[Salon] Saudi Arabia and a Slow Boat to China



Saudi Arabia and a Slow Boat to China

Summary: by fostering close tech ties with Beijing, Riyadh risks falling victim to US sanctions aimed at cutting China off from state-of-the-art semiconductor technology to the detriment of Mohammed bin Salman’s vision for Saudi Arabia.

We thank our regular contributor Alastair Newton for today’s newsletter. Alastair worked as a professional political analyst in the City of London from 2005 to 2015. Before that he spent 20 years as a career diplomat with the British Diplomatic Service. In 2015 he co-founded and is a director of Alavan Business Advisory Ltd. You can find Alastair’s latest AD podcast, Oil: the long good-bye here.

In late February, a combination of the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) 26-29 February biennial ministerial meeting and the possible return of Donald Trump to the White House triggered a flurry of articles on — seemingly unremittingly gloomy — prospects for the global trading system in general and China/US trade relations in particular. The two focal points of these articles were the ‘big picture’ of China’s efforts to move away from export dependency primarily on Europe and the US and Mr Trump’s threat to impose across-the-board tariffs of 60 percent on imports from China.

By concentrating more or less exclusively on the ‘big picture’, the commentariat collectively missed two key points. First, highlighting (as the FT’s James Kynge put it in a 26 February op-ed) Beijing’s “main strategy” of capitalising “on ties with the ‘global south’ fostered through its $1tn Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).…,” effectively underplayed the potentially critical role which at least a majority of China’s BRICS partners, including the new members such as Saudi Arabia, will need to play if Beijing is to realise its vision of “an alternative trade architecture that is insulated from US influence and centred upon the developing world.” Second, and even more importantly, by seemingly focusing more or less exclusively on trade in goods, the media failed even to mention how sanctions imposed by the US and (albeit often reluctantly) its allies on China since October 2022 are driving a bifurcation of technology standards worldwide with both economic and geopolitical implications which go far beyond the tech sector.

Burgeoning tech sector cooperation between Saudi Arabia and China was the subject of an FT article by Eleanor Olcott just one week earlier. Therein, Ms Olcott wrote as follows of Chinese tech companies looking to invest in the Kingdom:

In some cases, Chinese companies have to share technical expertise with their new Saudi partners…. The Saudi strategy echoes the tactics of local governments in China towards foreign companies decades ago, granting market access in exchange for training local teams and investment.


Saudi Minister of Communications and Information Technology Eng. Abdullah Al-Sawaha unveiling the manufacture of the first Saudi-made smart chip at a technology conference in Dammam in 2021 [photo credit: Saudi Federation for Cybersecurity, Programming and Drones]

Superficially, Chinese investment in its tech sector in return for access to Chinese IP is a good move by Saudi Arabia. However, Ms Olcott is correct to acknowledge that the “marriage between [China and Saudi Arabia] on tech deals carries risks for the kingdom….” Nevertheless, by offering little by way of elaboration, Ms Olcott is doing her readers a disservice consistent with much of the media's failure to understand the true impact of US tech sanctions against China.

As I posted on the Arab Digest Facebook page on 20 February, one of the principle US aims, successfully achieved to date, is to deny China access to lithographic machines which use Extreme Ultraviolet (EUV) to manufacture microchips, technology in which the Dutch company ASML pretty much has a global monopoly. EUV is a prerequisite for manufacturing the advanced 3nm and 2nm chips dominated by Taiwan’s TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company), and even commercially viable 5nm and 7nm chips.

It is the case that Huawei's Mate 60 Pro mobile phone, launched late last year, runs a 7nm chip manufactured by China’s Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC); but this depends on outdated Deep Ultraviolet (DUV) which is expensive in any case and has waste rates up to 70 percent through faulty chips meaning that state subsidies are a sine qua non. In short, the Mate 60 Pro is principally a politically-driven project intended to persuade the world that China can do 'state-of-the-art' despite US sanctions. The reality is that it cannot.

This being said, there are two related caveats to this.

First, China may manage to develop EUV technology on its own as it doubles down on its xinchuang project which aims to replace foreign suppliers of, inter alia, semiconductor technology with domestic ones. However, given the extreme and increasing secrecy which surrounds Chinese research, one can only speculate.

Second, we need to be careful about Xi Jinping’s definition of ‘self-sufficiency’ and how soon it can be realised.  Christopher Thomas and Sarah Kreps note in a 26 January essay for Foreign Affairs:

Because technology competition is not just a race between two countries or two sets of companies, it will not be won by a government lab or a company delivering singular, specific technological capabilities. The mark of a successful technology is that it is delivered as a product or service to thousands of businesses or millions of consumers. Achieving this scale requires an ecosystem of companies working together…. The Chinese government is starting to cater to its global tech ecosystem rather than focus only on its national technology industry. The incentives built into the Digital Silk Road initiative, as well as loan guarantees and subsidies for technology purchases, are encouraging foreign governments across Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East to adopt Chinese technologies…. For countries with ambitions to advance their digital and AI technologies, Chinese financing and foundational Chinese technologies are a welcome solution.

Thus, not least thanks to cooperation with the likes of Saudi Arabia, we should assume that China will achieve important technological breakthroughs at some point. However, as Don Weinland wrote in The Economist on 13 November, this: “…is likely to take many years — and TSMC will continue to race ahead in the meantime.”

So what has all this got to do with Frank Loesser’s 1945 song On a slow boat to China? Most frequently, and based on the Loesser lyrics, the idiom is taken today simply to mean a long, slow journey to a desirable destination, in the Saudi case the destination is Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s Vision 2030. However, the origin of the title lies in the game of poker where it was used, back in the day, to describe someone who loses “steadily and handsomely.” Putting to one side “handsomely” it is, in my view, this second course to which MbS, together with China’s Helmsman Xi Jinping, risks condemning his country.


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