Even Before It Killed Aid Workers in Gaza, the World Had Run Out of Patience With Israel - Israel News - Haaretz.com
Months after the start of the war against Hamas, Israel faces the possibility of a further dangerous escalation on two fronts. In the Gaza Strip, an airstrike in which the Israel Defense Forces mistakenly killed seven workers of a foreign aid organization will increase the international pressure over the humanitarian crisis. In Lebanon and Syria, Israel hopes that increasing strikes against Hezbollah and Iran will deter them from embarking on a full-scale war. On both fronts, it is hard to discern a clear policy with defined and achievable goals.
All this is accompanied by a serious deterioration in relations with the United States and growing suspicions at home about the considerations of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Rumors have been circulating widely in the past few days in the wake of the medical procedure he underwent and his rather odd public appearance.
But more worrying than his policy – it is hard to understand what Netanyahu wants to achieve. Even his foolish followers are apparently beginning to suspect in their hearts that total victory is merely a slogan printed on their caps and that the prime minister is actually seeking a forever war that will postpone the national settling of accounts for responsibility for the terrible failure of October 7, and possibly delay his criminal trial.
It took less than 24 hours for the last sensational headline – the targeted elimination of Iranian general Hassan Mahdavi in Damascus attributed to Israel – to give way to a new drama: the killing of aid workers in Gaza. More than 30,000 Gazans, mostly civilians, are estimated to have died in the Gaza war, but striking foreigners, aid workers for World Central Kitchen, which, during the war, also distributed meals to needy Israelis, is now causing a major uproar.
The incident is one of several involving the entry of aid, including the death of more than 100 Gazans in the northern Strip in a riot around an aid convoy on February 29. It is hard to bridge the gap between the level of professionalism in the intelligence that enabled a precision strike in Damascus, and the mistaken strike against an aid car in Gaza (not to mention the intelligence failures before the Hamas attack).
The cumulative result of the latest events is already substantial: less patience, even by our Western friends, for continuing Israel's military campaign and the growing demand for increasing aid shipments, especially in light of the reports of starvation and risk of starvation across the Gaza Strip. If Israel had hoped that its control over the entry of the shipments would serve as a means of pressure for the release of the hostages held by Hamas, it has lost this card.
IDF forces at Al-Shifa HospitalCredit: IDF Spokesperson's Unit
The difference between Israel's attitude and that of the international community over continuing the fighting in Gaza is also seen in the operation in Gaza's Al-Shifa Hospital. On Monday, the IDF left the site after completing a two-week operation that killed about 200 Palestinians (according to the army, all or nearly all of whom were terrorists) and the arrest of more than 500 Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists.
The IDF describes a smashing success: the terrorist organizations' operational capabilities have been serious degraded, intelligence was obtained, and meticulous care was taken not to harm patients and medical staff. Shifa is not described as a hospital, but as a center of terrorism where terrorists hid behind civilians using them as human shields.
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The depictions in the global media are utterly different. Doubts are cast on the Israeli claim that all the detainees and those killed were terrorists. Moreover, what is emphasized is the vast destruction at the large hospital, which was almost totally destroyed. Explanations by the IDF Spokesperson's Unit that armed men insisted on continuing to fight inside the medical facilities convince mainly the domestic audience.
Consumers of Western media, if they are still interested in the war, will be exposed to ruins and the signs of fire at Al-Shifa; the cost of renovations will be immense. As far as they and most of their governments are concerned, the October 7 massacre is already forgotten. At the same time, Netanyahu's refusal to show flexibility regarding the inclusion of the Palestinian Authority in day-after arrangements in Gaza place Israel in a position of stubborn rejectionism, which foils any alternative arrangement.
Meanwhile, Israeli diplomatic sources said this week that it appeared that all the political correspondents in the country were simultaneously briefed that the Cairo talks on a hostage deal had achieved the "potential for progress."
They said that Netanyahu slightly broadened the Israeli negotiators' mandate and that there are contacts in an attempt to resolve the main disputes concerning permission for Palestinian civilians to return to the northern Gaza Strip. And yet, these remarks should be taken with the utmost caution. The leak appears to be an attempt to pass the ball into Hamas' court – and so long as the heads of the intelligence agencies are not personally present in the talks in Egypt or Qatar, the chances of real progress do not seem great.
Protesters outside the Lincoln Center on Sunday.Credit: Emil Salman
It is possible to learn more about Netanyahu's positions from the remarks by his foreign media spokesman, Mark Regev, quoted by the news site Ynet on Monday. According to Regev, who spoke with American Friends of Likud, most of the Israeli public does not agree with the demand of most of the hostage families for a "deal at any price." He said, "They [the families] can say what they like. We understand them and their pain, but when Israelis are asked in polls about the idea of any price, they don't agree with that… Is the idea that, because of the captives, we let Hamas win the war? No. The public isn't there."
Risk of losing control
Correspondent Barak Ravid reports that the U.S. was quick to deny responsibility for Sunday's strike in Damascus and notified Iran that it was an Israeli operation, made without prior coordination with Washington. According to the Americans, IDF officers only called them after the planes were in the air and, even then, did not share the fact that the targets of the strike would be so senior. The conclusion is that the Biden administration is very worried about getting stuck in a regional war between Israel and Iran and wants to distance itself from the Israeli policy.
A man standing near the rubble a day after an airstrike on an annex building of Iran's consulate in Damascus on Monday.Credit: Firas Makdesi/Reuters
Tehran has publicly threatened to respond quickly and harshly to the killing of its general, which it blames on Israel. It is now almost forced into a response. In the past, some Iranian attempts to respond to similar assassinations, such as that of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, head of its nuclear program in 2020, failed.
The Iranians and their protégés in Hezbollah will presumably deliberate about the strength of the response, where it will take place and when. Israel has raised the level of alert and security at its representative offices around the world out of concern for a revenge attack. At the same time, a response along the Lebanese and Syrian borders is also possible, as is a strike deep in Israeli territory.
To date, Israel has sought to focus on the war against Hamas in Gaza and avoid an escalation to all-out war in the north. The American administration has also promised to sent presidential envoy Amos Hochstein for another round of negotiations in an attempt to reach a settlement in Lebanon, if and when a cease-fire is achieved in Gaza.
The latest act reflects a significant escalation, apparently in an attempt to shock the Iranians and make them realize that continuing to fire at northern communities is intolerable to Jerusalem. But in the Middle Eastern game of signals and threats, the action is also liable to achieve the opposite result and push the Iranians toward an escalation that will bring the sides closer to the threshold of war. That could definitely happen, even if the sides don't really want it to.