Israel's 'Multinational Force' Pitch for Postwar Gaza Is Little More Than Wishful Thinking
"The discourse of the occupation's leaders concerning the possible formation of an international or Arab force to manage the Gaza Strip is illusionary. Any force that enters the Strip is not welcome and will not be accepted. Any such force will be regarded as an occupying entity and will be dealt with accordingly. We appreciate the position held by Arab countries that refuse to participate in this plan."
This was the statement issued on behalf of the "Surveillance Committee of the National and Islamic Forces" which Hamas published Saturday in Beirut. Hamas' statement came in response to reports saying that Defense Minister Yoav Gallant discussed with his American counterpart, Lloyd Austin, the possibility of establishing an Arab Force that will manage the Strip and that three undisclosed Arab countries have agreed to participate in such a move.
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This idea isn't new. The option of forming a multinational Arab force was discussed in November, during U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's visit to the region and was met with the same reaction by Hamas.
Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi also clarified then that Jordan has no intention of sending its forces into Gaza. Egypt and Saudi Arabia responded in like – announcing that they would not participate in such a move. It's doubtful that anything has changed since. According to the responses received in the last two days from the latter three countries, it's hard to conceive that anytime soon – if indeed anytime at all – Arab militaries armed with U.S. weapons will govern the Strip.
To the extent that there's an "Arab consensus" concerning Gaza's management, it relies on the claim that the Palestinian Authority or any Palestinian body agreed upon by the Palestinian leadership hold the legitimacy to do it. Here also lies the heart of the dispute between the American position – which tries convincing Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to agree to have the PA manage the Strip – and Israel, which vetoes any possibility of the PA controlling both Gaza and the West Bank.
This isn't only because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu considers the PA as just another terrorist entity that is, in essence, no different from Hamas, but mainly because a Palestinian government that unites the West Bank with the Gaza Strip will legitimate the establishment of a Palestinian State. After all, this was the threat against which Israel's long-term strategy was conceived and which fostered Hamas' regime in Gaza, serving as a barrier against the PA and the PLO from being considered the sole representatives of all Palestinians.
However, if at the beginning of the war the discussions between the U.S. and Israel about postwar Gaza sounded less urgent, and President Biden's vision concerning the two-state solution seemed like a slogan designed to satisfy the Palestinian and Arab demand for a "balanced" position, the horrifying reality in Gaza has changed it.
The humanitarian crisis, which in other wars such as in Syria, Sudan or Yemen, was secondary if not marginal, turned out to be a crucial strategic minefield in the current Gaza war and dictated how the war eventually unfolded. It destroyed Israel's international status and did much of the same to the United States, especially in the Middle East. Now it seems there's no possibility of separating the necessary effort of providing aid to Gaza's approximately 2.3 million residents and coming to an agreement concerning who will manage it.
Mahmoud Abbas isn't alone in his claim that any PA rule over Gaza would require international – mainly American – support. The same is demanded by all the relevant Arab countries. This position, however, isn't much different from the American one, which holds that the United States will continue delivering aid to Gaza, establish the temporary port and pressure Israel to open more border crossings to increase the scope of aid entering the Strip.
However, American forces won't be the ones entering. What works best for Washington is also good for Cairo, Riyadh and Amman. From the perspective of the Arab countries, even if they agree to send troops to Gaza, the authority on the ground should be that of the PA, which should "invite" their involvement for it to be legitimate.
There's no certainty that even if Abbas does ask for assistance that these countries would immediately comply. Because, unlike multinational forces in other parts of the world such as in the Balkans and Africa, an Arab force that arrives in the Strip while still under Israeli control will be seen as aiding the occupation and working with the United States to dissolve the PA's legitimacy. This only shows how unrealistic it would be for Israel or the United States to become the source of authority for the invitation of Arab forces into Gaza.
The issue is that despite Abbas' recent statements, in which he emphasized that the PA is capable of "standing up to the task" of managing Gaza, these claims still need proof. In the PA military training centers in the West Bank, recruits continue to train in the use of protest dispersal methods. But for about a year now, they haven't received live ammunition for training, their budgets are poor and their instructors' salaries are only partially paid.
Mahmoud Abbas in the swearing in ceremony of the new Palestinian government in Ramallah, on Sunday.Credit: Mohamad Torokman/ Reuters
The commander of the PA security forces training center in Jericho, told the Washington Post in March that about 400,000 bullets for pistols are being held in Jordan for Israel's approval and that other training and combat equipment is also being delayed.
According to the Washington Post, the PA has approximately 35,000 conscripts serving in policing and administrative roles throughout the West Bank. Before Hamas took over the Strip in 2007, the PA deployed about 26,000 security personnel in Gaza. Recently, with U.S. backing, the PA re-examined its lists of security personnel in Gaza and reached a number ranging from 2000 to 3000 who are fit for duty, but it's not clear how many of them are still alive.
Talking to the Washington Post, the commander in Jericho added that if he gets the technical capabilities, the needed logistics and the political decisions that would support him, the option of being deployed in Gaza can be discussed.
None of this has been settled yet. Even if a political decision is made to allow an armed Palestinian force to enter Gaza, one can only imagine the complexity of the needed coordination with the IDF. This would include, among many other challenges, the establishment of rules of engagement accepted by both sides, movement routes and rules of engaging Hamas members and other terrorist groups.
This will all be needed for the immediate purpose of delivering humanitarian aid to the Strip, before proceeding to rebuilding houses, hospitals, schools and essential infrastructure. This whole enterprise will become much more complex, to the point of being impossible, if Saudi, Jordanian and Egyptian forces also arrive in the Strip.
In international military coalitions established by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, it was clear who was the "supreme commander." In Gaza, however, it's hard to imagine that Saudi or Egyptian forces would agree to be instructed by an Israeli general. These difficulties play well into the hands of Israel, which – as Netanyahu said – intends to stay in Gaza "as long as it takes," without a time limit and without a road map to ending the war.