Sheikh Muhammad Al Faris Al Abdulrahman Al Tayy, sheikh of the Arab
Tayy tribe in Syria and a former member of the Syrian People’s Assembly,
died in Damascus in 2021 aged 74 years as a result of complications
arising from Coronavirus [photo credit: shaamtimes]
Moscow rules
Qamishli city was divided up between the NDF and the YPG, but
co-existence was not easy. The NDF’s penchant for warlordism meant that
kidnapping civilians and dealing drugs were acceptable side hustles and
taking pot shots at Kurdish asayish checkpoints was considered a smart way to maintain relevance with Damascus.
Everything changed in 2015 when the YPG formed the nucleus for the
US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and Russia joined the war and
established a presence at Qamishli airport. The NDF faced a double
whammy: overt US support for the SDF umbrella organisation, and covert
Russian support for the YPG core.
For the Tayy, Russian influence in northeast Syria was particularly
pernicious. Despite being part of the US-allied SDF, the YPG also
maintained close coordination with the Russian military. This helped
somewhat to shield it (and the SDF) from regime and Turkish attacks,
while drawing the Kurds closer to the Russian orbit. As part of
Russia-sponsored coordination efforts between the regime and the YPG, a
permanent liaison room was established at Qamishli airport to arbitrate
disputes. Instead of advocating for the regime interest, however,
Russian generals tended always to rule in favour of the YPG. This
diminished the regime and gave rise to a faction within the YPG that is
pro-Russia and anti-NDF.
Not helping the Tayy’s relations with Moscow were the NDF’s
clandestine links with Tehran. It was long suspected that the Tayy were
deliberately agitating against the YPG in Qamishli on orders from the
IRGC in order to provoke a US-Russia clash. Being a paramilitary force
with a poor reputation, the NDF made a useful sacrificial lamb in
Moscow’s northeastern power plays. In April 2021, the YPG was given a
green light to move against the NDF. Five days of clashes later, the
Russian military police mediated a truce that saw the NDF evacuate the
city for good. The Tayy lost their fight with the Kurds and were
dangerously exposed.
Iran’s embrace
With the regime forced to throw the NDF under the bus, most ordinary
Tayy reconciled themselves to life under the Autonomous Administration.
Some pro-opposition figures within the tribe took the offer of US
security guarantees to return to Qamishli in 2023 after having been
banished by the regime and the YPG. The old Tayy elite – the chief and
his inner circle – remained staunchly pro-regime but they were under no
illusions. “The Syrian government today is just a pawn moved by Russia
and Iran,” was how one Tayy notable put it. For lack of alternatives,
the elite went for broke and threw in its lot with Iran.
Ten kilometres southeast of Qamishli along the M4 highway is a
sprawling Hezbollah base that is home to an estimated 1,000 Tayy
fighters, almost all ex-NDF. They are now trained and equipped by the
Lebanese group as well as by Saraya al-Khorasani of the Iraqi Popular
Mobilisation Forces (PMF.) The base is one of several operated by
Hezbollah in the northeast that US Special Forces patrols routinely
drive past several times a week. Tolerating Iran's presence in the
northeast is a price the US must pay for maintaining calm there; while
for Russia, having Iranian-backed anti-US forces is convenient, as long
as any violence occurs well away from Qamishli. The Tayy fighters’ area
of military operations has meanwhile shifted much further south: to Deir
Ezzor province, where the IRGC faces off against the US/SDF and Islamic
State. The Tayy never favoured fighting away from home, but hard times
call for compromise.
The Tayy leadership also underwent changes. Dari, the pro-Iran son of
Mohammad al-Faris, succeeded his father as chief in 2021. With other
chiefs, like Mahmoud al-Hasnawi of the Jubour, he formed an anti-SDF
tribal council to liaise with tribes across the border in Iraq. The aim
is to work towards opening a northern logistical route between the two
countries to ease pressure on an Iran-controlled border crossing further
south, at Bukamal, scene of repeated US and Israeli air strikes on IRGC
arms shipments. Iran also figures that in the event of a US military
withdrawal from northeast Syria, the Tayy would be useful assets to take
on the YPG/SDF and help counter any possible Turkish incursion.
It is said that Iran’s co-option of Tayy fighters is ideologically
predicated on the tribe having strongly supported Ali against the
Umayyads in the first Muslim civil war of 656-661. A Tayy notable
suggests the reality might be more mundane: “With a monthly salary of
1.8 million SYP (US$140), a young man can buy a motorbike, a phone, and
drugs.”