The latest public furor, which this week broke out over the extraordinary remarks made by the commander of the Israel Defense Forces' 98th Division, Brig. Gen. Dan Goldfuss, reflects the true state of the war in the Gaza Strip.
In the absence of concrete progress, either in the war or at the negotiating table, Israel is busying itself with scandals. This week it was Goldfuss' call to the country's political leaders "to be worthy" of the sacrifice being made by the combat troops.
Before that, a dispute erupted over the planned appointment of another brigadier general, Barak Hiram, as the next commander of the Gaza Division. If the IDF was now genuinely deploying for a rapid conquest of Rafah, or if it had achieved a breakthrough in the hunt for Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar as of Thursday (a mission that Goldfuss, as commander of the Khan Yunis sector, is in charge of), we would be occupying ourselves with different matters now.
The statement by Goldfuss – which called for national unity, but which, by promising that the IDF would not flee its responsibility, hinted that the political leaders were in fact doing just that – generated a certain confusion in the political arena.
Until now his image was of a knife-between-the-teeth type of soldier, an officer who had served in the naval commandos and was spearheading the uncovering of the tunnels under Khan Yunis with grit and persistence. The right wing liked the image, and is also generally pleased with messages of unity, because the call for unity blurs the necessary criticism of the government's failures.
However, so potent are the customs of the cult that the followers of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have adopted, that its members are incapable of entertaining even a wink and a nod in the direction of taking responsibility. In short order, the social media was flooded with engineered responses, supposedly from anonymous soldiers who had served under Goldfuss and now were unhappy about what he was saying.
The division commander on Wednesday read out a declaration to the media from a printed page, which was formulated in coordination with the IDF Spokesperson's Unit. But then he took from his pocket a notepad, from which he read out the words that stirred the controversy.
The officers of the Spokesperson's Unit who were on the spot were taken by surprise, but from Goldfuss' viewpoint it looks as though the noise was one of the goals. He has always been considered an independent, out-of-the-box officer, and one who harbors a great fondness for military history.
In 2003, he was brought from the naval commandos to be in charge of the Nahal infantry brigade's reconnaissance unit. Three of his troops were killed in a clash in the West Bank in the course of taking into custody wanted men from Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
When I was embedded in the young captain's unit in an operation in Jenin, he said he would not allow psychologists to take part in conversations with combat troops. Handling mourning, he maintained, is the commander's task. One psychologist wrote an angry letter to Haaretz – the brother of Yehuda Fuchs, who is now head of Central Command and Goldfuss' direct superior.
The March 1995 team of Shayetet 13 – the naval commandos – produced three outstanding officers, all of them presently army brigadier generals or navy rear admirals: Goldfuss, IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari and Tal Politis, chief of the navy's fleet. Hagari and Politis previously commanded Shayetet 13. Goldfuss' trajectory in the military was somewhat different: He served as commander of the Nahal Brigade and as chief Infantry and Paratroops officer.
The IDF chief of staff, Herzl Halevi, is certainly not pleased that another IDF spokesperson has sprung up from the same naval commando team. He has summoned Goldfuss for a clarification about exceeding the boundaries of his task, but no one is about to give him the boot. The IDF is not the U.S. armed forces, where a veteran general like Stanley McChrystal was fired for criticism he was quoted as having made by Rolling Stone magazine.
Similarly, when Brig. Gen. Erez Gerstein, the commander of the liaison unit with Lebanon, assailed the Four Mothers movement in an interview he gave on the roof of an outpost in southern Lebanon in 1998, his superiors made do with a light tap on the back of the hand. (Gerstein was killed less than a year later, when his convoy hit an arena of explosive devices planted by Hezbollah.)
Goldfuss' remarks drew emotional, positive reactions in the press on Thursday. A problematic pattern has been created here, which the media is encouraging while falling into the trap of populism. As it is, it's convenient for the right to portray the vast debacle of the October 7 terrorist attack as the fault of the senior command level in the IDF and Shin Bet, whose personnel are described as a group of elderly, tired horses.
They are contrasted with the galloping, kicking horses – the division commanders who led the conquest of the northern and central Gaza Strip. The fact that some of the latter are religiously observant, or came from the religious community, has made the emphasis on the contrasts between the two groups even more pronounced.
In practice, an average of three to four years separates the brigadier generals from the major generals above them. Both groups shared the same policy regarding Hamas and Gaza, and were partners in the mistaken conception that Netanyahu promoted. Nor is the background all that different. Halevi and former Southern Command chief Eliezer Toledano are both products of religious educational institutions, like half of the division commanders.
In the end, it's the same army and same senior command, for good and for ill. The majority of the top ranks will have to retire down the line in the war, but an arrogant approach to Hamas was visible before the war in the intermediate levels as well – and it's not certain that the army has weaned itself from that viewpoint even today.
As in other aspects of discipline and values in combat, it appears that in the midst of the rumble of war, the chief of staff is finding it difficult to control everything that happens below him. More than five months into the fray, the IDF is still in a state of vertigo, and the media mostly defends it, because everything is measured from the perspective of Bibi yes/Bibi no.
Another instance of indiscipline was recorded on Thursday, when the intelligence officer of Southern Command, who holds the rank of colonel, was compelled to resign because he had a love affair with a female officer who was under his command amid the war in Gaza. Regrettably, this is a phenomenon that is still somewhat prevalent in the army, but in this case another question crops up: Where the hell did he find the time?
Rafah threat
In the meantime, on the ground, the fighting in Gaza is in something of a waiting mode. The main battle is taking place in the center of the Strip, in the Hamad neighborhood. This is the Qatar-built section in northwest Khan Yunis, which the IDF entered nearly two weeks ago. Concurrently, limited raids are being conducted in the northern part of Gaza. In these operations, hundreds of armed militants from Hamas are being killed, and this week was no exception.
But at the moment, none of this seems to be having a great effect on breaking Hamas' will to go on fighting, even if only in small military frameworks. The combat there is taking place alongside an Israeli defense effort focusing on the West Bank and the seamline, during the month of Ramadan. This week saw a significant increase in attempts to perpetrate terrorist attacks, together with rising tension over the arrangements for the entry of Muslims to the Temple Mount for prayers.
The U.S.-based Politico website reported on Thursday that the Biden administration will consider supporting an Israeli operation in Rafah, if Israel will make do with a focused effort and refrain from conquering the entire city. That report came in the wake of public statements by President Joe Biden warning Israel against an uncoordinated move in Rafah, and calling on it to ensure that the more than one million Palestinian civilians who are crowded into the city will not be harmed.
It's not certain that a real way exists to strike meaningfully at Hamas in Rafah without conquering the city. In any event, contrary to the official Israeli declarations, the IDF apparently does not yet possess the ability to take immediate action in Rafah.
Many weeks will be required to evacuate the population, and as this column has noted, the IDF will have to allocate large forces for the task. They are slated to come from regular-army units which at the moment are not deployed in the southern Strip and from the reserves, most of whose members have been discharged.
The main military achievement of the recent past is still in doubt – namely, the assassination of Marwan Issa, the No. 3 man in the Hamas hierarchy in Gaza, who was apparently killed in an air force bombing operation in the Nuseirat refugee camp at the beginning of the week. Israeli intelligence doesn't yet have confirmation of Issa's death, so caution is being exercised here.
The major change that occurred this week relates to the humanitarian aid for Gaza, which was considerably expanded under U.S. pressure. Under an American dictate, Israel allowed aid to be air-dropped and now also the creation of a maritime route, which is due to be consolidated next month with the construction of an American floating dock on the Strip's northern coast.
Rear Adm. Hagari this week told foreign correspondents that Israel intends "to flood the area with supplies." Meanwhile, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant tried to set in motion a move that would allow for the involvement of the Palestinian Authority, or of Fatah personnel from Gaza, in receiving the aid in the north, where Hamas' hold remains relatively weak. But Netanyahu is torpedoing this.
The negotiations on a hostage deal did not make significant progress this week, but the issue is not totally deadlocked. The U.S. missed the target date it had set – March 11, the start of Ramadan – for which they blame mainly Hamas' obduracy. It's also possible that the (justifiably) increased aid is serving Hamas by reducing the pressure by the Gaza population to arrive at a settlement that will stop the fighting.
But Washington still has two levers with which to put pressure on Hamas, via the mediators, Qatar and Egypt. Qatar hosts Hamas' leadership abroad and injects funds into Gaza; Egypt controls the back entrance to the Strip, via the Rafah Crossing, and perhaps also via tunnels that were dug beneath the border. It's possible that more use of these pressure points would erode Hamas' resistance to a deal and would, after all, lead to progress being made during Ramadan.
Netanyahu's repeated threat to launch an operation in Rafah serves two purposes. The declared one relates to advancing a hostage deal: if Egypt, the U.S. and the Palestinians are fearful of an IDF invasion of Rafah, perhaps there is an opening for flexibility to achieve an agreement. But at the same time, Netanyahu gains time in this way. Endless occupation with the question of a possible invasion of Rafah distances the end of the war and sidetracks the public and political discussion about the investigation of the failures that made possible Hamas' terrorist attack on October 7.
Hezbollah's steep price
Under the cover of the less heated fighting in Gaza, Israel is stepping up the pressure on Hezbollah in Lebanon. The attacks at the beginning of the week in the Bekaa Valley took place almost 90 kilometers (56 miles) from the border and struck military sites.
Israel believes it's still operating below the bar of a full-scale war and is letting Hezbollah calculate its response in a way that wards off a major confrontation.
At the same time, the maneuver room of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is constantly shrinking. It's likely that in his discussions with his Iranian financiers, a certain question is being asked more forcefully: Wouldn't it be better for Hezbollah to dictate events instead of waiting for an Israeli decision on if and when to launch a war?
Lebanese Army soldiers stand next to a destroyed car in Tyre, Lebanon, after an Israeli drone strike on Wednesday.Credit: Mohammad Zaatari/AP
In an article for the UAE-based newspaper The National, Michael Young, an analyst at the Beirut-based Carnegie Middle East Center, maintains that Hamas' October 7 attack inflicted a disaster on Gaza. If Israel ultimately completes the conquest of the Strip, the organization will also have failed to achieve its goal of foiling a normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia. And Sinwar also tried to strengthen Hamas vis-à-vis the PA and entrench his standing in the internecine power struggle, Young notes.
When Nasrallah decided to join the campaign partially, the result was serious damage to the villages of southern Lebanon and the killing of dozens of Lebanese civilians and hundreds of Hezbollah fighters, Young adds. Was the price justified?
According to Young, Hezbollah has paid a steep price to preserve the semblance of a united "axis of resistance" against Israel. Iran gained, but its Arab proxies have paid a heavy price. Uniting the fronts turned out to be a risky strategy for Lebanon. The only goal here is to project Iranian power, and Nasrallah grasped this.
"The core concerns of Hamas and Hezbollah have been kicked out of joint because of Iran's priorities," Young writes, adding: "With Hamas and Hezbollah both prisoners of a conflict in which they've embarked, their only path out of their dilemma is to return to the situation prevailing before October. There are obvious costs with such an attitude, since it will lead their followers to seriously question whether their sacrifice was necessary."
Violence and deterrence
Israel is treading water militarily, but that's hardly the case politically. After more than five months, Netanyahu looks to be recovering. The polls don't show a significant change in his favor, but, with all due respect, he's like Hamas and its survival in Gaza. The very fact that he's holding on to power can be considered an achievement.
It's likely that if polls had been conducted in the week of October 7, the overwhelming majority of Israelis would have replied that Netanyahu has to go because of the debacle – and this would have happened. In the end, Netanyahu rebounded from his state of shock and returned to the survival ploys he's so good at.
The most significant development in his favor this week was the split of Benny Gantz's National Unity Party. The departure of Gideon Sa'ar and three more lawmakers stabilizes the hard-right/ultra-Orthodox coalition at 68 of the Knesset's 120 members, very far from the realm of risk.
Key now is the debate on the composition of the war cabinet. Sa'ar demands a place in that body, which Gantz prevented him from getting when the National Unity Party joined the coalition four days into the war. Gantz has already announced his opposition to Sa'ar's request.
If Netanyahu brings Sa'ar in and thereby strengthens his majority in the war cabinet, he will have violated the coalition agreement with Gantz. Because Gantz has made his opposition to the move public, bringing Sa'ar in will be a clear poke in the eye that could show that Netanyahu is trying to maneuver Gantz out of the wider emergency cabinet.
At the same time, it's hard to see far-right ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir agreeing to Sa'ar's entry into the war cabinet without also being brought in. (And Netanyahu originally created the war cabinet to keep those two away from decision-making.)
Ben-Gvir, who contrary to some predictions isn't hurrying to leave the government, is also helping Netanyahu in another way. In recent weeks it has become clear that he has completed his takeover of the police, who are now operating with great violence both in suppressing unrest in Arab East Jerusalem and imposing fear on Jewish demonstrators in Tel Aviv.
The authorities' approach to the demonstrations for the release of the hostages in Gaza, and certainly to the attempts to renew the protests on Tel Aviv's Kaplan Street to topple the government, is constantly escalating. This appears to be happening on instructions from above, with the full subordination of the police to the minister's policy. Above all, this is a blow to freedom of _expression_ and the right to demonstrate, but it could also have long-term implications when it comes to deterring Netanyahu's opponents.
Abroad, Netanyahu's situation is incalculably more difficult. The Americans hit him bad this week when the annual national intelligence assessment included a forecast that the domestic protest against Netanyahu would intensify. It's not clear if this came from high up. Either way, the prime minister responded, under the guise of a "senior political source," with a direct attack on Biden.
U.S. President Joe Biden arriving for an event in Saginaw, Michigan, on Thursday.Credit: Brendan Smialowski/AFP
The administration has maintained a steady trickle of protests and insults, with the American media publishing almost daily reports about sanctions being considered against Israel – from no longer vetoing hostile resolutions at the UN Security Council to slowing down security aid.
Few noticed that when Biden said he wouldn't stop sending defensive aid to Israel such as missiles for Iron Dome, which are partially manufactured in the United States, the implication was that he's considering restrictions on the export of offensive weapons. In the face of Republican opposition, the administration is still trying to advance a huge package of security aid for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan.
But the true danger seems to come from a leader most Israelis would like to see reelected – according to a Channel 12 News poll – Donald Trump. The 45th president's ever starker messages against aid for Ukraine, a country he detests (not to mention his admiration for Vladimir Putin), don't bode well for Israel either. Israeli defense officials are well aware of the danger but are making sure to say nothing in public.
In the run-up to November 5, the nadir in Netanyahu's relations with Biden is obvious. It's doubtful it has been this bad since the loan-guarantee crisis between George H.W. Bush and Yitzhak Shamir at the start of the '90s. This week, in response to the American efforts to advance a two-state solution, Netanyahu said that most Israelis stand with him in the dispute with the United States.
That's only partially true. Israelis have indeed veered to the right in their opinions about the conflict with the Palestinians, under the shock of Hamas' barbarity on October 7 and the sweeping support for the massacre in the West Bank. With the images of the massacre lodged so powerfully in the collective memory, few will agree to take a risk and support additional withdrawals in the West Bank.
But Gaza, in the long run, is another story. When it becomes clear how much the dispute with Washington is hurting Israel's economy and security, and when it becomes clear that the whole argument revolved around a U.S. request for Israel to agree to limited involvement by the PA in Gaza, Netanyahu might find himself in a minority on this issue as well.