a 
stretch of 100-degree-plus days in 1995 that saw 45,000 households lose 
electricity, homes losing water pressure from all the opened fire 
hydrants, and 739 deaths, most of them old and economically vulnerable 
people without anyone to look in on them. "Social distancing, back then,
 literally meant death," he reflected in Chicago. He felt compelled, 
contemplating his own family’s peril, to argue it still might: As he 
summarized the argument he made in a New York Times op-ed published on March 14, 2020, "The WHO is wrong, and instead of saying we need social distancing, we need physical distancing—and social solidarity."
 
 That’s this book’s first
 great theme. He writes, "‘Social distancing’ turned out to be the very 
opposite of what people needed to maintain health and vitality. The
concept conveyed a strong message: Sever ties and limit contact with 
friends and neighbors. Seal your domestic space. Create a bubble for the
 members of your nuclear family. Stay inside of it until the emergency 
ends. In a crisis, however, social closeness protects people. Social 
solidarity, the bonds of mutual obligation and linked fate between 
people who share a neighborhood, city, or nation, can be a crucial 
resource … The call for social distancing was rooted in good 
epidemiological science. Sociologically, though, it was destined to 
fail."
 
 The book’s second great theme is what happened because of this in a certain
society all too lacking in social solidarity: our own.
 
 The book’s title—2020—is
 a numeric pun. It refers to not just the year he writes about, but also
 the way in which chaos unveils social norms and structures that are 
occluded in normal times. As "lenses," we like to say. What we see 
afresh with this lens, in example after example, is how in America, 
those norms and structures favor individualism over mutual obligation, 
and in 2020, caused massive unnecessary death and social decay.
 
 I
 write "in America" advisedly—very advisedly. Klinenberg was intrigued 
to watch a journalistic discourse emerge claiming the imprimatur of 
sociological theory, even quoting the field’s founding hero Emile 
Durkheim. "We’re social beings, and isolation is changing us," as a 
writer named Olga Khazan wrote in The Atlantic, looking back from the vantage point of 2022 in a piece called "Why People Are Acting So Weird." "In the past two years, we have stopped being social, and in many cases we have stopped being moral."
 
 Sounds unobjectionable enough, except that it’s a terrible distortion. "People" weren’t acting "so weird." Americans were.
 "I
 don’t think Americans appreciate the extent to which our experience of 
COVID was an outlier," Klinenberg said in Chicago. Every nation 
experienced a similar change in social life. He wrote, "In most of 
Europe and Asia the lockdowns and distancing mandates were far more 
severe." Measures of stress and anxiety increased everywhere. "Yet no 
European or Asian society saw rates of destructive behavior anywhere 
near the American level. In fact, the reverse happened: most of them 
witnessed a remarkable decline in violent crime."
 
 Same
 contrast when it came to
public health. Klinenberg notes a metric experts devised, pre-COVID, to 
address nations’ vulnerability to damage from infectious disease 
outbreaks. Under it, America was rated the best-prepared nation on 
Earth. The nation of Australia was far behind us. Except, came the 
pandemic, and "if the United States had the same COVID death rate as 
Australia, 900,000 lives would have been saved."
 
 Like
 the U.S., Australia was then governed by a global warming–denying 
president, at a time of widespread national concern about increasing 
social distrust and ideological polarization. But the country was 
functional enough to enact normal
good-government responses. President Scott Morrison brought together the
 heads of each state and territory and their respective health 
ministers, formed a task force that set forth a federal plan and charged
 the states to come up with their own ways to effectuate it, subsidized 
the public production and distribution of masks, initiated lockdowns far
 more encompassing than ours, and initiated contact-tracing protocols.
 
 Afterward,
 surveyors found trust in government, trust in science, and trust in 
other citizens went way up among Australians—as happened in many 
countries. Here, all these measures plummeted.
 
 In my own writing
 on the sociology and politics of COVID, I’ve noted the psychologist 
William James’s lament that the only thing that seems ever to spur 
nations to truly heroic levels of sacrifice—paradoxically, to a higher morality—is war.
 A pacifist and a socialist, James longed for a "moral equivalent of 
war": all the heightened sense of mutual obligation, none of the 
slaughter.
 
 Klinenberg
 gives plenty of examples of how Donald Trump’s particular narcissism, 
stupidity, and lunacy played an outsized role in rendering that state of
 being impossible when it came to our COVID war—though he stresses it’s 
important not to overdo his part in the causality.
We get the leaders we deserve.
 
 Indeed,
 by my lights, the best exemplification of the unique and deep-seated 
cultural manias that rendered America’s response to the pandemic the 
moral equivalent of a war of all against all was the mayor of Las 
Vegas—a former Democrat, now an independent—who insisted casinos should 
reopen as soon as possible and let the market sort out the rest: 
"competition will destroy" the resorts where "it becomes evident that 
they have a disease."
 
 But, yes: Let us not forget Donald Trump.
 
 Klinenberg
 tells a tale of two cruise ships. The Diamond Princess, sailing from 
Japan, gets permission to dock, and a team of epidemiologists gets to 
work testing and quarantining passengers, armed with state-provided 
phones and tablets and Wi-Fi so scientists can track the disease course.
 That let them study how those contracting the disease related to the 
physical layout of the ship, and to
conclude, very early, that the pathogen circulates through air and can 
be spread by those without symptoms. They then unfolded a slow and 
deliberate re-entry program of these citizen research subjects. Leaders,
 meanwhile, educated the public in a crucial, basic reality of 
fast-moving emergencies: that experts would get things wrong. That,
 in exercising the precautionary principle, there might be overreach, 
toward which people proved largely forgiving, not casting about for 
blame: that trust thing, again.
 
 Then, here.
 
 The Grand Princess, sailing from San Francisco, did not get
 permission to dock, because, the president of the United States said, 
"I like the numbers where they are." When it did, it was commanded to 
dock not in San Francisco, but Oakland—hiding the embarrassment at an 
unglamorous industrial port in a majority-Black city. Passengers chose 
whether to stay or leave, under the principle that mandatory testing was
 a violation
of individual rights. The American way, right down to the denouement: 
"And the whole thing ends with lawsuits."
 
 Meanwhile, our leader
 primed his followers to think like he does, to only see the world 
through a friend-enemy distinction, always casting around for others to 
blame. Which became a sort of contagion as well: a social one. For "our"
 side cast around for someone to blame, too, with ever-heightening 
bitterness.
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 You see it in a fascinating New York Post article
 from two months ago. Anthony Fauci made the ex post facto observation 
that the six-foot social distancing recommendation "just sort of 
appeared … likely without data." President Biden’s current COVID adviser
 ungraciously seemed to complain this proves "dissenting
opinions were often not considered or suppressed completely," and that 
in future pandemics "America’s response must be guided by scientific 
facts and conclusive data"—as if careful data-sifting under sluggish 
peer review was desirable or even possible amid the fog of pathogenic 
war.
 Rupert Murdoch’s Post, meanwhile, weaponizes the entire "dispute" as proof of Trump’s critique of government as teeming with
deep-state monsters, dedicated day after day to smothering us all within their totalitarian maw.
 
 Which
 is where we are now, in the midst of a presidential campaign that 
somehow finds us—"I don’t know if you’re reading the news," Klinenberg 
remarked to a bookstore’s worth of guffaws—with the same candidates as 
in 2020.
 
 A
 campaign, he concluded with genuine anguish, in which the previous 
pandemic, where competent leadership could have saved 900,000 lives, and
 the next pandemic, which in all likelihood will be both epidemiologically and sociologically more catastrophic yet, is hardly even an issue.
 
 On "both sides," as the pundits like to say.
 
 The
 former guy opened an Orwellian memory hole within the architecture of 
his campaign speeches, with his customary feral brilliance. He now asks 
listeners if they were better off five years ago.
 
 "It
 wasn’t an accident," Klinenberg stresses. "He’s said it on several 
occasions. It’s a strategy. And the idea behind it turns out to be quite
 a popular idea in America: 2020 shouldn’t count. It wasn’t fair. Nobody
 could have seen this thing coming; everything was fine before that; 
don’t count this against him. If it wasn’t for 2020, the country would 
be fantastic, and I was obviously unlucky, it’s not fair. I’m a victim. 
I’m a victim."
 
 And then there’s the current guy.
 
 Our
 interview was the night of the State of the Union address. We weren’t 
able to watch, but Klinenberg pretty much predicted it based on what 
Biden had been saying to this point. It was about 8,000 words long. 
Little over 1 percent of those words concerned the preventable loss of 900,000 American lives.
 Effectively less than that, if you don’t count the parts about the 
attendant economic crisis, which seemed the main reason he brought it 
up. Both were over and done with, was the point: just one more component of "the American people … writing the greatest comeback story never told."
 
 Maybe
 the White House divined from focus groups that "the American people" 
just don’t want to hear about it. Maybe it would "step on his message" 
that the American people can accomplish anything they set their minds 
to.
 
 On both sides, it’s all of a piece. 2020, and 2020, are the lenses that let us see this. "Something gets whipped up, and intensified, and locked in during that year. And because we’ve all been so eager to just get 2020 behind us and get on with our lives, and because we allowed the
 previous president to say 2020 doesn’t count, let’s not worry about, 
this has not really surfaced as a topic in our current politics."
 
 What
 Klinenberg said next needs exclamation points: "a list of some of the 
things the next president will be dealing with: Russia and Ukraine! 
Israel and Gaza! Nuclear Iran! China! Taiwan! AI! Climate change! And 
maybe a new pathogen! It occurs to me that one would want to know how 
adept a leader is at managing a crisis. That this is something that you 
might want to select for."
 
 Your
 Infernal Triangle columnist adds: Agenda-setting elite political 
journalists might want to cover this as an issue—maybe, if it’s not too 
much to ask, with one-eighth or so the careful devotion to how Biden’s 
supporters are reacting to him using an antiquated word to refer to 
undocumented immigrants.
 
 It’s like that New York Times front page
 on May 24, 2020, listing names, names, names, names: "U.S. DEATHS NEAR 
100,000, AN INCALCULABLE LOSS." Ten times those deaths, however, 
nine-tenths of them entirely preventable, is now, apparently, 
calculable. Or at least, not the
 obvious center of discussion about who next will lead the free world. 
There is something truly broken about that. Hardly less insane than 
going at the problem with bleach or bright lights or horse 
tranquilizers.
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