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By SCOT MARCIEL
Hello China Watchers! Our U.S. host Phelim Kine is off this week. So please join me in welcoming your guest host for today, Scot Marciel, a former principal deputy assistant secretary for East Asia and the Pacific at the State Department. He also served as a U.S. diplomat in the Philippines and several other Southeast Asian countries. And he is the author of “Imperfect Partners: The United States and Southeast Asia.” Scot’s currently a fellow at Stanford University and an adviser at BowerGroupAsia.
Over to you, Scot! — Heidi Vogt, national security editor, POLITICO
SHOWDOWN AT THE SIERRA MADRE: The Sierra Madre, a World War II-vintage vessel slowly rusting on a small shoal some 120 miles off the coast of the Philippines, has become the hottest flashpoint in the contested waters of the South China Sea. The ship and its small Marine garrison are at the center of an increasingly tense faceoff between the Philippines and China — both of which claim sovereignty over the surrounding waters. Those tensions are likely to be front and center in a trilateral summit in Washington next month between President Joe Biden, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.
A dispute going back years. Beijing insists much of the South China Sea is Chinese territory, including Second Thomas Shoal where the Sierra Madre sits. To back that claim Beijing began in 2013 to occasionally block resupply missions to the Sierra Madre and has demanded that the Philippines tow the ship away.
Now becoming an ocean of trouble. Over the past year, China has dramatically raised the stakes by deploying more vessels to aggressively and consistently block Philippine resupply missions. The confrontations have become fraught. Earlier this month, Chinese Coast Guard vessels pummeled Philippine ships with water cannons, causing a collision between opposing ships that injured several Filipino sailors. That prompted the State Department to publicly remind China that the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty applies to these contested waters. Beijing has responded by blaming the U.S. for stoking tensions in the region.
U.S.-China cliffhanger. The tensions around the Sierra Madre are more than a territorial dispute between Manila and Beijing. They and other contested areas in the South China Sea are a test of wills that pits the Biden administration’s commitment to its Indo-Pacific Strategy, which rallies allies and partners to defend what it calls the “rules-based order,” against Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s aggression in the region. And if open military conflict breaks out between China and the Philippines, that could suck in the U.S. and its regional allies.
What to expect in April: The April trilateral summit is likely to produce renewed commitments for U.S. and Japanese security cooperation with the Philippines along with language backing Manila’s stance, though it won’t necessarily result in specific initiatives on Second Thomas Shoal. Beijing is likely to respond by blaming all three countries for raising tensions.
What hasn’t worked: The Philippines has an international ruling to point to in backing up its claims – the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea ruled against China’s claims in 2016. That was part of a broader U.S.-backed strategy to raise the reputational costs to Beijing for its aggressive behavior, while bolstering Manila’s capacity to monitor and patrol its waters. But China rejected the tribunal’s decision and instead intensified efforts to assert control over Second Thomas Shoal and other disputed areas.
What Manila is trying now: Under President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., the Philippines has embarked on a strategy of “assertive transparency.” That has included inviting journalists to join resupply missions to record aggressive Chinese actions. It also has accelerated implementation of a U.S.-Philippine defense agreement that allows U.S. forces to deploy to several Philippine bases. And the Marcos government has signed security agreements with the European Union, France and India and is pursuing similar deals with Japan, France and Canada.
Heightened danger: Still, Xi’s domestic credibility may depend on him sticking to his declaration that China won’t accept the arbitration panel’s ruling.
“We should be very worried,” about the potential for armed conflict, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs Wallace “Chip” Gregson said in an interview. “It may not make sense in our way of thinking for Xi Jinping to get more aggressive and more kinetic in the South China Sea and in the East China Sea, but we’re not inside his head and we’re not inside his government, So we don’t know what pressure he’s under or what his logic pattern is.”